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Abstract 
This dissertation is a case study of the Isleta Pueblos of central New Mexico, the Quapaw 
tribe of northeast Oklahoma, and the Osage Nation of northcentral Oklahoma, and their 
relationship with the federal government, and specifically the Environmental Protection Agency. 
As one of the youngest federal agencies, operating during the Self-Determination Era, it seems 
the EPA would be open to new approaches in federal Indian policy. In reality, the EPA has not 
reacted much differently than any other historical agency of the federal government. The EPA 
has rarely recognized the ability of Indians to take care of their own environmental problems. 
The EPA’s unwillingness to recognize tribal sovereignty was no where clearer than in 2005, 
when Republican Senator James Inhof of Oklahoma added a rider to his transportation bill that 
made it illegal in Oklahoma for tribes to gain primary control over their environmental protection 
programs without first negotiating with, and gaining permission of, the state government of 
Oklahoma. The rider was an erosion of the federal trust relationship with American Indian tribes 
(as tribes do not need to heed state laws over federal laws) and an attack on native ability to 
judge tribal affairs. Oklahoma’s tribes, and Indian leaders from around the nation, worked to get 
the new law overturned, but the EPA decided to help tribes work within the confines of the new 
law. Despite the EPA’s stance on the new law, the tribes continued to try to fight back, as they 
had in the past when challenged by paternalistic federal policy. The EPA treated the Quapaws 
and Isletas in a similar fashion. Thus, the thesis of this study is that the EPA failed to respect the 
abilities of American Indian nations, as did federal agencies of years before, to manage their own 
affairs. Historians have largely neglected the role the EPA has played in recent Indian history 
and are just now beginning to document how deliberate efforts at self-determination have been 
employed by tribes for centuries in America.
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Preface 
A dissertation may only have one name on the cover page, but it is truly the work of 
many. When I went back to graduate school to pursue a master’s degree in history, Ray Wilson, 
my advising professor Fort Hays State, asked me what area of research I hoped to have as a 
focus. Although Dr. Wilson, now retired, had a long career as a historian of American Indian 
history, he let me choose my own path. Bow hunting had become a hobby, and enamored with 
the stereotypes of Indians and the West, I chose Indian history. Under the tutelage of Todd 
Leahy, my master’s thesis advisor at Fort Hays State, it did not take long for my romantic 
stereotypes about Indian peoples to be overturned, as I began studying American Indian legal 
history. I was still fascinated with the environment when I began classes at K-State. My advisor, 
Bonnie Lynn-Sherow, introduced me to the confluence of the stereotypes about Indians and the 
environment. In this way, I came upon a subject that hopefully has left the stereotypes behind, 
but that will be useful in enlightening the public about the struggle that Indians have had in 
keeping their land safe from harm.     
 Donald Fixico has written that it is imperative for non-Indians writing Indian history to 
“think like an Indian.” He argued that scholars should think of Indians as proactive, the makers 
of their own history, not reactive to the stories of others.1 My study illustrates that Indians have 
been proactive throughout their relationship with the United States, especially when seeking to 
control their homelands. After 1970, Indians asked the federal government for control over the 
protection of their lands from a variety of wastes.  
                                                 
1 Donald Fixico, “Ethics and Responsibilities in Writing American Indian History,” in Major Problems in 
American Indian History, 2nd, ed., Albert L. Hurtado and Peter Iverson (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), 8. 
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In this study, I use the terms Indian, Native American, and American Indian 
interchangeably. In consultation with several historians, including those of American Indian 
descent, and in reading Indian source material for years, I have come to understand this 
flexibility in terminology as an accepted practice in writing American Indian history, which in no 
way shows a lack of respect for culture or people.   
Several people have helped me. My advisor, Bonnie Lynn-Sherow, has been patient and 
kind, providing me with amazing support and advice along the way, in addition to reading 
several drafts. My committee consisting of professors Derek Hoff, David Graff, James Sherow, 
and Sue Zschoche, have all read drafts of this study and been supportive and helpful. Michelle 
Nolan has also edited two drafts. Most importantly, my wife, Nikol Nolan, and my daughters, 
Logan and Myka, are amazing and have given me terrific support. While I certainly hope there 
are no errors in this study, if there are, only I am to blame.       
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Introduction 
Since the founding of the United States, the federal government has only reluctantly 
recognized tribal control of tribal land, also known as sovereignty, self-determination, or self-
rule.2 The Self-Determination Era (1970-present) promised to be the era in which American 
Indian tribes could at last forge their own futures. This study considers the role of one federal 
agency, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which began operations on 
December 2, 1970, at the dawn of the Self-Determnination Era, in the period.3 At issue is 
whether the EPA, which has been in charge of mitigating pollution in America since 1970, has 
recognized tribal government control over tribally owned land. In other words, has the EPA 
recognized that American Indians can make decisions about their own land and can protect or 
exploit it as they wish? Some scholars have considered the EPA to be an intermediary between 
sovereign Native peoples and public or private entities.4 For that matter, the EPA has stated that 
it recognizes American Indian sovereignty. In 1983, the EPA’s Indian Work Group stated that “it 
would recognize tribal governments as the primary parties for policy formulation and 
                                                 
2 Dina Gilio-Whitaker, “Indian Self-Determination and Sovereignty,” Indian County Today, assessed 
October 1, 2015, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/indian-self-determination-and-sovereignty-
147025. Gilio-Whitaker provides a convincing argument that the term sovereignty is not appropriate to refer to tribal 
self-determination, as sovereignty refers to the ability of European states with hierarchical structures to rule their 
nations. I use the term sovereignty in this dissertation, because it has been used by native scholars for many years, 
and is still prominent in the literature. In addition, native peoples have seeked the standing that European nations 
have as sovereign nations in the eyes of the federal government, ever since the United States stopped agreeing to 
treaties in 1871. 
3 EPA, “The Guardian: Origins of the EPA,” EPA.gov, spring 1992, accessed October 4, 2015, 
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/guardian-origins-epa. 
4 Darren J. Ranco, “Environmental Risk and Politics in Eastern Maine: The Penobscot Nation and the 
Environmental Protection Agency,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2000; Dan McGovern, The Campo Indian 
Landfill War: The Fight for Gold in California’s Garbage (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995). 
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implementation on Indian lands, consistent with agency standards and regulations. The Agency 
is prepared to work directly with Indian Tribal Governments on a one-to-one basis, rather than as 
subdivisions of other governments.”5 Furthermore, in 2010 former EPA Administrator Lisa 
Jackson created the Offfice of International and Tribal Affairs to ensure that “we approach our 
relationship with the sovereign tribal nations within our own country in the same way we 
approach our relationship with sovereign nations beyond US borders.”6 Despite operating during 
the Self-Determination Era and claiming that it recognizes tribal sovereignty, the EPA has not 
recognized tribal sovereignty, similar to earlier federal agencies.   
There is a small but growing collection of literature about American Indians and 
environmental resource protection, but scholars have not yet answered the question of whether or 
not the EPA has recognized tribal self-determination. The best scholarship on the subject comes 
from anthropologist Darren Ranco, who spent two years in the late 1990s with the Penobscots of 
Eastern Maine. His unpublished dissertation “Environmental Risk and Politics in Eastern Maine: 
The Penobscot Nation and the Environmental Protection Agency” (2002) detailed the 
proceedings in the late 1990s between the Penobscots of Maine and the EPA to set dioxin 
standards for the Penobscot River. Ranco believed that the EPA had the authority to recognize 
tribal self-rule, but in the end was not willing to do so.   
The Penobscot people asked the EPA to force the Lincoln Pulp and Paper Company, 
located north of Penobscot lands, to stop releasing dioxin into the Penobscot River, which runs 
                                                 
5 LaDonna Harris, Stephen M. Sachs, and Barbara Morris, “Honoring Indian Nations’ Sovereignty,” in Re-
Creating the Circle: The Renewal of American Indian Self-Determination, eds. LaDonna Harris, Stephen M. Sachs, 
and Barbara Morris (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 2011), 125-126. 
6 Dave Ryan, “EPA Announces the New Office of International and Tribal Affairs,” accessed September 
13, 2015, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/df3c84313061411f8525740a0057efe1/59b590ea 
7955e143852576e8006137f7!opendocument. 
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south through the Penobscot lands. Dioxin is a poisonous chemical that comes from paper 
processing, specifically the bleaching of paper. The Penobscots agreed to the EPA’s guidelines 
for the chemical dioxin that the agency was going to force the Lincoln Pulp and Paper Company 
to abide by for release into the Penobscot River. The tribe used the river for fishing and other 
tribal needs and thus asked the EPA to enforce tribal guidelines that were more stringent than 
previously agreed upon by the two entities. The Penobscots’ request placed them outside the 
realm of what the EPA usually allowed, as far as tribal input on the question of poison guidelines 
for the river. The EPA has tended to overrule tribes on scientific grounds, and in the Penobscot 
case the EPA saw no scientific reason to enforce the Penobscots’ standards for higher water 
quality. Ranco concluded that the EPA should have been open to rationales outside the Euro-
American realm of information and should have recognized the Penobscot’s ability to choose 
their own standards.7    
Ranco contrasted the Penobscot case study with that of the Isleta Pueblos, who set water 
quality standards for the Rio Grande in the 1990s, to show that the EPA did not treat the 
Penobscots as sovereigns, while the EPA treated the Isletas as sovereigns. Ranco was wrong in 
this case, though. Ranco argued that the Isletas were able to win the battle for water quality 
standards with the city of Albuquerque and the state of New Mexico, because the Isletas took 
ownership of the discussions with the two. Ranco contended the EPA was simply an 
intermediary between the Isletas and the state government of New Mexico and city government 
of Albuquerque. In contrast, according to Ranco, the EPA did not act as an intermediary with the 
Penobscot Tribe and the Lincoln Company, because the tribe was not a sovereign nation under 
                                                 
7 Darren J. Ranco, “Environmental Risk and Politics in Eastern Maine: The Penobscot Nation and the 
Environmental Protection Agency,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2000. 
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the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, which meant that it had given up its power of control 
over Penobscot land to Maine. What Ranco did not realize, though, was that the EPA did not 
treat the Isletas as a sovereign nation, because the Clean Water Act dictated the Isletas’ position 
and the EPA’s position.8 In other words, the EPA did not recognize tribal self-rule in either case. 
Scholars have interpreted the EPA as a benign negotiator in Indian affairs. Dan 
McGovern’s The Campo Indian Landfill War: The Fight for Gold in California’s Garbage 
(1995) argued that the EPA in that case was a well-intentioned middleman. The book detailed the 
attempts by the Campos of San Diego County in the early 1990s to build a waste dump east of 
San Diego. McGovern, a former administrator with the EPA’s Region IX (Pacific Region), 
concluded that both sides of the issue should have compromised over the right of the Campos to 
build a waste dump on their land next to the San Diego suburbs. McGovern cast the EPA as an 
arbitrator in a discussion between two parties of equal status, which was charitable of McGovern, 
but still did not recognize the tribes’ desire for self-rule. McGovern was correct to illustrate, 
although not intentionally, that the EPA did not recognize the long history of the Campos’ 
authority over the disposition of their homelands. McGovern was seemingly not aware of tribal 
self-rule, which was the major flaw of his study, along with the unacknowledged fact that the 
EPA has often chosen sides.9   
Environmental political scientist and historian Daniel McCool and journalist Marjane 
Ambler have missed the important role that the EPA has played in tribal resource development. 
Daniel McCool’s Command of the Waters (1987) argued that iron triangles negatively affected 
tribal water rights. An “iron triangle” is the political science term for relationships among federal 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 104-108. 
9 Dan McGovern, The Campo Indian Landfill War: The Fight for Gold in California’s Garbage (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995). 
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departments, Congressional committees, and constituents that benefits all three entities. Iron 
triangles do not recognize the rights of the tribes to be at the decision making table. According to 
McCool, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was willing to defer to state laws during the early 
twentieth century. It was a conflict of interest for Congress to recognize tribal rights to water, 
because that would get in the way of federal and state irrigation projects. Yet, tribes still pressed 
for their water rights. McCool adeptly illustrated how Congress has often not abided by Supreme 
Court decisions, much as this dissertation illustrates in the case of the Osage Nation and the 
EPA.10 But, McCool failed to include the EPA as further illustration of the ways Congress and 
the EPA did not respect tribal governance over tribal land and water during the Self-
Determination Era.      
McCool’s Native Waters (2002) argued that Indians gained access to more water after 
1970 during the Self-Determination Era, than during the whole of the twentieth century. In the 
late 1970s, non-Indians and the federal government became interested in negotiating with tribes 
over water rights, instead of taking water by simply ignoring tribal treaties. McCool explained 
how numerous tribes gained access to water, such as the Papago Tribe, who won a total of 
66,000 acre feet of surface water, but agreed to limit ground water pumping to just 10,000 acre 
feet annually. In fact, the Army Corps of Engineers actually transferred 9,300 acres of land back 
to the tribes from 1997 to 2002. McCool also mentions that the Corps and the Bureau of 
Reclamation as of 1998 began to seek consultation with tribes, at times, before projects were 
                                                 
10 Daniel McCool, Command of the Waters: Iron Triangles, Federal Water Development, and Indian Water 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987), 231. 
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created.11 In similar fashion, this dissertation illustrates tribal relationships with the EPA, 
especially in the case of the Osage Nation, which McCool did not cover. 
Journalist Marjane Ambler similarly does not mention how the EPA did not recognize 
tribal ownership and authority in Breaking the Iron Bonds (1990), a study of how tribes took 
control of their natural resources during the Self-Determination Era, instead of waiting for the 
federal government to act on their behalf. Among several examples, Ambler detailed the 
establishment of the Navajo Environmental Protection Agency, which worked alongside the EPA 
to regulate energy development on the reservation. Ambler included the EPA as a partner with 
tribes that worked within the guidelines that Congress set forth for tribes.12 A similar discussion 
of cooperating between the EPA and tribes came from LaDonna Harris, Stephen M. Sachs and 
Barbara Morris in their chapter “Honoring Indian Nation’s Sovereignty: Building Government to 
Government Relations Between Tribal Governments and Federal, State, and Local 
Governments,” in Re-Creating the Circle: The Renewal of American Indian Self-Determination, 
also edited by Harris, Sachs, and Morris. Harris, Sachs, and Morris explained that the EPA’s 
efforts through its Indian Work Group in 1983 to recognize tribes as independent nations that 
could be partners with the EPA to protect the environment. Further, through the provision in the 
Water Quality Act of 1987 to treat tribes like states for purposes of setting water quality 
standards, the EPA had become a model of how the federal government should act toward 
tribes.13 The Osage case study in this dissertation details a similar phenomenon where the EPA 
                                                 
11 Daniel McCool, Native Waters: Contemporary Indian Water Settlements and the Second Treaty Era 
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2002), 123-124. 
12 Marjane Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds: Indian Control of Energy Development (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1990), 177-178. 
13 Harris, Sachs, and Morris, “Honoring Indian Nations’ Sovereignty,” 124-128. 
7 
 
partnered with the Osage Nation to further environmental protection and programs. The Osage 
case study also makes it clear, however, that the EPA was not willing to recognize tribal self-
determination. The federal government has continued to hold Indians at bay during the Self-
Determination Era by limiting and circumventing the tribes’ rights to self-determination. 
There has also been a whole category of scholarship about Indians and their relationship 
with the environment, but not necessarily cleaning polluted land. Within the genre of Indians and 
their connection to the environment, which sprouted post-1970 with the rise of environmentalism 
in America, there has existed the overarching question of whether Indians have always illustrated 
ecological knowledge in a modern sense, or whether they have used the land in unsustainable 
ways. In other words, were Indians the first environmentalists?    
The concept that some tribal patterns of sustainable environmental use might save the 
planet is at the heart of Christopher Vescey’s and Robert Venable's edited collection of essays, 
American Indian Environments (1980). Christopher Vescey’s “American Indian Environmental 
Religion” illustrated the sanctity of animals in some tribal religion and bemoaned the use of 
isolated incidences of overkill as examples of a lack of ecological understanding by all Indians. 
For example, even when the Micmacs of the Northeast chose to kill beavers beyond sustainable 
limits, the slaughter did not mean that they were unaware of the damage they were imposing on 
the local ecosystem. It meant that they needed to kill beavers to survive.14 While many people 
stereotype the Indians of centuries ago through a Eurocentric lens, Vescey understood that 
Indians of bygone centuries were in control of their actions. Vescey’s call to accept the goals of 
Indian peoples apart from the non-Indian agenda is certainly a part of this dissertation, which 
                                                 
14 Christopher Vescey, “American Indian Environmental Religion,” in American Indian Environments: 
Ecological Issues in Native American History, ed. Christopher Vescey and Robert W. Venables (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1980), 1-37. 
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builds on the concept that native people can choose their own path by showing how, indeed, 
native peoples have chosen their own path, even in the face of a lack of sovereignty recognition 
by the United States.     
Not long after Vescey’s essay appeared, historian J. Donald Hughes came along with a 
similar concept in American Indian Ecology (1983) that also subscribed to the idea that Indian 
environmental philosophy could save animals and vegetation from destruction. According to 
Hughes, Indians lived in harmony with nature for centuries, which provided for the numerous 
accounts of an unspoiled continent when European explorers arrived. Indians’ appreciation of 
nature was not romantic, but utilitarian. Some native peoples killed animals, but thanked the 
animals, believing that they just shed their skins before going back to their animal villages. Other 
native peoples believed that plants possessed sacred qualities, having to be harvested and 
gathered in ways specific ways. Many tribes did not practice crop rotation, but perfected 
intercropping. They burned for fertilizer and planted nitrogen rich beans, which climbed the corn 
stalks planted right next to the beans. Native peoples planted corn and beans next to squash, so 
the squash leaves could block the sun, and thus inhibit weed growth. Hughes called for non-
Indians to follow the land ethic of Indians in order to survive the problems of environmental 
destruction.15 When considered in conjunction with Ranco’s theory on the Penobscots described 
earlier, Hughes’ argument is powerful, because we see in the last forty years that Indians are not 
able to choose the path to environmental protection that they believe in, especially if it does not 
coincide with EPA science. 
The third important book on the Native American land ethic came twelve years later in 
The Ecocide of Native America: The Environmental Destruction of Native Lands and People 
                                                 
15 Donald J. Hughes, American Indian Ecology (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1983). 
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(1995) by historians Donald Grinde and Bruce Johansen. In addition to English resources, the 
authors used Spanish documents to trace Indian beliefs about the land to argue that Americans 
should follow Indian traditions of land protection. The authors believed that the Indians’ values 
about the earth were the result of their circular way of envisioning time, which contrasted with 
the linear time concepts of the federal government and non-Indians, which were based primarily 
on capitalism and a need for material progress. A prime example of the dangers of non-Indian 
thinking occurred in 1978 on the Navajo reservation, when the largest nuclear melt down in 
American history occurred at Church Rock. Perhaps the disaster could have been averted with 
input from Navajos, who knew there were problems. Non-Indian journalism simply did not care 
to report the Navajo melt down with the same gusto, thus Indian problems were swept away. 
Grinde and Johansen suggested that the environmental crises of the late twentieth century could 
have been cured if the United States and other major world powers followed American Indian 
land practices. The ultimate problem for the authors was that non-Indians have been making 
decisions about land for so long that change is difficult.16 Thus, Indian self-rule is at the heart of 
Grinde’s and Johansen’s book. Indians should be able to choose their own path in terms of 
environmental protection, because, according to Grinde and Johansen, it will be the right path. 
The theory smells of an idealized version of Indian America, not based in the historical reality 
that Indians live in the same capitalist economy as non-Indians forcing tough choices that 
sometimes lead to unsustainable land practices.    
Among the most controversial responses to studies that argue that Indians were the first 
ecologists is anthropologist Shepard Krech III’s The Ecological Indian (1999). He argued that 
                                                 
16 Donald A. Grinde and Bruce E. Johansen, The Ecocide of Native America: Environmental Destruction of 
Indian Lands and Peoples (Santa Fe: Clear Light, 1995). 
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non-Indians could not call Indians ecologists, because Indian beliefs and practices did not mesh 
with modern American scientific concepts of ecology. Krech analyzed several areas of resource 
use considered to be the building blocks of the ecological Indian myth. For example, he believed 
the Eden myth to be false. The Eden myth described early America as wonderful based upon 
sustainable environmental practices of the Indians. Krech argued that the lack of Indian 
population pressure led to an Eden like land when Europeans arrived, not native practices meant 
to be ecologically sound. As for the theory that tribes across the American continent set fire to 
grasslands with the noble intention of rejuvenating the land and improving grazing conditions, 
Krech also disagreed. He illustrated that early aboriginal populations on the American continent 
set fires intentionally to trap animals and did not treat the fires with care. Krech used the example 
of the Flatheads of modern Montana, who let fires burn out of control, which is not ecologically 
responsible due to the modern problems of smoke pollution and the potential to set fire to animal 
habitat.17 Krech’s views are also important for readers of this dissertation, because he has argued 
that many native peoples often act in their own self-interest, and to make ancient cultures the 
poster-children for the environmental movement of the modern era is inappropriate. This 
dissertation builds on Krech’s theme. For instance, in the Osage case study, we see that they 
expressed their sovereign right to have their land cleaned, although they were not asking for the 
oil companies to leave.  
 Among the critics of Krech’s work was Darren J. Ranco, in “The Ecological Indian and 
the Politics of Representation: Critiquing the Ecological Indian and the Age of Ecocide,” in 
Native Americans and the Environment: Perspectives on the Ecological Indian (2007). He 
argued that Krech’s stance was wrong since Indian leaders often used the ecological Indian 
                                                 
17 Shepard Krech, III, The Ecological Indian: Myth and History (New York: Norton, 1999). 
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stereotype as a way to create a discourse that non-Indians understood. Ranco wanted Krech to 
make such arguments within the context of the battles that Ranco faced with the Penobscots 
against the EPA over water quality on their land.18 This dissertation builds on Ranco’s research, 
looking at how the EPA and Indian tribes struggle to find a common discourse, and how the EPA 
has not recognized tribal abilities to make decisions. 
 Another powerful critique of Krech belonged to David Rich Lewis and his article on the 
Skull Valley Goshutes’ modern attempts at building an underground nuclear storage site, which 
appeared in Native Americans and the Environment: Perspectives on the Ecological Indian 
(2007). Lewis incorporated a history of the tribe, one of deprivation, with a discussion of their 
modern needs and battles for federal and state recognition of their right to self-rule. Residents of 
Utah did not want the tribe to have a nuclear storage facility, because they did not want nuclear 
waste in their backyard. Residents of Utah did not realize that Goshute leaders had done 
comprehensive research on the project and did not want a catastrophe either. The Goshutes 
studied modern ecological science, and propelled by their own desire for self-rule, made 
powerful arguments for their future. Lewis’s conclusion is that modern Indians cannot be 
classified as either ecological or not ecological, but instead exhibit both qualities.19 Taken a step 
further, the theoretical discussion of the Indian-as-ecologist illustrates that Indian sovereignty has 
been a threatening concept for non-Indians, because non-Indian political and environmental 
goals do not mesh with the reality that Indians are capable of making their own decisions about 
                                                 
18 Darren J. Ranco, “The Ecological Indian and the Politics of Representation: Critiquing the Ecological 
Indian in the Age of Ecocide,” in Native Americans and the Environment: Perspectives on the Ecological Indian, ed. 
Michael E. Harkin and David Rich Lewis (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 32-51. 
19 David Rich Lewis, “Skull Valley Goshutes and the Politics of Nuclear Waste: Environment, Identity, and 
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land use. The following case studies bring Indian self-determination to light. When we account 
for Indian self-determiantion, we see that the EPA has consistently used non-Indian standards for 
their environmental guidelines, and thus the federal government during the last forty years has 
still not shown support for the decision making power of Indians on environmental issues. 
There is also an extensive collection of scholarship about Indian self-rule that does not 
necessarily revolve around environmental protection. The general thrust of the following 
scholarship illustrates that the United States has not respected the ability of Indians to judge their 
own affairs. The preeminent author of numerous studies on Indian self-rule and self-government 
was the prolific Indian activist and scholar Vine Deloria Jr., whose book Behind the Trail of 
Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence published in 1974, illustrated how the 
federal government had not followed through on its trust responsibility. Deloria wrote that tribes 
should have been recognized as foreign states, as described in the United States Constitution, 
whose ability to run their own affairs had not been respected by the federal government. Deloria 
argued that the federal government should make treaties with Indian tribes again, because it 
would place the United States at the forefront of the first world nations in how it dealt with its 
aboriginal populations. More important, for the federal government to resume treaty-making 
provisions, it would mean that the federal government had finally thrown away the myths and 
stereotypes about Indians and begun respecting the governing abilities of Indian nations.20 
Deloria’s goal to resume treaty making was lofty for 1974, and this dissertation shows that the 
goal has still not been realized, as all tribes living in the United States are still subjected to the 
whims of Congress. 
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Vine Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle’s American Indians, American Justice (1983) is 
dedicated to how various courts in the United States deal with tribes. It is a key book for anyone 
who want to analyze the relationship between the federal government and tribal nations in the 
United States. The authors’ analysis of the Cherokee Cases in which the legal status of Indians 
was established as “domestic dependents” (tribes are sovereign, yet have to abide by federal law) 
is thorough, highlighting that Chief Justice John Marshall’s decisions were both pro and anti-
Indian. The authors also explained that the court was split four ways over the cases, with two 
justices who believed that the tribes had sovereignty as independent nations.21 
A third book of Deloria’s that is important to read to understand Indian sovereignty is 
The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty, authored again with 
Lytle. Deloria claimed that Indians were unique in the world, because they were the only 
aboriginal people still practicing a separate form of government within the boundaries of another 
nation. Within that premise, the authors’ goal is to explain the idea of self-government so that all 
people could differentiate the concept from nationhood. Nationhood, to the authors, was tribal 
government created by the tribe, while self-government was the establishment of government 
structure as understood and approved by the United States as part of the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934. The authors also distinguished between self-determination and self-government for 
the future of Indian life, arguing that the tribes should separate the two ideas. Self-government, 
which by the authors’ definition is modeled after the federal interests, does not necessarily hold 
the key for Indian justice on reservations. Tribal government should look to the elders and the 
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old customs for their answers to legal issues.22 Overall, Deloria’s scholarship mixes a variety of 
academic themes, but from a historical standpoint, the following case studies and analysis do not 
take issue with his concepts, but instead seek to build on his concepts within the scope of the 
Self-Determination Era. This dissertation takes Deloria’s concept of self-rule and shows how the 
federal government, through the EPA, still does not respect tribal self-rule, despite the efforts of 
tribes to exert self-determination in the modern era.  
Another scholar, whose work on Indian legal matters is relevent, is John R. Wunder. His 
“Retained by the People” A History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights (1994) illustrated 
how the Bill of Rights to the Constitution excludes Indians, and what the exlusion means for 
Indians. Wunder covered all the topics that are important for understanding Indian sovereignty, 
including income from gaming and self-determination during the Self-Determination Era. 
Wunder argued that the meaning of self-determination to the federal government and to Indians 
is quite different. The federal government believed that Indians would make some decisions for 
themselves, while Indians held self-determination to represent complete legal and political 
sovereignty, with the federal government honoring all treaties. Wunder illustrated that the federal 
government came up short in honoring the Indian perspective on self-determination. The 
Supreme Court, such as in the case of United States v. Dion (1986), in which the court upheld 
federal endangered species law over tribal religious freedom, rarely has recognized Indians as a 
people protected by the Bill of Rights.23 This dissertation does not contradict Wunder’s 
conclusions, but instead inserts the EPA into the story. While no American citizen is at liberty to 
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Sovereignty (New York: Random House, 1984). 
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pollute, Indians have also been limited in their ability to mitigate pollution on their own terms, 
despite being sovereign nations. 
What about the history of the EPA itself? Scholarship on the EPA has often been 
politically charged. McGovern’s study, mentioned earlier in this section, has been one of the 
better books on the EPA, with its somewhat moderate take on the political aspirations of the 
agency. Political scientists Mark Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas in The 
Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to Clinton (1994) 
made claims of political pluralism (that several entities had power) when discussing the EPA. 
They argued that pluralism, sometimes politically desirable, does not work well within the realm 
of science where crises often need quick and definitive answers. The authors also explain that the 
EPA, from its inception, was a government department with an objective to protect human 
health, not the health of the land. The authors constantly refer to politicians’ responsibility to 
educate the public, yet they leave American Indians out of the group known as the public. 
Interestingly, this study provides a framework for understanding and critiquing the EPA’s 
experiences with tribes, even though there is no mention of tribes. The pluralism that the authors 
argued hurt the decision making process at the EPA also has damaged tribes, and ultimately 
challenges environmental protection.24 This dissertation does not make a statement on the EPA’s 
putative pluralism, but it does illustrate that whatever choices the EPA has made, have been 
made in the effort to interpret federal law.  
Another scholar that has criticized the EPA is history professor E.G. Vallianatos, who 
recently released Poison Spring: The Secret History of Pollution and the EPA (2014). The author 
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used government documents and insider interviews to illustrate how science at the EPA has been 
compromised due to the interference of chemical companies, and acceptance of interference by 
the EPA. Vallianatos, trained in the history of science, worked for the EPA for twenty-five years 
as a program analyst. He signed on with the federal agency in 1979 in the hopes of shaping 
policy decisions, but his idealism eventually turned to disillusionment. One of the author’s major 
issues is that the EPA has political appointees that are often tied to the corporations that the 
agency has tried to regulate. Another problem for the author is that the EPA tolerates small 
amounts of pollution when no pollution should be tolerated at all. Ultimately, the author’s call is 
to stand up against agribusiness and defend the earth.25 This dissertation, essentially, agrees with 
Valliantos, but takes the discussion a step further by applying the evidence to tribes. Again, the 
EPA is a federal agency with bureaucrats who follow federal laws. 
On the other end of the spectrum of scholarship are studies done by think tanks such as 
the CATO institute. Lawyer James V. DeLong’s Out of Bounds, Out of Control: Regulatory 
Enforcement at the EPA (2002) charged that the EPA’s enforcement procedures for carrying out 
federal laws are wholly inadequate based on a concept DeLong calls “the rule of law.” He 
defines the rule of law as law that government is bound by, and therefore is fixed prior to 
carrying out a procedure. All affected bodies understand the law and have necessary warning to 
abide by it. DeLong charged that the EPA has maintained the ability to judge what is legal and 
that it makes the laws that define its powers. Ultimately, DeLong takes issue with the Supreme 
Court’s Chevron standard (described in chapter one of this dissertation) that federal agencies 
should be given deference to interpret federal laws. DeLong’s opinion is that laws should be 
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further interpreted by Congress.26 The major problem with DeLong’s stance is that Congressmen 
have repeatedly argued that they do not have the time to work out the minute details of laws, thus 
the existence of the Code of Federal Regulations. DeLong did not mention the EPA’s 
relationship with the Osage Nation, but his theory would mean that oil corporations would not 
have to abide by Osage law or environmental guidelines to protect reservation lands. 
What most historians, scholars, and EPA officials have failed to articulate clearly is that 
the EPA, through implementation of policies and procedures, interprets federal law. When 
dealing with Indian tribes, the EPA must interpret the Clean Water Act (CWA 1972), the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA 1974), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA 1980), also known as Superfund, due to the 
enormous expenses incurred in soil removal and other remediation procedures that restore the 
land.   
The primary argument of this study is that the United States was effectively disrespectful 
of native ownership of land and resources prior to the Self-Determination Era, and the federal 
government has provided only limited recognition of tribal sovereignty regarding land issues 
during the Self-Determination Era, with the EPA serving as the main executive agency 
interacting with tribal governments over the use of tribal land. As noted earlier, this dissertation 
is one of a handful of evidence-based studies to analyze the EPA’s work with Indians.        
 Before presenting the evidence included in the case studies, chapter one outlines the key 
cases and federal laws that have defined Indian self-rule in the United States. The chapter details 
not only the famous Cherokee Cases of the early nineteenth century, which are the primary basis 
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for the federal trust relationship, but also some lesser-known cases of the twentieth century. 
Ultimately, the reader sees that there has been no clear path to Indian self-determination. Even in 
the Self-Determination Era, federal law and the federal court system have limited Indian self-
rule. 
This study includes three case studies that each investigate one of the three major federal 
laws that govern environmental resource protection and American Indian tribes. By analyzing 
the Isleta Pueblo of New Mexico, the Quapaw of northeast Oklahoma, and the Osage of 
northcentral Oklahoma, the limits and extent of the EPA’s authority with those tribes under 
federal legislation is illustrated.27 Case specific studies provide a more detailed and 
representative overview of the EPA as a federal agency and its relationship with tribes 
nationally. Case studies also connect the recent history of the tribes’ relationships to the EPA to 
culturally consistent, long held traditions and values as a way of demonstrating the power of 
tribal self-identity and governance in shaping and redefining their legal relationship as nations to 
the United States.  
Each case study has its own section, with two chapters. The first chapter of each case 
study begins with the tribes’ experiences with European powers prior to the creation of the 
United States. An analysis of European and tribal contact shows that not only have the Isletas, 
Quapaws, and Osages survived European invasion, but that since each tribe existed as a nation 
prior to the signing of the Constitution, it stands to reason that each tribe has long considered 
itself sovereign. Then, the first chapter of each case study moves to the treaties that each tribe 
signed with the United States, which established the trust relationship with the federal 
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government. Last, the majority of chapters two, four, and six are devoted to the tribes’ 
relationships with the federal government in the twentieth century prior to 1970, which illustrates 
that the federal government was disrespectful of tribal self-rule prior to the formation of the 
EPA, and serves as a comparison for the final chapters about the tribes’ experiences with the 
EPA.      
Chapter Two details the Pueblos’ ability to exert self-determination in the face of 
repeated infringement on their legal rights to self-rule and argues that the federal government 
was disrespectful of Pueblo sovereignty over tribal land prior to 1970. For example, during the 
1920s the Pueblo Land Board, given the responsibility to give land back to the Pueblos, 
shortchanged the Pueblos in its final decisions. Further, during the 1930s, the Interdepartmental 
Rio Grande Advisory Committee worked to provide land for use by the Pueblos, yet did not 
recognize the tribes’ desires involving land use. 
Chapter Three illustrates that the EPA only allowed the Isleta Pueblos to write water 
quality standards for the Rio Grande, because the Isletas were willing to write standards as strict 
as those of the EPA. Even though the EPA approved the Isletas’ standards, the EPA did not treat 
the tribe as an equal partner in making decisions as understood by the tribe. The EPA followed 
the guidelines of the Clean Water Act, which called on the water standards of Indian tribes to 
match federal standards as set by the EPA.    
Chapter Four argues that the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Interior Department (BIA) 
protected and encouraged non-Indian mining leases on Quapaw land, but did not provide the 
Quapaws a voice in the process. The Interior Department struck inferior deals with mining 
companies with the justification that it was better to take lower profits from an established 
company, than to sign a contract for higher profits with a mining company that was new to the 
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mines. The Quapaws continued to ask for better royalty deals from mining and had to pressure 
federal officials for investigations into what mining companies were doing on Quapaw land.  
Chapter Five details the Tar Creek Superfund during the Self-Determination Era and how 
the EPA cleaned the mining areas in Quapaw country in the 1990s, arguing that the EPA limited 
tribal involvement due to the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act. The EPA included the Quapaw tribe in some aspects of the process, but did 
not provide the tribe the money to clean their land, as the tribe’s environmental office desired. 
Chapter Six argues that the federal government marginalized the Osage tribe over the 
entirety of its relationship with them until the Self-Determination Era. This chapter explains the 
creation of the Osage mineral estate and how the BIA answered requests by Osage land owners 
to investigate alleged claims of pollution by oil companies. The BIA was more concerned about 
protecting profits for corporations and, to a lesser extent, profits for the Osages. When individual 
Osages complained of oil pollution to the local BIA office, the BIA’s solution was not to force 
changes to oil drilling practices, but instead to ask for payment from the oil companies to 
compensate landowners. The BIA did not recognize the Osages’ sovereign right to set retribution 
costs. Remarkably, the Osages managed to remain on the land that they had known since the 
beginning of European arrival in North America, even as they continued to work against federal 
misunderstandings of Osage traditional values and legal rights.  
Chapter Seven presents evidence that the EPA was further compromised in its fair 
treatment of the Osages and their concerns about pollution due to Senator James Inhofe’s 
“Midnight Rider,” which was a last minute addition to a transportation funding bill that the 
president signed into law on August 10, 2005. The rider forced tribes to negotiate deals with 
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Oklahoma to gain control of oil waste injection and other environmental programs.28 The Osages 
expected the EPA to not only help them operate an underground injection program to inject 
waste water from oil pumping into safe underground rock formations, but also to recognize the 
Osage Nation’s right to oversee its underground injection program. The EPA, however, ignored 
the special relationship the tribes have with the federal government, making it similar to federal 
agencies of the past. The Osage Nation’s leaders and tribal representatives repeatedly asked the 
EPA, the President, and Congress to help Oklahoma’s tribes find an answer to the Midnight 
Rider, but to no avail.   
 The greater significance of this dissertation is that it illustrates that American Indian 
history should not be defined by United States legislation, but by the Indians themselves who 
continue to act as sovereigns. Regardless of the federal agency, American Indians have requested 
that their land be respected by the federal government. Our textbooks should not introduce 
American Indians to the youth of America through the lens of federal legislation, but through the 
eyes of sovereign America Indian nations. 
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Chapter 1: American Indian Sovereignty Defined   
Sovereignty is a confusing topic for the layperson and the scholar, thus it is important to 
provide a brief introduction to the history of tribal sovereignty in the United States. This 
dissertation offers a historical overview of federal policy related to Indian sovereignty by 
examining three tribes’ interactions with the EPA. Scholars sometimes understand self-
governance as equivalent to tribal sovereignty, but some law scholars note a distinct difference 
historically between sovereignty and self-governance. In general, self-governance is the freedom 
given to native nations to direct policies that have been put in place by the federal government, 
most recently as a consequence of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), sometimes 
referred to as the Indian New Deal. Sovereignty, on the other hand, stems from native designed 
policies and programs that meet the needs of the people as they understand them, not a federal 
agency, such as the EPA.29   
Scholars of Indian law have always claimed it is extremely important to define the 
nuances of sovereignty. The Lakota historian and activist Vine Deloria Jr. described tribal 
sovereignty as the ability to “determine one’s own course of action with respect to other nations 
[both Indian and other].”30 Fred Hoxie and other scholars have echoed Deloria’s theme. As Hoxie 
put it, “Indian peoples have exhibited a continuous allegiance to their territories and to the goal 
                                                 
29 N. Bruce Duthu, American Indians and the Law (New York: Viking, 2008), xxvi; Vine Deloria, Jr. and 
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of governing their homelands without interference.”31 The National Congress of American 
Indians described the essence of tribal sovereignty as “the ability to govern and to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of tribal citizens within tribal territory.”32  
The term sovereignty, however, also has specific legal connotations. Historian John R. 
Wunder offered a definition of sovereignty based on the treaty the United States signed at the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in Montevideo, Uruguay on 
December 26, 1934. Article One of the treaty states that “sovereign nations have permanent 
populations, a defined territory, a government that functions, and the ability to conduct relations 
with other governments.” Thus, according to that definition, Indian tribes have been sovereign 
for centuries, and within the United States system of laws.33 Along that same argument, historian 
Michael Leroy Olberg has written that “treaties rest at the heart upon a recognition of American 
Indian tribal sovereignty, even if the nature and limits of that sovereignty have been fiercely 
contested throughout the nation’s history and eroded significantly by the federal courts and 
Congress.”34 Therefore, even though the United States has not recognized tribal sovereignty in 
recent history, based on the federal government’s past recognition of tribal sovereignty through 
the treaty process, tribal nations have always been sovereigns. 
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Spanish theologian Francisco de Victoria originally cast the idea that Indians are 
sovereign in 1532 in what has become known as the “Doctrine of Discovery.” The King of Spain 
invited Victoria to advise the Spanish monarchy on its rights of discovery in the Americas. 
Victoria believed that the native peoples of the Americas were the true owners of their land, and 
therefore the Spanish “discovery” could only convey title to the Spanish where the land in the 
Americas was ownerless, or where the Indians had signed a treaty assigning new title to the 
Spanish. Victoria argued that the Spanish could not wage a just war against the Indians, and thus 
could not take the land of the Indians by virtue of conquest.35 The “Doctrine of Discovery” has 
been consistently misconstrued throughout the history of Indian relations with foreign 
governments, as Americans such as Chief Justice John Marshall argued that the doctrine upheld 
their right to take American land since no European nation ruled the continent. Vine Deloria has 
argued that Victoria’s view of Indian relations should be revisited in the modern era, because it 
encouraged respect for tribal sovereignty.36 
The United States has a poor record respecting tribal sovereignty over land issues, even 
though sophisticated Indian social and political systems pre-dated the arrival of Europeans in the 
fifteenth century, well before the signing of the United States Constitution. It is the Constitution, 
in fact, that most clearly articulated the relationship between the new nation and native political 
authority. Article I, Section Eight, gives Congress exclusive control of commerce with Indians, 
articulating the tribes are sovereign nations.37 The Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 chipped away at 
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tribal soverign status as it required American citizens to garner Congressional approval before 
purchasing land from Indians.38   
Following a series of costly wars during the mid-nineteenth century with American 
Indian nations that fiercely resisted the use of treaties for the purpose of making room for new 
non-Indian settlement through land cessions that reduced the size of tribal land holdings, the 
limits of native people’s land rights within the boundaries of the new United States became 
problematic. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall (1801-1835) attempted to 
create a kind of “limited” sovereignty for Indians in the nineteenth century.  
Marshall’s series of rulings on Indian affairs began somewhat ominously for Indians’ 
sovereignty. The first of the cases that the Supreme Court heard that changed Indian legal status 
in the United States was Fletcher v. Peck (1810), where the Court held that Georgia could sell 
land within its limits as long as the state constitution allowed it to do so. The state legislature 
could not, however, break contracts made by previous legislatures. Georgia passed a land grant, 
known as the Yazoo Land Act of 1795, for the benefit of four development companies, but the 
next state legislature voided the land grant when it found out that it was passed with the help of 
bribes. Land speculator John Peck bought part of the original grant in 1800, and then he turned 
around and sold the land to speculator Robert Fletcher. Fletcher brought suit against Peck in 
order to get back his original investment, claiming that Peck’s title was not legal. In order to side 
with Fletcher, the Court needed to judge that the land belonged to the state of Georgia and not 
the Cherokees. Marshall did not take Cherokee ownership into consideration, instead stating that 
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the contract between the two men in question had to be upheld. Thus, the Cherokees, according 
to Marshall, did not have sovereignty over their land.39   
 Marshall maintained his lack of respect for Indian ownership of land in Johnson v. 
McIntosh (1823), where he decided that Indians could not hold title to land in the United States. 
The case was based on Thomas Johnson’s land claim. He was a non-Indian colonist who 
purchased a piece of Illinois Indian and Piankeshaw Indian land in 1775, and upon his death left 
the land to his son Joshua Johnson. A land dispute arose in 1818 when William McIntosh, also a 
white colonist, bought the land in question from the federal government. Marshall settled the 
disagreement by stating that Indians could not hold title to lands and therefore the titles bought 
from Indians were null.40 So, often overlooked prior to his famous Cherokee decisions, Marshall 
had made it clear that Indians could not hold title to land within US borders. Then, in the 1830s, 
in response to powerful states’ rights arguments from Georgia, Marshall changed his thoughts on 
the subject.  
In State v. George Tassels (1830), the Georgia Superior Court decided that the Cherokee 
Nation could make rules in regard to intra-tribal affairs, but that Georgia had power over tribes 
that lived within Georgia’s borders. The Hall County superior court sentenced George Corn 
Tassel, a Cherokee Indian who killed an Indian named Sanders Talking Rockford, to be hanged.  
The Georgia Superior Court said that states possessed full criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
Indian tribes within their boundaries as a matter of state sovereignty, and thus it was legal for the 
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state to hang Corn Tassel for his crime. The court also judged that since a president never 
declared war on a tribe, Indian tribes were not foreign nations with sovereignty over their land 
and affairs. Lastly, the court held that it could make judgments for crimes on the Cherokees’ 
lands, since the natives lacked the intelligence necessary to live without supervision. The court’s 
paternalistic rationale did not make sense to Corn Tassels’ attorney, William Wirt, who appealed 
the Georgia Superior Court’s decision to the US Supreme Court. But, in a crazy twist, before the 
Supreme Court could hear the case, the Georgia legislature met in special session and ordered the 
execution of Corn Tassel. Wirt, understandably angry, had the inspiration to challenge Georgia 
and future states’ rights arguments.41 
Wirt’s chance to challenge Georgia’s states’ rights argument came in 1831, when he 
argued for the Cherokee sovereignty in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia before the Supreme Court. 
Wirt stated that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign nation with separate laws, and therefore it did 
not need to abide by laws of Georgia, or any political or legal representative thereof, because of 
several treaties the Cherokee Nation signed with the United States. Justice Marshall agreed that 
the Cherokee Nation did not need to abide by the laws of Georgia, but that the Cherokee Nation 
also did not wholly constitute a foreign nation, despite its treaties with the federal government. 
The Cherokee Nation, said Marshall, was one of many “domestic dependent nations” whose 
“relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”42 The Marshall decision 
was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it diminished the power of Indian tribes to act as 
foreign nations, but it also stipulated that it was the federal government’s responsibility to 
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enforce laws for the protection of Indians—and specifically to protect native peoples from 
arbitrary state laws.43  
The outlines of the federal-tribal trust relationship were further defined in 1832 in the 
Supreme Court decision Worcester v. Georgia. Georgia, on its own authority, arrested eleven 
missionaries for trespassing on Cherokee land. Georgia requested the missionaries take an oath 
of allegiance to the state before being released, and all but two of the missionaries initially took 
the oath. Marshall ordered the state to release the two remaining missionaries, because the 
federal government, not the state of Georgia, possessed exclusive authority over Indian affairs as 
defined by the Constitution. In what was potentially a constitutional crisis, Georgia ignored 
Marshall’s opinion, and President Andrew Jackson refused to enforce the opinion of the Supreme 
Court against the state. The two missionaries remained in prison until they took the oath of 
allegiance to the state.44 The narrowly avoided constitutional crisis initiated by Jackson created a 
backlash that solidified Marshall’s definition of the federal-Indian trust relationship for another 
century. Jackson later admitted his error.45 Thus, the federal government was, and still is, 
responsible to protect Indian land against the infringement of states and non-Indian citizens.     
Treaties have further defined the federal-Indian trust relationship and limited Indian self-
rule within the borders of the United States. From the time of the American Revolution until 
1871, the federal government made treaties with Indian tribes primarily to move them from their 
lands and provide non-Indians with land for settlement. Non-Indians often did not wait for 
treaties to settle Indian lands. When non-Indians squatted illegally on Indian lands, they 
pressured federal administrators, among them William Clark of Lewis and Clark fame, to 
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remove Indians. From 1808 to his death in 1838, William Clark served as the superintendent of 
Indian affairs,46 and slowly negotiated away the Osages’ land, and other tribal lands, through a 
series of treaties. The Osage Nation’s first peace treaty with the United States in 1808 alone took 
almost the entire area of what would become the state of Missouri from the Osage Nation.47      
After the era of treaty making ended in 1871, the federal government could officially 
open a war of extermination on Indians, which it had sparingly done during the treaty era. The 
most infamous of the United States Army’s wars on Indians was George Custer’s famous “Last 
Stand” on June 25, 1876, when Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho bands destroyed Custer’s Seventh 
Cavalry on the banks of the Little Bighorn River, an event known by Indian peoples as the battle 
of Greasy Grass. Custer was convinced that he could run a surprise attack on the Sioux, 
Cheyenne, and Arapaho, defeat them, gain glory for himself, and open the lands for white 
settlement. His plan failed miserably, mostly due to his arrogance, and his lack of respect for the 
Indians’ knowledge of their terrain and their skill as fighters.48 For much of the period between 
1876 and the passage of the Dawes Act (1887), which took the land of Indians, the official policy 
of the United States was to move Indians to reservations by force if it could not be done 
peacefully.49 
There was still a question at hand: regardless of whether Indians were forced or agreed to 
go to reservations, did the federal government or the states have jurisdiction on reservations? 
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According to Worcester, that had been decided; the federal government held jurisdiction. The 
states would get their revenge, though. In US v. McBratney (1882), the Supreme Court 
overturned its decision in Worcester. McBratney, a non-Indian, was on trial for killing another 
non-Indian on the Ute Reservation in Colorado. The state court sentenced McBratney to be 
hanged. McBratney appealed, arguing that the state did not hold jurisdiction on the Ute 
Reservation. The Supreme Court held that it was not Congress’s intent to leave jurisdiction of 
non-Indians on reservations to Indian justice, or even federal justice, thus the Supreme Court 
upheld the state court’s opinion. The court completely ignored Worcester.50 But, what if an 
Indian killed an Indian on the reservation? The Supreme Court decided that question shortly 
thereafter. 
The case of Crow Dog challenged the federal government’s ability to control the lives of 
Indians on reservations. Crow Dog, a traditional Brule Sioux leader, killed Spotted Owl, a 
federally approved Brule Sioux leader, on the Sioux reservation, and was tried in the First 
Judicial Court of the Territory of Dakota in 1883. The territorial court found Crow Dog guilty of 
murder and sentenced him to die. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, stating that due 
to the Treaty of 1868 between the United States and the Sioux, the Sioux reservation was not part 
of the Territory of Dakota, and therefore, the territorial court had no jurisdiction over an Indian 
killing another Indian on reservation land. In addition, the Sioux treaty created a structure for 
handling criminal issues on the reservation. The treaty stated that in cases of criminal activity, 
the tribe must offer up the defendant for trial to the federal government. If the tribe did not 
present the accused, then payment from the tribe’s annuity would go to the family of the victim. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court decided that Indians retained right to their own tribal law in 
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cases involving only Indians as part of their sovereign jurisdiction on their reservations.51 But, 
the Crow Dog decision created a problem for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as it could not 
completely control all activities on the reservation.   
Congress responded by moving to make Indian courts and tribal justice insignificant. The 
Indian Appropriation Act of 1885 made violent crimes committed on federal territorial land 
subject to federal territorial courts.52 United States v. Kagama (1886) put the Indian 
Appropriation Act to the test with the question of whether a federal district court had jurisdiction 
over the trial of Kagama, an Indian who killed Iyouse, also an Indian, on the Hoopa Reservation 
within the limits of Humboldt County, California. The Court relied most heavily on Marshall’s 
opinion in Cherokee Nation, stating that the tribes were dependent nations that owed no 
allegiance to the states, thus the federal court did, indeed, hold jurisdiction.53 Kagama gave the 
federal government, not the states, priority in cases involving major crimes by Indians and, 
unlike Crow Dog, gave power to the federal court system to judge crimes between Indians on 
reservations. 
The Kagama decision opened the door for the Dawes Act, which President Grover 
Cleveland signed into law on February 8, 1887, marking a new approach by the federal 
government to the Indian “problem,” by seeking to make Indians emulate white farmers. The act 
provided for the President to allot 160-acre farms for the heads of households, 80-acre farms for 
single men over eighteen, and 40-acres to children. Farmsteads were to be held in trust by the 
secretary of the interior for twenty-five years and could not be sold or transferred. Indians who 
accepted allotments could petition to become citizens of the United States, and they could 
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remove themselves from the protection of the federal government. The law also provided for the 
sale of so called “surplus” lands to the highest bidder, which ultimately led to millions of acres of 
Indian land being transferred to non-Indians.54 The “civilizing” of the Indian race, according to 
Francis Leupp, later commissioner of Indian affairs, was necessary because Indians had not 
progressed as far as non-Indians as a race. Leupp stated that, “in simple terms, the great mass of 
Indians have yet to go through the era, common to the history of all races, when they must be 
mere hewers of wood and drawers of water.”55     
In addition to “civilizing” Indians, the law allowed for the federal government to transfer 
Indian land to non-Indians. Not only did unallocated land end up on the selling block, but 
speculators also convinced Indians to sell their allotments, hoping to gain access to the mineral 
wealth.56 Overall, the Dawes Act was part of a larger trend of Indian land transferring to non-
Indians at the end of the nineteenth century. For instance, the Ute Treaty of 1880 called on the 
White River Utes to cede 12 million aces of their mineral-rich land of Colorado.57 The federal 
government also dissolved tribal courts in 1898 with the Curtis Act, extending the jurisdiction of 
federal courts into Indian country.58 At the turn of the twentieth century, Indian peoples’ ability 
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to direct and control their own destinies, and resources, had just about reached its lowest level, 
but it got worse with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903).59 
Lone Wolf marked a primary and historical watershed in the history of the relationship 
between Indians and the federal government. Here, the Supreme Court listened to testimony 
describing the means by which the federal government, through the process of allotment, took 
2.5 million acres of Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache reservation land beginning in 1890, 
seven years before the expiration of the Medicine Lodge treaty signed by the tribes and the 
United States in 1867. Lone Wolf, a principal chief of the Kiowas, attempted to prevent the 
allotment of his reservation by referencing several articles of the 1867 Medicine Lodge treaty, in 
particular Article 12, which stated that no Indian land could be ceded without agreement by 
three-fourths of all adult males in the tribe. Ignoring the 1867 treaty, the federal government 
moved forward with allotment, claiming its authority to do so via a small group of native leaders 
who agreed to a new treaty in exchange for more favorable terms for themselves and their 
families. Until the filing of Lone Wolf, no Indian nation had attempted to sue the federal 
government for failing to live up to its treaty obligations. Lone Wolf, however, did not convince 
the Supreme Court. The Court decided that Congress had exercised plenary authority over the 
tribal relations from the beginning of the United States.60 In other words, the Court concluded 
that Congress had never recognized tribal sovereignty over land. 
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Soon after the Lone Wolf decision, the Supreme Court reversed itself in Winters v. US 
(1908), establishing what is today known as the Reserved Rights Doctrine. The Reserved Rights 
Doctrine holds that if Congress did not specifically outlaw an action by an Indian tribe, then the 
tribe may perform the action. The Winters case involved the Gros Ventre tribe of Montana, 
which argued that it could use the water from the Milk River to irrigate and cultivate land as 
provided by its 1888 treaty with the United States. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit sided with the Indians, granting the Gros Ventres access to the Milk River, because their 
right to the water actually pre-dated the creation of the state of Montana.61 The Gros Ventres 
victory was rare for American Indians, but it did not have much influence over the federal 
government, as Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs continued to infringe on tribal self-
determination over land during the twentieth century. Taken together, the US Constitution, 
Marshall’s Cherokee Nation decisions, Lone Wolf, and the Reserved Rights Doctrine formed the 
basis for Native peoples’ legal challenge in asserting self-determination—until the day of the 
passage of the Midnight Rider. 
One of the reasons the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) did not respect Indian self-rule at 
the turn of the twentieth century is that in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt made a move that 
deeply infringed on tribal sovereignty by appointing Francis Leupp, a former newspaperman and 
assimilationist, as commissioner of Indian affairs, and thus the head of the BIA. Leupp believed 
that assimilation was the only way forward for Indians, and that the federal government had 
practiced “misdirected paternalism” for many years.62 Assimilation, the complete erasure of 
native culture, language, and economy, was the goal of Congress and many federal officials in 
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the early twentieth century. Even so-called progressive leaders, among Indian nations, contended 
that Indians would be better off if they left the reservations and assimilated into American 
society. Leupp held that reservation land was too valuable to be set-aside for future Indian use. 
Roosevelt considered Leupp to be an expert in the field of Indian relations, and Leupp agreed 
with Roosevelt in identifying considerable paternalism in the BIA.63   
Congress encouraged Leupp to sell Indian land and resources for development without 
Indian consent. In 1906, Leupp called on Congress to allocate $500,000 of the Uintah Tribe’s 
own trust money for a $200,000 acre irrigation project. Congress allocated $600,000, and when 
residents of the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming protested the misappropriation of their 
money for irrigation projects against their will, the House Indian Affairs Committee cited the 
Lone Wolf decision, arguing the committee could do as it wished in regard to tribal money. 
Congress was convinced that irrigation would pay dividends for the tribes. In 1907, Congress 
gave Leupp the power to sell allotments belonging to Indians deemed incompetent by the BIA,64 
and in 1908 Congress allowed Leupp to negotiate long-term leases for the Fort Belknap, Uintah, 
and Wind River reservations. In May 1908, the BIA opened 2.9 million acres of the Standing 
Rock and Cheyenne River reservation for mineral leases. By 1919, Congress was issuing mineral 
leases on reservations held in trust by the BIA, with miners paying only five percent royalties to 
the tribes. As a result of Leupp’s and Congress’ policies, 4.5 million acres of Indian land were 
under lease by non-Indians by 1920.65   
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In 1924, the federal government declared all Indians within the borders of the United 
States to be citizens of the United States,66 which served as a further move to assimilate Indians 
into the greater non-Indian population and dissolve the federal trust relationship with American 
Indians. Despite the federal government’s assimilationist goal, Indians were still not allowed to 
vote in many states.67 The federal government defended its stance on Indian citizenship even in 
1972, as American Indians pressed the federal government on treaty rights. The federal 
government stated that due to the Citizenship Act, the federal government did not need to reopen 
treaty making with Indian nations due to the fact that indeed Indians were citizens of the United 
States.68 
Federal perceptions of what was best for American Indians eventually changed with the 
arrival of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration, but the federal government continued to 
interfere in tribal decisions about their land. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) was a 
major change of course from earlier assimilation policies. Under the terms of the Indian 
Reorganization Act, the secretary of the interior could use surplus land, not already allotted 
under the Dawes Act, to recreate reservations for the benefit of the tribes. Once tribes accepted 
the terms of the IRA, and held democratic elections to a tribally controlled body, the tribes stood 
ready to receive land from the federal government, along with access to federal funding for 
social projects and business charters.69 Although the BIA, under Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
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John Collier, was more willing to listen to tribal concerns, and encouraged self-governance more 
than under previous administrations, the IRA also infringed upon native customs, because it 
required tribes to earn Collier’s approval of their reorganized tribal governments. Thus, new 
tribal government structures were based on Euro-American political culture, not necessarily 
tribal traditions. In addition, the federal government did not return previously allotted land to 
tribal ownership, and so the federal government did not truly restore most reservations. 
Fortunately for tribal self-determination, the federal government did not require tribes to accept 
the IRA, and seventy-seven tribes rejected the act.70    
The Supreme Court also revisited tribal treaties during the 1930s and the 1940s to see if 
the federal government owed money to tribes. The Supreme Court in Seminole Nation v. United 
States (1942) found that the federal government had made a mistake just after the Civil War 
when it paid $28,922.64 directly to tribal creditors, at the direction of the tribal council. In 
addition, $61,563.42 had been used to feed and clothe Indians after the Civil War. The money 
came from interest to the annual annuity, which was supposed to be held in trust by the federal 
government, based on the tribe’s treaties of 1856 and 1866. The court reasoned that the federal 
government at the time knew full well that the Seminole government was in the habit of cheating 
its tribal members and should not have followed its directions as to where to pay trust funds.71  
Congress soon set out to destroy the federal-Indian trust relationship that the court’s 
decision in Seminole Nation upheld. During the Termination Era (1945-1970), Congress passed 
House Concurrent Resolution 108 (1953), which called for the end of the federal trust 
relationship based on treaties with tribes and an end to the federal government’s funding for 
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programs on reservations. Claiming that the BIA had created a system of “dependency” on 
federal government handouts, Congress assumed that Indians would assimilate into American 
culture once federal funds were withdrawn. Tribes deemed “ready” to have their federal financial 
support taken away were placed on a list for termination.72 
Utah Republican Senator Arthur V. Watkins and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon 
S. Meyer were leading proponents of termination, arguing that Indians could prosper more 
quickly without the federal government holding them back. Some tribal governing bodies, such 
as the Menominee Advisory Council, agreed.73 Several joint sessions of the House and Senate 
worked quickly to push bills through Congress to terminate several tribes in the 1950s. The 
Klamaths of Oregon and the Menominees of Minnesota were the two largest tribes that voted for 
termination. Several smaller tribes were also on Congress’ list to be terminated, including an 
assortment of California reservations (referred to as Rancherias). Congress, however, could not 
convince the largest tribes with political savvy and long-standing treaties, such as the Osage 
Nation and Navajo Nation, to vote for termination.74 Termination was the nadir of the federal 
government’s disrespect for the federal trust relationship and tribal self-determination in the 
twentieth century. 
 While termination was a choice for tribes, in reality it was difficult for some tribes to 
avoid, because the tribal voting process for termination was confusing for many Indians. Many 
members of the Menominees, for example, believed that the federal government did not manage 
their money well, and therefore, they wanted the federal government off the reservation. At a 
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tribal meeting with Senator Watkins, a Menominee named Gordon Keshena argued that it would 
be difficult for the Menominees to manage their own affairs after 125 years of the federal trust 
relationship, but that the tribe was certainly able to do so. He knew that termination should be a 
gradual process, but many of the elders did not fully understand the full ramifications of the 
termination of the federal trust protection. Some Menominees thought that they were only voting 
to receive $1,500 per person payments that the federal government offered if the tribe voted for 
termination. The result of the Menominees’ confusion was that the Menominee Advisory 
Council approved a tribal resolution for termination in 1953 with a vote of 197 to 0. To make 
matters worse, the advisory council’s vote was not representative of the entire tribe, considering 
that 3,059 tribal members owned 233,902 acres of land in trust.75 
President Eisenhower signed the cornerstone of termination law in August 1953, known 
to this day simply as Public Law 280. The statute allowed state governments both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes in California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, 
and Alaska, whether the tribes in those states had been terminated or not. PL 280 was a blatant 
attempt to overturn the long-standing federal trust responsibility to the tribes. 
The decisions of the federal courts during the termination era mirrored the federal 
government’s interest in termination of the federal trust responsibility. In Federal Power 
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation (1960), the Supreme Court found it legal for the Federal 
Power Commission to condemn Indian lands from tribes that had not signed treaties with the 
federal government. The Federal Power Commission wanted to take the Tuscarora’s land 
adjacent to the Niagara River in New York in order to build a storage reservoir for a 
hydroelectric power project. To cushion the blow to the tribe, the Federal Power Commission 
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planned on paying the tribe for the land. The court held that the Federal Powers Act allowed for 
the federal government to take any bodies of water for use in developing electric power, whether 
Indians or non-Indians owned the lands.76 
Termination as federal policy officially came to an end when President Nixon ushered in 
the Self-Determination Era (1970-Present) on July 8, 1970. Nixon told Congress that termination 
was morally and legally unacceptable, and that it had produced negative results. Nixon argued 
that termination made Indians more dependent on the federal government, not less.77 The new 
Self-Determination Era was intended to reverse the activities of the Termination Era and re-set 
United States-tribal relations. President Nixon, of course, was not acting on his own accord, but 
in response to Indian protests throughout the United States in 1969 and 1970. Indians fought for 
fair treatment and recognition of past treaties beginning with the occupation of Alcatraz on 
November 19, 1969. The Indians that occupied Alcatraz came from a variety of backgrounds, 
many from families that the federal government had relocated to San Francisco. The protests 
extended into 1970, when a group of veterans from Alcatraz took control of Fort Lawton near 
Seattle in March. Throughout 1970, Indian protestors occupied the BIA offices in Chicago, 
Cleveland, and Minneapolis, pushing for fair treatment by the federal government. Even after 
termination had ended as official federal policy, Indian activists continued to march and occupy. 
The American Indian Movement (AIM), led by Russell Means, an Oglala Sioux, and Dennis 
Banks, an Ojibwe, occupied the BIA headquarters in Washington D.C. for several days 
beginning on November 2, 1972. Three months later AIM went to Wounded Knee, South 
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Dakota, where they became enmeshed in a nine-week standoff with local officials. AIM was 
protesting the tribal government of the Oglala Sioux that was beholden to the federal government 
and not the tribal members.78    
The Self-Determination Era was initially highlighted by three pieces of legislation: The 
Indian Civil Rights Act (1968), the Indian Education Act (1972), and the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (1975). The Indian Civil Rights Act negated Public 
Law 280. The Indian Education Act provided training for teachers, fellowships for Indian 
students, and basic research for Indian education. Lastly, the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act allowed tribes to give the BIA approval to administer programs on 
tribal lands, and the law gave the tribes the power to contract with the BIA to administer 
assistance programs. In the past, the BIA had administered programs without tribal consent.79 
The Self-Determination Era has seen tribes take part in federal programs and work alongside 
federal agencies such as the EPA, but, as we shall see, the EPA was beholden to environmental 
legislation that it holds above tribal self-determination.    
There have been a several court cases during the Self-Determination Era that have helped 
define self-determination. United States v. Shimer (1971) provided the precedent for the 
operations of a federal agency to override state law. In Shimer, the Supreme Court had to decide 
whether the United States could recover $4,000 from a US military veteran who defaulted on his 
United States Veterans’ Administration (VA) loan, although according to Pennsylvania law, he 
did not have to pay back the loan. Excelsior, a mortgage company, bought Shiner’s home at 
sheriff’s auction for $250. Shiner’s lawyer argued that since the debt was paid according to state 
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law, Shiner did not have to pay back the VA, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania agreed. The appeals court upheld state law, stating that since the VA did 
not attempt to regain its losses in six months after the sheriff’s sale, which was the time frame 
allotted under state law for such action, the VA could no longer recover its original loan amount. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court, declaring that VA rules make clear that 
they were intended to create a uniform system for determining the Administration's obligation as 
guarantor, which in its operation would displace state law.80 Shiner had great bearing on the 
modern era of federal-Indian relations, as the attempts of federal agencies to deal with Indians as 
each agency saw fit could not be curtailed by the states. Federal agencies, now, had the ability to 
operate alongside Indians on reservations without the interference of states, ultimately setting the 
stage for the EPA to assist the three tribes described in the following case studies.   
  Another case that upheld federal power over state power on reservations during the early 
Self-Determination Era was the Supreme Court’s decision in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission (1973), where the court stated that Arizona could not tax Indians whose entire 
income was earned on their reservation. The state of Arizona had taxed a member of the Navajo 
Nation whose entire salary came from jobs within the Navajo Nation’s boundaries. The court 
relied primarily on Marshall’s Cherokee decisions for precedent, but also drew upon the Navajo 
Nation treaty of 1868, which provided for Navajo self-governance on their reservation under 
authority of the United States government.81   
A third important case from the 1970s is Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County 
(1975), because the Federal Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit judged federal law to take 
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precedence over state law in issues of Indian affairs. The case revolved around two members of 
the Santa Rosa Band of Indians living on the Santa Rosa Rancheria in King’s County, California, 
who appealed to the BIA for new housing under its Housing Improvement Program. The Indians 
received the maximum federal grant of $3,500 for housing. In addition, the Indian Health Service 
agreed to supply the houses with water and sanitary plumbing. After the plaintiffs purchased the 
mobile homes they learned that under county zoning ordinance section 402, they needed prior 
approval from the county before moving a mobile home to the land within an agricultural 
district. Adding more problems, local law stated that mobile homes could only be utilized for 
two years in agricultural districts, and county inspections and permits were needed for utility and 
plumbing hookups. The plaintiffs lacked the money to pay local fees, and therefore were not able 
to live in the mobile homes they purchased. In defense of their fee requirements, Kings County 
argued that under Public Law 280 the county had civil jurisdiction due to the assimilationist 
intentions of the law. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that local jurisdiction over Indian 
reservations ran contrary to Congress’ intent through the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 for 
tribes to control reservation land. Furthermore, the court stated that Public Law 280 denied states 
the power to tax Indian land.82 Once again, federal power trumped state and local laws. 
Several cases came to the courts in the 1980s that had Indian sovereignty as the central 
question, but ultimately left tribes in no better state of self-rule than before. In Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Butterworth (1981), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the lower court ruling that Florida did not have jurisdiction over the Seminole bingo casino, 
because Florida’s statute in question was regulatory in nature. Sheriff Butterworth of Broward 
County had arrested Seminoles for violating Florida statute 849.093, which permitted bingo 
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games to be played by certain qualified organizations subject to restrictions by the state. The 
Seminole Tribe made an agreement with a private limited partnership, unnamed in the court 
proceedings, to build and operate a bingo hall on the reservation in Broward County, Florida, in 
exchange for a percentage of the profits as management fees.83 Seminole provided precedent for 
several more gaming cases, and it also set the stage for the landmark case that limited the scope 
of Public Law 280 and directly led to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians (1987).  
A few more gaming cases from the 1980s set the stage for Cabazon, as well. In Oneida 
Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin (1981), the Oneida Tribe contended that Wisconsin’s 
bingo law could not be enforced on the reservation, because of the regulatory nature of 
Wisconsin’s laws, which did not keep the general populace from playing bingo. The court relied 
on the precedent of Butterworth and agreed that Wisconsin’s statute, like Florida’s statute on 
gaming, was regulatory in nature, not criminal in nature, and thus could not keep the Oneidas 
from operating a card room.84  
In The Barona Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy (1982), the 
Barona Tribe argued that California’s bingo regulations, which stated that profits must be used 
for non-profit purposes, did not apply to tribes. The court held that the Barona Tribe, using 
profits from bingo for tribal improvements, fell within state code. The court also noted that the 
California public could play bingo “at will,” making any California statute against bingo 
regulatory.85 In Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan (1986), Connecticut tried to justify its 
regulation of all Indian activities, including gaming, under the Connecticut Claim Indian 
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Settlement Act. The district court found Connecticut’s bingo laws to be regulatory in nature, not 
criminal in nature, and thus the court applied the precedents set by Barona Group, Seminole, and 
Oneida, in which regulatory bingo laws did not apply to tribal reservation gaming. Therefore, 
Connecticut could not regulate Pequot bingo games on the reservation.86 
Barona Group, Seminole, Mashantucket, and Oneida led to Cabazon, where the US Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that California’s laws against gaming card rooms were 
also regulatory in nature. The Cabazon Band of Mission Indians from Palm Springs helped to 
weaken the termination legislation of Public Law 280 by opening a card room, which was not a 
criminal offense in California, but the state initially treated it as one. The Ninth Circuit ruled in 
favor of the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians, because it said that California only 
outlawed casinos where the house banked money, not card rooms where money moved from 
player to player.87  
The result of Cabazon should have been that more tribes could profit from casinos, but 
President Reagan signed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988, which limited the 
ability of tribes to profit from gaming. The IGRA classified Indian gaming into three categories. 
Class I games, social games and traditional tribal gambling, remained under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the tribes. Class II games, bingo and non-banking card games (the casion does not 
pay out), also stayed under tribal authority, unless illegal in the state of operation. Class III 
games, banking games, had to be agreed to under a deal between the Indian tribe and the state. 
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Initially, Indian tribes could sue to bring states to the table to make a deal.88  That last provision 
was destroyed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996). 
 Seminole Tribe dealt with the question of whether a state could be sued by an Indian tribe 
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not give Congress the power to make laws allowing Indian tribes to sue the 
federal government, which was a requirement to open Class III gaming operations under the 
IGRA. Today, state legislators do not have to allow Class III casinos because of the Seminole 
decision.89 Ultimately, Indian tribes do not have the authority to run their own banking casinos 
without agreements by the state whose borders they live within, which is an infringement of the 
federal trust agreement and tribal self-determination.  
There have been several cases after 1960 that have helped define the boundaries of federal 
agencies, and specifically the EPA’s ability to make judgments on environmental law when 
Congress has left a gap in language for interpretation by the federal agency in charge of 
overseeing the application of the federal legislation. The courts have repeatedly allowed federal 
agencies to interpret federal law. In Udall v. Tallman (1965), the Supreme Court gave deference 
to the secretary of the interior on his decisions regarding lease applications, because the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 gave the secretary the power to give lease rights. The case originated when 
two applicants for leases argued that they had the right to land on the Kenai National Moose 
Range in Alaska, even though one of the applicants had filed for their lease while the range was 
not open for leasing. The Supreme Court stated that the secretary of the interior could judge who 
could win the leases as long as he followed federal law, which in Udall was the Mineral Leasing 
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Act of 1920.90 Some modern court commentators and scholars believe that it was Chevron v. 
Natural Resource Defense Council (1984), described later, that set the precedent that a federal 
agency can interpret federal law, but it was really Udall.91 
 The power of federal agencies to interpret federal laws was next supported in INS v. 
Jong Ha Wang (1981), where the Supreme Court decided that the US Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit had incorrectly overturned a decision by the Attorney General acting for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) when he said that a Korean family who had 
overstayed their permitted time as traders in the United States had to be sent home. The Ninth 
Circuit stated that under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the Korean immigrants had 
illustrated severe economic hardship, and thus they did not have to leave the United States. The 
Korean husband and wife argued that their children, who did not speak Korean, would be denied 
a proper education in Korea, and that the family would be in economic hardship from the loss of 
their dry cleaning business if they had to return to Korea. The Board of Immigration Appeals 
denied the couple’s appeal for extreme hardship. The Supreme Court decided that the Attorney 
General had the ability to judge what constituted extreme hardship. In other words, just because 
the Ninth Circuit did not agree with the Attorney General, that did not mean he was wrong.92     
The Ninth Circuit, in Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v. Schlesinger (1981), 
made a similar judgment to the Jong Ha Wang case, stating that the Bonneville Power 
Administration (BPA) had the expertise to make judgments within the power the federal 
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government provided it. The case began when farmers from Franklin County, Washington 
wanted to stop the construction of a 500-kilovolt-power line across their lands by the BPA. The 
farmers had several complaints, but chief among them was the fact that the BPA had not 
performed an adequate cost analysis of all the routes that the agency could have utilized. 
Although the BPA might not have acted as the farmers wished, the court agreed with the BPA, 
an agency within the Department of the Interior, that it had properly filed its Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS), which included a cost analysis. Although the agency could have chosen 
other routes for its power lines, the BPA filed the EIS properly, and therefore the Ninth Circuit 
decided that there would be no injunction against the BPA project.93   
The most famous case that still is associated with the power of federal agencies to make 
educated judgments on federal law is Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
(1984), where the Supreme Court allowed the EPA to issue permits allowing corporations to 
only fix one air polluting source, even though there were more sources of the pollution, as long 
as the total air pollution from the factory had not increased. The EPA’s new allowance granted 
by the Supreme Court became known as the “bubble concept.” The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia decided that the EPA misconstrued Congress’ intent in the Clean Air Act 
amendments of 1977. The Supreme Court overturned the appeals court ruling, holding that 
where Congress had left a “hole” in the legislation, the federal agency in charge could use its 
expertise to make a judgment.94   
The same rationale was applied to State of Washington, Dept. of Ecology v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (1985), where the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
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decided that Washington could have control over all the federal hazardous waste programs in the 
state, but they could not regulate the federal hazardous waste programs on Indian reservations. 
The state argued that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA, 1976) allowed states 
to develop their own hazardous waste programs. The appeals court countered that while RCRA 
was not clear on that point, federal agencies had the ability to interpret federal statutes. By 
leaving a gap in the statute, Congress gave the EPA the ability to make a judgment as 
necessary.95  
The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Emery 
Mining Corp v. Secretary of Labor (1984). The Tenth Circuit found that the Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Review Commission (MSHR) had acted within the scope of the Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Act when it judged that the Emery Mining Corporation had violated the miner 
training requirements that required miners to get safety training every twelve months. Five 
miners had not received their refresher training within the required twelve-month period, instead 
receiving training at fifteen months. Emery interpreted the miner training clause to mean that 
miners had to be trained once a year, but it did not matter whether the training took place at the 
beginning or end of the year. In addition, Emery claimed that the MSHR agreed with Emery’s 
training schedule. The court acknowledged deference to federal agencies in cases where federal 
agencies had superior knowledge, especially when the law was clear on the point. MSHR, in 
fact, issued a memo in 1981 to Emery that its miners needed to be trained no later than one 
calendar year from the time of their last training session.96  
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In another somewhat classic case on the abilities of federal agencies to interpret federal 
laws, the Supreme Court decided in Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council (1985) that the EPA could issue variances on pollutants. The Natural Resources 
Defense Council argued that the EPA, under the Clean Water Act (CWA), was not allowed to 
issue “fundamentally different factor” (FDF) variances for pollutants listed as toxic under the 
CWA. The Court found that the law was not clear on FDF variances, and the EPA had the 
expertise to make necessary decisions in areas where Congress was ambiguous. Under the CWA 
the EPA was required to set categories of waste, but in order to not unduly burden corporations, 
the EPA created FDF variance. Corporations could appeal to the EPA for a FDF variance if they 
found that they had been harshly categorized. The EPA allowed appeals, because not only was it 
difficult to accurately create categories of toxic waste producers, but the EPA had limited time to 
set the standards. The Court found that appeals did not run contrary to Congressional intent for 
the CWA.97 
Lastly, in American Mining Congress v. Marshall (1982) the US Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit found that the secretary of labor was able to interpret laws as long as his reasoning 
seemed rational to the court. The American Mining Congress (AMC) challenged the secretary of 
labor under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, arguing that the secretary misconstrued the 
regulations. The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act from 1976, renamed in 1977 to the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act, provided that each mining company should maintain an average 
concentration of dangerous respirable dust in the mine to no more than 2 milligrams per cubic 
meter of air. In 1980, the secretary of labor added a ruling to the legislation requiring the mining 
company to also take measurements within the non-working section of the mine, because recent 
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studies had indicated dangers to miners in non-working sections to the mine. The AMC argued 
that the secretary did not follow the original law when making his ruling. The court found that 
since the secretary had utilized a rational base for his additional requirements, the mining 
company had to follow them.98 
Cases such as Chevron and American Mining Congress, in which the federal courts 
provided leeway for federal agencies to interpret federal laws based on the expertise of the 
agency, provided precedent for a case that bears on the Osage case study in this dissertation. The 
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Phillips Petroleum Company v. U.S. EPA (1986), 
decided that the EPA could regulate underground oil waste injection on the Osage Reservation. 
The Phillips Company challenged the EPA’s ability to grant primacy to the Osage Nation 
because, according to Phillips, the Safe Drinking Water Act did not grant the EPA the ability to 
award primacy. Phillips argued that the SDWA only allowed the EPA to regulate on Indian 
reservations where the state did not regulate, and therefore, since states could not regulate on 
Indian reservations, neither could the EPA. The court decided that the SDWA was ambiguous on 
this point, allowing the court to interpret Congressional intent. The court found that there was no 
way the SDWA was meant to leave out application of clean water policies to Indian reservations, 
leaving a vast part of the United States unregulated. Furthermore, a general law made for the 
welfare of Americans was also meant for American Indians.99 The federal courts had now made 
it clear that when prescribed by federal law the EPA could regulate environmental programs on 
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Indian reservations and the EPA could interpret federal laws where the laws were open to 
interpretation.   
Other cases from the 1980s also need to be mentioned, since they show the development of 
court approved Indian self-determination, almost unthinkable thirty years prior. In White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980) the Supreme Court overturned the ruling of Arizona’s 
appellate court that a non-Indian owned logging company, the Pinetop Logging Company, 
operating exclusively on the Fort Apache reservation, had to pay the state’s motor carrier license 
tax and fuel tax. The key to White Mountain Apache Tribe was that the logging company’s 
operations amounted to ninety percent of the White Mountain Apache’s annual profits, therefore 
state taxes infringed on tribal profits. The company operated under federal supervision and 
employed tribal members. Timber on the reservation was owned by the federal government and 
kept in trust for the tribe, with the intent to help the tribe.100 
The Supreme Court in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982) decided that the Jicarillas 
could charge a severance tax for oil and natural gas extraction on tribal land leased by non-
Indians, because charging taxes was an essential form of tribal self-government. The tribes’ 1887 
treaty with the federal government set aside tribal land with no special restrictions except it 
protected the rights of existing settlements. The Jicarillas reorganized in 1934, and the new tribal 
constitution allowed for ordinances, such as taxes, for the development of tribal land. The non-
Indians signed their leases beginning in 1953, and the severance tax was enacted in 1976 with 
the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.101 
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In Hoover and Bracken Energies Corp. v. US Department of Interior (1983), the Tenth 
Circuit agreed with the Department of the Interior that the United States Geological Survey had 
the right to interpret federal regulations based on its expertise. The Hoover Bracken Company 
owed royalties to the federal government from oil and gas that came from land leases on Indian 
land, which should have included rebates from paying the Oklahoma severance tax. The Hoover 
Bracken Company disagreed that it owed the USGS more money, the the Tenth Cicuit disagreed 
with the Hoover Bracken Company.102 
It should be clear from Chapter One that Indian sovereignty has come under attack since 
the formation of the United States, and Indians have rarely been able to choose their own path, 
although they have tried. The three branches of the federal government have wavered between 
paternalism and assimilation, while sometimes sponsoring the destruction of tribes. What has 
often been lost in the various written histories of tribes is that the Indians themselves have 
continued to push back against the federal government, and the states, for greater tribal self-
determination over their lands.  
Chapter One also shows that the federal courts after 1970 have consistently supported the 
right of the EPA, and other federal agencies, to interpret federal law, as long as the agency in 
question was allowed to do so by the law. Therefore, during the self-determination era, federal 
agencies have had the ability to make determinations that support not only Indian self-
government, as defined by the federal government, but also Indian self-rule as defined by the 
tribes.   
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Chapter 2: The United States and Pueblo Sovereignty 
 
The Pueblos believed they came from the North and came “up” to the air at a place called 
Shipapu by way of an underground lake. The “war chief” and his staff cleared the path for the 
people to travel. The Great Spirit came with them and guided them through many arduous tasks. 
For ages, the great people were led all over the continent before finally settling in the Four 
Corners area of southwestern Colorado, northwestern New Mexico, southeastern Utah and 
northeastern Arizona. The Pueblos migrated to their current areas at the behest of the Great 
Spirit, who kept them from annihilation by other tribes of the region.103   
The Great Spirit taught the Pueblos how to be self-reliant by planting and harvesting 
crops. He also taught them which indigenous plants were safe and useful. The Great Spirit 
warned the people to obey the laws of the environment, their chief, the war captains, and the 
cacique (spiritual guide). The cacique set Pueblo laws. The Pueblos trusted the cacique and the 
other leaders, because they believed that the One above guided Pueblo leaders.104 They all were 
to obey the laws of the environment. The Pueblos had the leadership to show them how to use 
the land and how to respect what the environment had to offer them. The pollution of the Rio 
Grande by the city of Albuquerque was an affront to Pueblo traditions and teachings.     
The Pueblos have lived in the American southwest for thousands of years and have 
survived the governmental incursions of the Spanish, the Mexicans, and the United States. The 
Pueblos, and especially the Isleta Pueblos, set the groundwork for the eventual bond with the 
EPA by pushing for control of their land. Chapter Two argues that the federal government rarely 
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recognized Pueblo self-determination over their land before the EPA. For example, the Pueblo 
Lands Board during the 1920s, and the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board during the 1930s, 
worked to provide more land for the Pueblos, but they did not recognize Pueblo decisions about 
tribal land.  
The tribal histories of the Pueblos have been well covered by Indian historians, but issues 
of land and sovereignty, and especially the convergence of the two topics, have not been covered 
by scholars. In addition, historians have barely touched the Pueblo history of the twentieth 
century. To read the accounts of Pueblo history, it seems the Pueblos only have lived during 
periods when non-Pueblos interfere in the Pueblo world. The most heavily covered topic 
involving the Pueblos is the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. During the revolt the Pueblos rose up at 
Santa Fe and killed and expelled their Spanish colonizers. The Spanish regained New Mexico by 
the turn of the eighteenth century. The best work on the topic is David J. Weber’s edited 
collection of essays called What Caused the Pueblo Revolt of 1680? (1999), which is meant for 
college classrooms, but it is also a tremendous resource for the historian who needs a quick 
introduction into the subject. The study covers several theories about the causes of the rebellion 
that range from Spanish Franciscan missionaries not respecting tribal religion to the fact that the 
priests overworked the Pueblos at the missions.105  
On the destruction of Pueblo society under the Spanish, the best work is Ramon A. 
Gutierrez’s When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality and Power in 
New Mexico, 1500-1846 (1991). Gutierrez showed the social changes that helped subjugate the 
Pueblos when the Spanish arrived. The Catholicism of the Spanish certainly did not peacefully 
coexist with the belief systems of the Pueblos. Gutierrez provided the view of the Spanish 
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onslaught through the eyes of the conquered, making Pueblos active participants in the fight. 
Gutierrez provided a tremendous section on the Pueblo creation stories at the beginning of his 
book, which explained the Pueblos’ connection to the land in their tribal histories that have been 
carried down from generation to generation. Using many Spanish sources, Gutierrez also 
analyzed Pueblo marriage and social structures to illustrate tribal change over time.106 
On the clash of cultures in the American Southwest, the definitive study is still Elizabeth 
A. H. John’s Storms Brewed in Other Men’s Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and 
French in the Southwest, 1540-1795 (1975). John’s thesis was that Indians and Spanish 
communities evolved with each other into a somewhat peaceful state of existence at the dawn of 
the nineteenth century. John took the reader through a variety of tribal lives, intermixing war, 
trade, and culture into a narrative about tribal survival. The tribes were not merely acted upon, 
but they were powerful forces in the story of change in the Southwest. She analyzed each region 
of the Southwest while also keeping to a chronological order.107 
Another study that covered a wide range of territory and several peoples was Edward H. 
Spicer’s Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians 
of the Southwest, 1533-1960 (1962), which illustrated how the tribes of the American southwest 
became subjugated under the foreign influences that entered their lives. He described tribes as 
influencers of conquering Europeans, not the other way around. Spicer mostly focused on 
religion and economics, but he barely touched on the important topic of the Pueblo Lands Act. 
His work was published several years before the Self-Determination Era, thus it would be unfair 
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to hold him accountable for topics of the last forty years. Nevertheless, the work still holds value 
as a general history of the American southwest.108  
In contrast to histories of the entire United States Southwest, Edward Dozier and Joe S. 
Sando focused on the history of the Pueblos themselves by attempting to tell the stories from the 
Pueblos’ perspectives. Dozier’s The Pueblo Indians of North America (1983) was a case study of 
Pueblo life and how they adapted over time to a variety of changing conditions. There was some 
judgment on the author’s part about the fact that some Pueblos groups had not held on to 
tradition the way they should. It is debatable whether it is the historian’s task to judge how a 
tribe deals with its traditions, but as a native Pueblo historian, Dozier spoke from experience. 
Dozier’s book, still, has plenty to offer the historian, such as tables on government structure and 
population. Most importantly, Dozier described how the Pueblos continued to act on their own 
accord, which is something the Pueblo case study also does.109 The following case study updates 
the Pueblo story of sovereign life, bringing new evidence to the table.  
Another native Pueblo historian, Joe S. Sando, provided the reader with a history of the 
Pueblos from their perspective in Pueblo Nations: Eight Centuries of Pueblo Indian History 
(1992). Like Dozier, Sando showed how the Pueblos have survived through years of challenges 
from outside societies. Sando provided more discussion of the federal intervention into Pueblo 
lives than Dozier, but Sando’s discussions of the events of the twentieth century were still brief 
in comparison to what is presented in the following case study. He barely discussed the Pueblos’ 
ability to manage affairs of water and land.110 Overall, while scholars have written about the 
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Pueblos at length, no study has focused on land problems and issues of land sovereignty, as does 
the case study that follows. 
The histories of the Pueblos often overlap, and the federal government has often viewed 
Pueblos together, thus it is necessary to illustrate their connections to make sense of their unique 
world. First, the Pueblos are connected through language. As of 1500, the Pueblos spoke seven 
languages belonging to four language families, Tanoan, Keresan, Zuni, and Uto-Aztecan. The 
Tanoan language family included the Tiwa, Tewa, Piro, and Towa speakers who lived on the 
banks of the Rio Grande and tributaries. The Tiwa Pueblos of Taos and Picuris were at the 
northern edge of Pueblo settlements in 1500. The Northern Tewa were thirty miles to the 
southwest of the previously mentioned pueblos, which included San Juan de los Caballeros, 
Yugeuingge, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambe, Cuyamunge, and Tesuque. Lying 
twelve miles southwest of present-day Santa Fe were the Southern Tewa (or Tano) Pueblos of 
San Marcos, Galisteo, San Lazaro, and San Cristobal. The Southern Tiwa Pueblos, of which 
Isleta is a part, lived near present-day Albuquerque. The Spanish explorers referred to a group of 
ten villages collectively as Tiguex. The Isleta Pueblos formed their village fourteen miles to the 
south of modern Albuquerque. To the east, on the eastern slope of the Sandia-Manzano 
Mountains were the pueblos of Chilili, Tajique, Quarai, Abo, and Gran Quivira. The Piro 
Pueblos of Alamillo, Pilabo, Senecu and Trenaquel lived fifty miles south of Albuquerque. The 
Towa speaking Pueblo of Pecos was forty miles east of Santa Fe. Fifty miles west of Santa Fe on 
the Jemez River were the Pueblos of Giusewa and Amoxungua.111 While the languages of the 
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Figure 2.1 Pueblo Language Groups 
(“Pueblo Language Groups,” National Park Service, accessed March 28, 2015, 
http://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/kcc/chap3.htm.) 
Tanoan branch are similar, they are mutually unintelligible. Within the Tiwa family, members of 
the Taos, Picuris and Isleta Pueblos had a difficult time communicating with each other.112 
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The Keresan speakers primarily lived on the Rio Grande, twenty-five miles southwest of 
Santa Fe. Cochiti was the northern most Pueblo. Down the river were Santo Domingo, San 
Felipe, Zia, and Santa Ana. Sixty miles west of Albuquerque sat Acoma Pueblo, the only Keres 
Pueblo in western New Mexico until Laguna Pueblo was founded in 1697.113   
Far from the Rio Grande to the west was the Zuni language family, which occupied 
pueblos seventy miles northwest of Acoma. The Zuni language family, from east to west, were 
Kiakima, Matsaki, Halona, Kwakina, Kechipauan and Hawikuh. The Spanish thought that they 
had discovered the mythical Seven Cities of Cibola when they came across the Zuni pueblos in 
1539. Archeologists have found ruins of six pueblo cities in the area.114  In northeastern Arizona, 
two hundred miles northwest of the Zunis, lived the Uto-Aztecan speaking Hopis. Seven Hopi 
villages existed in 1540 on four adjacent mesas. Kawaiokuh and Awatobi were situated on 
Jeddito Mesa, the easternmost mesa. Walpi was on First Mesa, while Mishongnovi, Shipaulovi, 
and Shungopovi were on Second Mesa, and Oraibi was on Third Mesa.115 
The Pueblos have lived on their land for thousands of years and have operated distinct 
communities for thousands of years, yet the federal government has not recognized the Pueblos 
as sovereign communities. The federal government also has not abided by the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hildago (1848) that ended the Mexican-American War. The treaty called on the 
federal government to respect the land grants of the former Mexican citizens, including the 
Pueblos. On July 4, 1687, Spanish King Charles II approved Pueblo land grants of 17,712 acres 
for each pueblo, which included the Catholic Church that stood at each location. By the time the 
United States took over the area, the majority of the pueblos had been invaded by non-Indian 
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settlers, leading to land disputes.116 Thus, the Pueblos maintain actual towns called pueblos that 
constitute their land holdings in the United States, but through a series of court cases and federal 
laws, the federal government has eroded Pueblo self-rule over the many years since the signing 
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago. The following discussion outlines how the federal 
government has not recognized Pueblo sovereingty.   
Pueblo history in North America began some 11,000 years ago, in what is today the 
southwestern United States, where there was a savannah with trees, not desert with cactus. Here 
the Anasazis, the ancestors of the Pueblos, could hunt large game such as Columbian mammoths, 
the less woolly brethren of their northern neighbor, the woolly mammoth. When a climate shift 
occurred about 9,500 B.C., the Anasazis turned to hunting smaller prey and gathering various 
plants for survival. About 2,000 B.C. the Anasazis first planted maize, beans, squash, and cotton. 
With agriculture, came the sited village that the federal government later so deeply admired as a 
Pueblo quality. The Pueblos were farmers well before the United States was established. By the 
end of the first millennium A.D., the Anasazis had built elaborate personal homes, the first at the 
famous Chaco Canyon in northwestern New Mexico. Around 1250 A.D. the Anasazis abandoned 
their homes, most likely due to over-cultivation and water shortages, but some scholars blame 
diseases and factionalism for the move. The Pueblos, however, have explained the change 
otherwise. They say the serpent, the deity of rain and fertility, mysteriously departed. The people 
felt helpless, so they gathered up their possessions and tried to follow the serpent to the river. Of 
course, migratory life was normal in the southwest from 1250 to 1540 A.D.117      
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The Spanish attempts at conquest of the Pueblo began with the ramblings of Francisco 
Vásquez de Coronado in 1540. The 29-year-old governor of Nueva Galicia visited the Eastern 
Pueblos, and perhaps the Pueblos of Isleta, while seeking the mythical Seven Cities of Gold. 
Coronado’s men asked the Pueblos for more and more supplies, challenging the well-run system 
of resource allocation the Pueblos maintained. When the Pueblos tried to force the Spanish 
soldiers from the area, Coronado’s three hundred soldiers captured two hundred Pueblos and 
killed them.118 News of Coronado’s brutality spread across the lands of the Pueblos and created 
the underlying mistrust that would be problematic for the duration of the relationship between 
the two cultures.119 
In 1595, King Phillip II of Spain awarded conquistador Don Juan de Oñate a contract to 
colonize what was known to the Spanish in Mexico as New Mexico. Over the next three years, 
with his four hundred colonists, including mostly soldiers, ten Franciscan missionaries, and some 
Indian servants, Oñate received agreements of “submission” from the Pueblos in exchange for a 
dubious protection that the Pueblos did not know they were receiving.120 When Oñate 
encountered resistance at Acoma Pueblo in 1598, his soldiers killed numerous Acomas and 
burned the Pueblo. As further punishment, Oñate’s men amputated one foot from all Pueblo men 
over twenty-five years old. Oñate forced all men and women over twelve years old into twenty 
years of service to the new conqueror and took Pueblo land for the Spanish crown.121 At the time 
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the Spanish invaded the area, there were thirty to forty thousand Pueblos who inhabited seventy-
five to eighty permanent towns.122  
The Spanish created a mission system in what became New Mexico, which caused great 
distress among the sovereign Pueblo communities of the region, and was one of the root causes 
of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. The Spanish friars quickly baptized the Pueblos. Father Alonzo de 
Benavides, who directed the missionary program in the early seventeenth century, documented in 
1630 that 60,000 Pueblo Indians had been converted and ninety chapels had been built.123 The 
Franciscans did not understand native religions and usually did not try to understand. The 
missionaries enforced compulsory attendance at mass and destroyed native religious materials, 
such as masks. The missionaries also interfered in Pueblo ritual activities that were orchestrated 
to help the growing season as well as provide a deeper sense of community. The intensity by 
which the missionaries tried to restructure Pueblo religious life was at the heart of the Pueblos’ 
revolt against the Spanish.124 
The other primary cause of the Pueblo Revolt was that the Spanish institutionalized a 
system of theft of Pueblo land. The Spanish governors and missionaries required large forces of 
Pueblos to collect salt, piñon nuts, and hides. The encomienda system, imposed by Oñate as part 
of the colonization system, gave land grants to soldiers who participated in the conquest of New 
Mexico. A soldier, also known as an encomendero, received the right of repartimiento, which 
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was the right to enslave Indians living on the land grant. The produce from Indian labor went 
partly to the king and partly to the encomendero.125 
The final reason for the Pueblo Revolt was that the Spanish could not offer protection 
from the drought and Plains tribes that intertwined to threaten Pueblo existence. The extended 
drought that began in 1672 led to Pueblo crop failures and massive starvation. At the same time, 
disease and raiding tribes invaded the region. The Navajos and Apaches also suffered from the 
drought, and they raided the Pueblos for what little supplies the sedentary people had left. The 
Spanish failed to protect the Pueblos from the raids, which was the only reason the Pueblos had 
tolerated the Spanish in the first place. By 1675, at least six pueblos had been destroyed through 
raids. The Pueblo response to the destruction of the pueblos was rebellion against the Spanish.126    
On August 10, 1680, led by Popé, a San Juan medicine man, the Pueblos defeated the 
Spanish at Santa Fe, which the Pueblos held under siege for nine days.127 The Spanish were 
genuinely confused at how they could have been attacked and why they deserved such treatment 
by the Pueblos. They thought that they had done nothing wrong. The Spanish Governor of New 
Mexico, Antonio de Otermín, learned from an 80-year old Pueblo named Pedro Nanboa that the 
Pueblos had been plotting for seventy years to attack the Spanish, because the Spaniards were 
cruel and had destroyed the Pueblos’ religious objects. The Spanish forced the Pueblos to work 
and beat them when they disobeyed. The Franciscans, however, believed that the only thing they 
were guilty of was caring for the Pueblos.128 
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Pope’s reign was short, since his promises of bounty were hollow. The rain did not come 
and the crops neglected to grow. His demands for women and tribute of crops were too much for 
the Pueblos. The Tewas and Tanos deposed Popé in late 1681. What followed was more war, as 
the Pueblos fought amongst themselves, while the Utes and Apaches also attacked the Pueblos.129    
All the while, the Spanish were planning to re-conquer Santa Fe and the Pueblos. In 1692, Diego 
de Vargas, a Spanish general, recruited 100 Pueblo refugees from Isleta, Senecu, and Socorro to 
re-conquer Santa Fe. Vargas and his troops camped outside Santa Fe on September 13, 1692. 
After asking to enter the city peacefully and being refused, Vargas and his soldiers attacked the 
city on December 28. By December 30, the Pueblo warriors had surrendered. Vargas had seventy 
Pueblo warriors executed and he gave 400 woman and children to Spanish colonists to be used as 
slaves. By the end of the re-conquest in 1698, Isleta stood as the lone surviving southern Tiwa-
speaking pueblo.130       
The 1700s saw the Spanish missionaries somewhat change the way they related to the 
Pueblos. The Franciscans did not force an end to Pueblo religious practices or ceremonial 
painting. Governor Francisco Cuervo y Valdez appointed Captain Alfonso Rael de Aguilar as 
protector general of the Pueblos at a meeting on January 6, 1706, which was attended by many 
Pueblo and Spanish leaders. The goal of having a protector general was to cement positive 
relations with the Pueblos. Furthering relations in 1714, Governor Flores Mogollón declared that 
the Pueblos had the right to arm themselves, as arms provided an advantage against raiding 
Indians from the surrounding territories that were not Pueblos. The Franciscan friars supported 
arming the Pueblos.131  
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In the eighteenth century, what the Franciscan friars did not support was the open 
practice of Pueblo religion, but the friars no longer had the ability as they once did to stop the 
rituals. The Spanish governors did not support the friars in their attempts to force Pueblos to 
adhere to Catholic ritual, as to do so was counter productive to the overall need of survival for 
Spanish colonists in the region. The Pueblos disliked the harsh church discipline, and with the 
friars unable to stop Pueblo rituals, the Pueblos practiced a few rituals in the open. One of the 
Pueblo rituals the friars disliked the most was the scalp dance, which was done in remembrance 
of those who died trying to fight the Spanish. The friars referred to it as a ritual of vengeance. 
The Pueblos did not let the Spanish see other dances that they knew would be particularly 
disconcerting to outside peoples, especially in areas where the Spanish element was heaviest. 
The only recourse the friars had was in church, when they would enforce strict rules. They also 
tried to force the Pueblos to church, but with little success. The Spanish government was more 
concerned with having a partnership with the Pueblos that could keep the raiding tribes of the 
surrounding regions, such as the Comanches, Apaches, and Utes, at bay. Thus, to support strict 
Catholic adherence would be counter productive to the Spanish government.132 The previous 
century of rebellion by the Pueblos had finally started paying dividends in the eighteenth 
century, as the Spanish governors had to view the Pueblos as allies, instead of enemies and 
slaves. 
The Spanish finally lost New Mexico at the completion of the Mexican Revolution in 
1821, which marked a change for the Pueblos, as the Mexican government initially respected the 
Pueblos’ abilities to make land decisions. The problem for the Pueblos was that with the ability 
to sell land came the threat that Mexican government officials would try to buy the land at 
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bargain prices, which they did. Mexican administrators and politicians falsified documents to 
swindle Pueblos out of their land. The Mexican courts were overrun with cases of illegal land 
occupation. The Mexican government, generally, ignored the Pueblos’ plight, as the officials in 
Mexico City were more concerned with keeping the United States from taking New Mexico and 
its northern territories.133   
The United States ultimately took control of Pueblo land after victory in the Mexican-
American War, and at first, the US respected the Pueblos’ sovereignty over their land as outlined 
in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago in 1848.134 The federal government proceeded to create the 
territory of New Mexico in 1850,135 and the federal Act of December 22, 1858, approved land 
title for all Pueblos to land granted by the Spanish and recognized by the Mexican government.136 
The United States did not initially consider the Pueblos to be Indians. Thus, unlike the vast 
majority of Indians living in America, the Pueblos held communal fee-simple title to most of 
their land.137 The Supreme Court upheld the Pueblos’ right to land ownership in United States v. 
Joseph (1876), which involved an American who faced a fine of $1,000 from the territory of 
New Mexico for illegally settling on land belonging to the Taos Pueblos. The court reasoned that 
the Pueblos’ right to their land was superior to that of the United States, because Pueblo land 
grants were made by Spain prior to the United States owning the territory, and protected in the 
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Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago. In addition, federal law, as of December 22, 1858, approved title 
for all Pueblos to land granted by the Spanish and recognized by the Mexican government, 
therefore Joseph would have to buy Pueblo land.138 The United States briefly recognized the 
Pueblos’ sovereignty over their land, due to the Pueblos’ history as first occupants.    
Federal recognition of the Pueblos land titles was brief, as 1913 saw the Supreme Court 
overturn the Joseph decision in United States v. Sandoval (1913). The court decided that the 
Pueblos were under the protection of the federal government, and therefore Congress could make 
judgments on all land within the borders of the United States. The case involved a Mexican-
American named Felipe Sandoval whose lawyers argued that alcohol sales were legal on Pueblo 
lands, because Pueblos owned their lands outright, since the King of Spain granted the Pueblos 
title in 1689. Officials of the Territory of New Mexico arrested Sandoval under the Act of 
January 30, 1897, which made it a felony to introduce liquor into Indian County, and under the 
New Mexico Enabling Act (1910), which stated that Pueblos lived in Indian Country and did not 
hold their land in fee simple.139 The Supreme Court went the opposite direction of the Joseph 
court and stated that the Pueblo Indians “are always living in separate and isolated communities, 
adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetishism, and chiefly 
governed according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are a simple, 
uninformed and inferior people.”140 In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that since public 
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money had been spent on the Pueblos for schooling and agriculture training, Pueblo land 
belonged to the United States, not the Pueblos, who were wards of the federal government.141   
The Sandoval decision was a product of the changing legal nature of Indian sovereignty 
in the United States. The Supreme Court leaned heavily on its decision in United States v. 
Kagama (1886) to rule on Sandoval. In Kagama, the court decided that the US had legal 
jurisdiction over the case of an Indian who killed another Indian in federal territory, even though 
the Indian Appropriation Act (1885) stated that Indians who committed violent crimes were 
subject to the territorial courts.142 The federal-tribal trust relationship, as outlined in the 
Constitution, and defined by Chief Justice John Marshall, now applied to the Pueblos. The 
United States would no longer recognize the Pueblos’ sovereignty over their land.   
The Supreme Court went a step further in United States v. Candelaria (1926). The 
Supreme Court relied on the precedence of its decision in Sandoval to judge that the Pueblos 
held fee-simple titles to their various lands of each independent Pueblo, but they were subject to 
the trust relationship of the United States. The case involved a Mexican-American named Jose 
Candelaria who made claims to Pueblo land, which New Mexico recognized, and the district 
court upheld. The United States brought suit against Candelaria to keep him from fencing 
Laguna Pueblo land for himself. The Supreme Court stated that the fiduciary duty, or adherence 
to the trust relationship, alone belonged to the federal government.143 Ultimately, the implication 
of Sandoval, Kagama, and Candelaria on Pueblo sovereignty was that they would not be able to 
decide land issues on their own.   
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The example of the Pueblo Lands Board also illustrates the federal government’s 
unwillingness to recognize the Pueblos’ ability to make land decisions. The Pueblo Lands Act of 
1924 called for investigations of land claims by non-Indians on Pueblo lands through the creation 
of the Pueblo Lands Board. The federal government was to pay the Pueblos for lands lost to 
illegal settlers. Congress’s intention was to put the Pueblos on solid economic ground, make 
them independent of the federal government, and address past injustices. Congress promised 
large payouts under the Pueblo Lands Act, since non-Indian settlers had taken as much as 90 
percent of the Pueblos’ land at places like San Ildefonso Pueblo.144 
In practice, the Pueblo Lands Board rarely gave fair market value to the Pueblos for their 
stolen land. Republican Herbert J. Hagerman, the territorial governor of New Mexico from 1906-
1907, chaired the Pueblo Lands Board. Congress referred to his decisions as “decidedly hard-
boiled”145 and Congressmen thought that he held considerable sway over the other two members 
of the board. His character was questioned by Congress, as he never appeared at Senate hearings 
in 1931 to defend himself on charges that he did not adequately perform his duties as chair of the 
Pueblo Lands Board. Some Senators believed that he purposely dodged the hearings, although 
Hagerman said he had the flu.146   
Hagerman was a controversial choice to lead the Pueblo Lands Board, since his 
background as territorial governor of New Mexico gave ample warning of his questionable 
leadership. Hagerman was embroiled in controversy involving the circumvention of New Mexico 
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Territory land law that only allowed 160-acre land grants. Hagerman allowed workers of the 
Pennsylvania Development Company, the Santa Fe Central Railway, and the New Mexico Fuel 
and Iron Company to purchase 160-acre plots. The workers then turned the plots over to the 
corporations, allowing the three companies to acquire massive quantities of land. Hagerman’s 
controversy provided the perfect reason for President Theodore Roosevelt to remove Hagerman 
from office. Roosevelt asked for Hagerman’s resignation on April 1907. Although Hagerman 
managed to pass an anti-gambling law, an irrigation law, and a land law during his brief tenure 
as territorial governor of New Mexico, he had alienated Republicans in New Mexico prior to 
Roosevelt’s move. Hagerman had fired Holm O. Bursum from his post as superintendent of the 
penitentiary, even though Bursum was the chairman of the Territorial Republican Committee.147 
The Pueblo Lands Board consistently shortchanged the Pueblos. The board appointed 
appraisers to figure the cost of the lost Pueblo land, but it paid the various Pueblos $600,000 less 
overall than judged fair by the appraisers. The courts did not challenge the decision of the board, 
arguing the board’s decision was the one that mattered. The burden of proof fell to the Pueblos, 
even though they were not responsible for the loss of their land. The federal government did not 
allow the Pueblos to hire attorneys on their own, nor could they afford attorneys. The 
commissioner of Indian affairs appointed Judge R.H. Hanna as the Pueblos’ attorney.148 Judge 
Hanna was a longtime New Mexico Democrat who served in a number of capacities. He was a 
justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court from 1912-1919 and served as chief justice in 1917. 
He was a candidate for New Mexico governor in 1920 and a candidate for the United States 
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Senate in 1921.149  In December 1925, Hanna asked the board to furnish him the Spanish land 
titles for review, but it declined due to cost and the lack of a Photostat machine.150 The board had 
no interest in being critiqued by Hanna.  
The Pueblo Lands Board left the Spanish land records open for Hanna to view, but his 
office was sixty-five miles from the board’s Santa Fe headquarters, and Hanna knew that he 
could not get to the records in time. He had just sixty days to review all the records before his 
hearing with the board. In contrast, the board furnished copies of the deeds to the Board of 
Indian Commissioners in Washington, D.C., and also to the secretary of the interior, the attorney 
general, the clerk for the Unites States District court, and the clerk for the Pueblo Lands Board.151 
Thus, it was obvious that Hagerman was not cooperating with Hanna.   
To make matters worse for Judge Hanna and the Pueblos, the Pueblo Lands Board was 
not clear in their report on how they arrived at their decisions. Therefore, it was difficult for the 
Pueblos and Hanna to counter the board’s decisions without understanding their rationale. The 
board stated in a letter to Hanna, dated December 14, 1925, that it would not give him a defense 
of its reasoning on cases. Hanna sent a letter of complaint to the attorney general and the 
secretary of the interior, but neither responded. Hanna believed that the federal government 
would not cooperate with him because he was not federally appointed, but the Pueblos’ chosen 
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attorney.152 Hanna’s stance was odd since the commissioner of Indian affairs had actually 
appointed Hanna.153    
The Pueblo Lands Board picked a team of three appraisers, who did not appraise Pueblo 
land properly, although Hanna initially believed that the appraisers were qualified.154 For 
instance, the appraisers did not go to all the Pueblos; they went only when a large amount of land 
was at stake.155 Another problem was that the Pueblos could not counter the appraisals, which 
they needed to do, because not only were the appraisals low, generally just $80 an acre, but the 
Pueblo Lands Board then awarded only $35 an acre. After the appraisers gave the Isletas their 
appraisal at about $80 an acre, non-Indians sold twenty-six lots just south of their pueblo at $200 
to $300 an acre.156 It was clear that the Pueblo Lands Board did not give the Pueblos a fair deal. 
Water rights were also at stake for the Pueblos in the fight to receive their land back. In 
Hagerman’s opinion, the Pueblos would not lose their water rights if they lost land to the Pueblo 
Lands Board, but Hanna disagreed with the Lands Board’s stance. It was impossible for Pueblos 
to lose access to land, yet still take water from land they lost. Hagerman judged raw land without 
water to be only $5 per acre. Land with water was only worth about $25 per acre to Hagerman, 
even though the federal government had just spent $90 an acre for land with water when it 
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purchased land for the Elephant Butte, New Mexico, irrigation project south of Isleta Pueblo.157 
Obviously, Hagerman was not interested in paying the Pueblos for their water that they lost or 
returning land with water access.  
Hagerman believed that he did right by the Pueblos. He defended himself to the Santa Fe 
Kiwanis Club on March 3, 1931, arguing that several of the Pueblos received proper rewards. 
For instance, the Isletas held 188,661 acres of land because the Pueblo Lands Board had added 
21,414 acres and had taken away just 500 acres. He hypothesized, that by fencing and properly 
grazing the land, the Isletas could earn an extra $50,000 a year, since they were industrious and 
good farmers. In contrast, he considered the Sandia Pueblos to be lazy, and he was convinced 
that most of the money awarded to them had gone to bootleggers.158 Hagerman’s personal 
judgments on race played a part in his decisions. He certainly did not believe that the Isletas were 
a sovereign nation that could make decisions about Isleta land. 
The Pueblo Lands Board misinterpreted its duty, also leading to it not recognizing the 
Pueblos’ land rights. Charles Jennings, the United States attorney general’s representative on the 
Pueblo Lands Board, also defended the board’s decisions, contending it followed the federal 
statute in regard to what constituted possession of land, which was twenty-two years.159 Jennings 
was known as a deliberate official who created the tract-by-tract abstracts and tax statements for 
non-Indian claims. Along with Hagerman, he was a consistent member of the three-person 
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Pueblo Lands Board.160 Hanna argued that the Indians held title for more than twenty years. 
Jennings admitted, under oath, that the board never took into consideration the value of land for 
the years that the Pueblos had lost title to it, in defiance of the federal statute. The board’s view 
was that it simply would account for financial loss amounting to the value of land at the time 
non-Pueblos took the land.161 Senator Wheeler of Montana told Jennings that the board’s 
methods were the wrong way to carry out the Pueblo Lands Act, since the act stated 
compensation must be given to Indians for value lost.162 In addition, Jennings told Congress that 
the board never awarded the Pueblos more than $35 an acre, even if the appraisers said that land 
was worth $100 an acre, because it was the board’s estimation that the Indians never did the 
work to make the land worth $100 an acre. Jennings assumed the land was never under 
cultivation by the Indians.163 Ultimately, the board thought that the Pueblos were lazy, even 
though the board presented no evidence to that point. It was simply the board’s opinion. Again, 
they did not believe that the Pueblos held sovereignty over their land.     
Ultimately, the Pueblo Lands Board and the federal government did not recognize the 
Pueblos’ ability to take care of their land, and the board actually took land from the Pueblos. The 
board took 20,000 acres of land from the Pueblos. The Isletas lost the largest tract of land at 
14,700 acres. The Pueblos gave up 39,000 additional acres for an average compensation of just 
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$15.57 per acre. Hanna argued that the irrigated land was worth $125 an acre, while Senator 
Burton Wheeler of Montana believed that there was no land in northern New Mexico worth more 
than $15 per acre. At Isleta, the appraised value of land was $3,998.67, but the Pueblo Lands 
Board awarded the Isletas only $3,218.21. At San Ildefonso Pueblo, the appraised value of land 
was $52,128, but the Pueblo Lands Board awarded San Ildefonso just $29,090.53. At Picuris 
Pueblo, the appraised value was $71,898.14, but the board awarded the Picuris $47,132.90. The 
board assumed that whatever was growing on the land (alfalfa and other various crops) was not 
to the credit of the Pueblos, thus, the Pueblos did not deserve to be awarded full value.164 While it 
was obviously beneficial that the board gave land back to the Pueblos, the federal government 
did not recognize the Pueblos’ ability to improve their land and make other decisions about their 
territory.   
Congress granted several Pueblos more access to water with the creation of the Middle 
Rio Grande Conservancy District in 1925 as a political subdivision of New Mexico. Congress 
granted flood control and land reclamation to the Cochiti, Santa Domingo, San Felipe, Santa 
Ana, Sandia, and Isleta Pueblos. Congress concluded that the reclaimed land would provide 
about 15,000 more acres for cultivation, but in actuality, the Pueblos had to use the money they 
earned from the reclaimed land to repay the government for the money it invested in the 
Conservancy District. Congress estimated the total improvements to Pueblo land would be 
$1,593,311, while improvements to non-Pueblo land would total $10,235,689.165 In 1965, 
Congress updated the act to allow the secretary of the interior to contract with New Mexico for 
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more charges involving the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District.166 Thus, Congress 
continued to allow improvements to the Pueblos’ land and water situation, albeit through the 
BIA and not under the control of the Pueblos.   
The federal government further improved Pueblo access to water with the Rio Grande 
Conservancy Act of March 13, 1928.167 The Rio Grande Conservancy Act provided conservation, 
irrigation, drainage ditches, and flood control for the Pueblos in the region, including Isleta 
Pueblo. The act prioritized Pueblo irrigation rights over those of non-Pueblo land owners, but it 
gave the secretary of the interior the final say on all cases, thus the federal government did not 
recognize Pueblo self-determination.168       
The BIA also did not allow the Pueblos to be part of the equation for saving rangeland, 
illustrating that the federal government still did not recognize the Pueblos’ ability to manage 
their land. The lack of federal recognition did not stop the Isletas from trying to use the range 
how they saw fit, which was illustrated by the case of a rancher named Bibian Cordova. At the 
end of 1933, the Isletas agreed to permit grazing on the Isleta Land Grant for three years 
beginning January 1, 1934, for no more than 3,200 head of sheep, but at the last moment, the 
Isleta Tribal Council decided that the range could hold 4,500 head and balked at the deal. The 
BIA told the Isletas that the range could not carry more sheep, but the Isleta Tribal Council held 
firm. Finally, they made a deal for 200 head of cattle to graze the grant along with the 3,200 head 
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of sheep. A non-Pueblo rancher, Bibian Cordova, won the bid to graze his sheep, and another 
non-Pueblo rancher, Robert Sanchez, agreed to graze his cattle on the range.169 
 The BIA did not recognize the Isletas’ ability to manage the range and did not recognize 
the Isleta Tribal Council’s deal with Cordova. First, Lem Towers, the superintendent for the 
Southern Pueblo Agency branch of the BIA, wrote to Cordova informing him the price of the 
lease had been increased from $1,636 to $1,836, due to an accounting error.170 Cordova paid the 
money without incident.171 Then on December 31, 1935, the BIA cancelled Cordova’s permit for 
his sheep in order to make room for cattle, so the range could be conserved in the BIA’s 
estimation. The BIA believed that sheep destroyed the range, but approved of grazing 1,100 head 
of cattle. Additional sheep, the BIA argued, would be beyond the carrying capacity of the range. 
The BIA’s experts also thought that the range could handle only 1,750 head of cattle. Cordova 
was out of luck, as were the Isletas. Cordova’s 3,200 head of sheep, along with the 200 head of 
cattle co-owned by Cordova and Sanchez, were the equivalent of 1,000 head of cattle according 
to the BIA, which would make for a total of 2,100 head of cattle, if the Isletas’ 1,100 head were 
added to the range. The BIA reserved the right to cancel any grazing permit with compensation 
to the lessee.172 Yet, if the Isletas’ traditional knowledge had been taken into consideration, a 
greater profit could have been commanded from the range, because Cordova could have been 
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allowed to graze his cattle along with the Isleta’s cattle and sheep. That is not the way the BIA 
viewed the situation, however, since it was interested not only in the Isletas grazing their own 
cattle on their own range, but also conserving the range for what the BIA judged as the long-term 
health of the herd and the range. The BIA’s stance did not stop the Isletas from pressuring the 
BIA for control of the range. 
 BIA officials, clearly, did not understand ranching. Oscar L. Chapman, assistant secretary 
of the BIA, sent a letter to Cordova on November 14, 1935, to inform him that he had to move 
his stock by December 31, 1935.173 Chapman did not understand the sheep and cattle industry, 
since it would prove difficult to quickly find another range for the stock to graze on. Cordova 
could not immediately find a range for his sheep and cattle, and had to gain permission to keep 
the cattle on the Isleta range until February 1. E.R. Fryer, the director of land use activities for 
the BIA’s United Pueblo Agency, granted permission.174 The BIA’s interjection into the range 
lease agreement was making a mess of the Isletas’ plans. 
 The Isletas, then, worked a deal behind the scenes with Cordova. At the end of January 
1936, Fryer learned Cordova had come to an informal agreement with the Isletas to graze his 
cattle on their land. Fryer was livid. The BIA did not allow the Isletas to make deals without the 
approval of the BIA.175 Fryer could not keep the Isletas from exerting control over their land, 
even without federal approval. 
Another federal program that refused to recognize tribal knowledge was the Land 
Program of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, which originated in 1934 and lasted 
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until 1942. The overall goal of the program was to bring agricultural production, land use, and 
farm income into a sustainable relationship, while also integrating rural people into American 
society. The federal government originally planned to acquire twenty million acres of farm land 
and grazing land for parks, shelter belts, and wildlife refuges. Many of the New Deal scientists 
did their work within the Land Program and the Land Policy Section of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act.176 Thus, although New Dealers sympathetic to the plight of American Indians 
ran the Agricultural Adjustment Act, they still did not recognize Pueblo land rights.   
The Land Program began with promise in 1934, due to the large amount of funds 
dedicated to the project by the federal government. John Collier, commissioner of Indian affairs, 
and BIA officials submitted plans for fifty-one projects, with the hope of adding two million 
acres to Indian farm and grazing land. The largest of the projects was for the purchase of four 
hundred thousand acres of land for the Pueblos. Several cattlemen and cattle companies were 
anxious to sell their land to Collier for two to three dollars per acre, since cattle prices had fallen 
during the Great Depression. The federal purchase project organized the land into nine sites 
named after the adjacent Pueblos. At the northern New Mexico Rio Grande watershed were Zia-
Santa Ana, Jemez, Cochiti-Santa Domingo, Isleta, and Tewa Basin. Tewa Basin covered the 
Pueblos around Santa Fe: San Juan, Tesuque, Picuris, San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, Pojoaque, and 
Nambe. Four projects were in the west: Laguna, Acoma, Zuni, and Gallup-Two Wells. The 
Navajos were to use the land at Gallup-Two Wells. Problems arose, however, based on long-
standing cultural divisions between Indians and non-Indians.177 
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Many non-Pueblo cattlemen opposed the project due to the projected loss of grazing land 
and the interference of the federal government in their affairs. The New Mexico Wool Growers 
Association were convinced that giving land to Indians would damage the county and state tax 
base, thus hurting wool growers as well.178 Hispanics, who lived off the land in northern New 
Mexico, detested the fact that Commissioner Collier was giving Pueblos land at the expense of 
the Hispanics. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes and Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace 
somewhat solved the problem with creation of the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory 
Committee in 1936, which changed its name to the Rio Grande Board in 1938.179 The 
Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory Committee consisted of the commissioners from the 
BIA, the Division of Grazing, the General Land Office of the Interior Department, the Forest 
Service, the Soil Conservation Service, and the Resettlement Administration, which changed its 
name to the Farm Security Administration in 1937 as part of the Department of Agriculture. 
From 1935 to 1937, the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory Committee discussed shared 
land use and fair land allocation for the Pueblos and Hispanics.180    
On May 19, 1936, the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory Committee divided 
460,000 acres somewhat equally among Pueblo and Hispanic peoples, providing access to each 
group for certain purchases. The Soil Conservation Service developed management plans for the 
land. The idea was to help all rural residents, not just the Pueblos, as Commissioner Collier had 
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originally envisioned.181 Legal custody of the land remained in the Resettlement Administration, 
which worked to fix rural isolation during the New Deal. Small stock farmers in the West were 
not pleased. They complained that they were being forced from their homes by the Pueblos.182   
The Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory Committee was interested in Pueblo 
prosperity as long as it aligned with what the committee deemed fit for the health of the land. On 
November 30, 1937, the committee proposed a federal land use adjustment program for the 
Upper Rio Grande Watershed. The purpose of the program was to protect and restore the soil and 
water and to help the rural residents of the area, both Pueblo and non-Pueblo. On September 30, 
1937, the committee purchased 701,100 acres of depleted and eroded grazing lands for the 
Pueblos as part of the program to rehabilitate Indian populations, as outlined in the National  
Industrial Recovery and Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 1935. According to the federal 
government, the Pueblos would not be able to decide the number of animals that could graze on 
the depleted and eroded grazing lands.183 
The Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory Committee did not give rural residents the 
opportunity for ownership, or use of land, when it judged that the environment, and the resource 
needs of rural residents, could be better provided for under federal ownership. For instance, on 
January 19, 1937, the committee transferred 8,000 acres of forest near the Santa Fe National 
Forest, known as the Galbadon Grant, to the Forest Service. The committee believed that the  
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Figure 2.2 The Upper Rio Grande Watershed  
(Department of Agriculture and Department of the Interior, Interdepartmental Rio Grande 
Committee, “Report and Recommentations,” Washington D.C., October 1937, RG 75, Box 1, 
Folder 10/31, IRGB reports.) 
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Forest Service could protect the water and timber, while regulating the water for the benefit of 
the Tesuque Pueblos and non-Pueblos of the area.184   
The Forest Service was to only allow the Tesuque Pueblos the use of dead timber and 
downed timber for firewood, as well as standing green timber for other projects.185 The first 
priority for the committee was the protection of the land; the second priority was Pueblo usage. 
The committee did not give the Pueblos a choice in what timber they could use. 
The federal government had several branches involved in conservation of the range, to 
the chagrin of the BIA, to the detriment of Pueblo control of their range land, and to the 
disappointment of non-Pueblo stockmen. The Grazing Service worked to grant grazing rights to 
both Pueblos and non-Pueblos in Grazing District Number Seven in northwest New Mexico.186 
The non-Pueblo stockmen of the area were concerned that there were different rules for the new 
grazing district, contrary to those of the Taylor Grazing Act. The stockmen believed that the 
federal government gave the Navajos, and the Pueblos, special privileges, when the point of the 
Taylor Grazing Act, according to the non-Indian stockmen, was to stabilize the range, not help 
local tribes.187   
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Another infringement of Pueblo sovereignty occurred when the Grazing Service 
Advisory Board investigated and judged the legitimacy of Pueblo land use. The Pueblos and 
non-Pueblos had sometimes grazed their stock on common land over the years. The Grazing 
Service Advisory Board moved to stop common grazing, but Congress had not charged the 
Grazing Service with the responsibility of judging Indian affairs.188 The Grazing Service held that 
the Pueblos needed to graze cattle and sheep, at least during 1940 and 1941, on their own land, 
based on the premise that the Grazing Service could not legalize the use of non-Pueblo land by 
Pueblos.189 Ted Formhals of the BIA office in Albuquerque disagreed with the Grazing Service, 
because only he was to judge Indian land. Furthermore, argued Formhals, if Pueblos could not 
use non-Pueblo land, then the Grazing Service should not be able to approve non-Pueblo use of 
Pueblo land.190 The BIA was supposed to be the sole judge of Indian land disputes.  
S.D. Aberle, the United Pueblo Agency superintendent, was furious that the Grazing 
Service Advisory Board did not approve the applications of nine Puertocito Indians for 
allotments. His argument was that the Grazing Service Advisory Board--established under the 
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 to advise the regional grazing manager and the secretary of the 
interior on matters of the Grazing District--had no business judging allotment applications. The 
applications were made under the Dawes Act of 1887. Special Allotting Agent William Williams 
received the applications in 1912, but he never filed them in the land office. The Pueblos went 
ahead and improved the land, believing they owned the land. Thus, the Pueblos were on the land 
before the establishment of Grazing District Seven on September 1, 1939, and the Grazing 
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Service had no jurisdiction to disallow the allotments.191 Aberle was fighting for the BIA’s role in 
rulings on Indian affairs and the BIA’s function as the federal department to enforce the federal-
Pueblo trust relationship. The Pueblos’ ability to manage their own land was not the main 
concern of Grazing Service Advisory Board and the BIA. 
H.W. Naylor, the regional grazer manager, responded to Superintendent Aberle. Naylor 
contended that the Grazing Service Advisory Board judged that the Puertocito range could hold 
only 595 sheep, even though the Puertocitos had applied for 1,402 head, thus it did not approve 
the eight applications from the Puertocitos. The Grazing Service asked the Interior Department 
for permission to create a six-year grazing improvement plan for the district. The plan was for 
the Grazing Service to eventually allow Pueblo requests for more stock once the range was in 
shape for more sheep.192 Naylor argued that the Grazing Service was not unsympathetic to the 
needs of the Pueblos in question, but was more concerned about the health of the range. It is not 
clear whether Aberle was primarily concerned about keeping his power to make decisions for 
Pueblos, or whether he was more interested in Pueblo stock. Historians, especially Donald 
Parman, have established that the federal government, including the BIA, did not understand the 
cultural significance of keeping sheep on the range, even malnourished sheep, since it meant 
subsistence that did not involve market forces.193    
Eventually, the Grazing Service left the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory 
Committee, due, in part, to opposition from the BIA. World War II marke the end of the 
committee, which had changed its name to the Rio Grande Board in 1938. The federal 
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government decided the projects in New Mexico were not worth financing due to the high cost of 
war. The Grazing Service also left the committee, because the Grazing Service had a 
disagreement with the rest of the committee members on the Rio Puecos project, which provided 
land use for Hispanics at the Zia and Jemez Pueblos. The BIA opposed the Grazing Service on 
the Rio Puecos project, believing that the Grazing Service should not have a say in Indian 
affairs.194  Overall, the Pueblos saw the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory Committee place 
recognition of Pueblos’ ability to manage their own land a clear second to what the committee 
trumpeted as proper land use practices.   
Ultimately, the Pueblos persevered in the face of three foreign governments—Spain, 
Mexico, and the United States—that each refused to recognize the Pueblos’ ability to govern 
themselves and their right to their land without interference from foreigners. Once the United 
States created the territory of New Mexico, the federal government briefly recognized the 
Pueblos’ land rights, but only because the Supreme Court did not recognize the Pueblos as 
Indians, opening the land to all types of squatters and settlers. Eventually the federal government 
attempted to give land back to the Pueblos, as well as money, to compensate for lost land to non-
Indian settlers. The Pueblo Lands Board came up short in its assigned job, thus Congress 
investigated the board’s actions, but ultimately did not award the land or money that the 
appraisers judged to be fair.   
The Interdepartmental Rio Grande Advisory Committee, based upon Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs John Collier’s Lands Program, held some promise to provide more land for the 
Pueblos, but disagreements on the federal level, along with protests from non-Pueblo ranchers, 
led to less land allocation for the Pueblos. Despite the lack of federal recognition of Isleta 
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sovereignty, the Isletas signed grazing contracts on their terms, to the dismay of federal officials. 
Native peoples in New Mexico, overall, continued to push for more land and for federal 
recognition of their sovereignty.  
The Isletas perseverance served them well, because the next challenge for the Isletas to 
overcome came from the city of Albuquerque, which released sewage waste into the Rio Grande. 
At first the sewage was treated, but the growing population of Albuquerque during the twentieth 
century pressured the water treatment system to a point that it could not treat all the sewage. 
Untreated sewage thus floated down the Rio Grande to Isleta Pueblo. Albuquerque’s pollution 
set the stage for the next era of Isleta history, when the tribe would take primary control 
(primacy) of writing water treatment standards. While some thought the Isletas were the model 
of environmental self-determination in the 1990s, the EPA did not truly recognize the Isletas’ 
right to self-rule. 
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Chapter 3: The Isleta Pueblos Write Water Quality Standards 
 
The city of Albuquerque, New Mexico released millions of gallons of wastewater every 
day toward the Isleta Pueblo during the twentieth century, with 55 million gallons of wastewater 
being released by 1991. Because of the high concentration of pollution in the river, the Isletas 
could not grow squash and corn, eat fish, or celebrate traditional religious practices, which they 
had been doing for centuries. The Isletas’ religious practices were, and still are, a major unifying 
force for them.195 Isleta Governor Alex Lucero stated in 1991 that water “is more important to the 
people of Isleta for religious and traditional reasons. It is vital for our ceremonies and our 
religion. It is the essence of life.”196    
Chapter three argues that in late 1992 the EPA approved the Isletas’ water quality 
standards for the Rio Grande River, not because the EPA was an enlightened government agency 
that recognized tribal sovereignty, but because the EPA was interpreting the guidelines of the 
Clean Water Act as the EPA saw fit. The Isletas had to fulfill the EPA’s guidelines, and 
therefore, the Isletas could not write water quality standards as they wished. Fortunately for the 
Isletas, they agreed with the EPA’s water quality standards. 
Albuquerque tried to treat its sewage, but its efforts were not enough to protect the 
Isletas. Albuquerque installed its first sewers in 1891, which carried sewage into the Rio Grande 
River. The city government soon realized it was affecting people downstream with its waste and 
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began chemically treating the sewage in 1907. The first sewage treatment plant was located at 2nd 
and Anderson, and the first water reclamation plant was located at 2nd and Rio Bravo in 
Albuquerque, but ultimately the sewage treatment plant did not work, and the river could not 
handle the load of waste. The Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority claimed 
that since the 1970s it was concerned with protecting the environment down stream. It stated that 
strict regulations were developed, and it tried to recover methane gas from waste to produce 
electricity. The utility agency also recovered wastewater for non-drinking water uses such as 
irrigation of golf courses.197 The city’s recycling processes did not do enough to protect the 
Isletas from the pollution.  
Sewage in the Rio Grande was, and still is, particularly disastrous for Isleta land, because 
of the high water table. The high water table allows pollution from the river to stretch into 
adjacent farm lands, damaging crops. A soils report produced in the 1960s by the federal 
government stated that 3,616 acres, of the Isletas’ 6,183 irrigated acres, had high salinity and 
poor drainage. In addition, the water table was between three to five feet the majority of the time, 
and occasionally as low as thirty inches.198 Thus, the pollution would not just seep into farm land, 
but would also fail to drain from farm land.     
In 1972, Congress called on the EPA through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(known as the Clean Water Act) to regulate the cleanliness of water within the borders of the US. 
The EPA specifically used Section 402 to set effluent (sewage discharge) limits on an industry-
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wide basis and on for water-quality standards. Companies that wanted to discharge pollutants 
had to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The Clean 
Water Act allowed the EPA to give states the power to issue NPDES permits, but the EPA still 
had oversight responsibilities.199 The EPA reduced pollutant discharges into waterways, financed 
municipal wastewater treatment facilities, and limited polluted runoff in streams and rivers. Early 
efforts focused on “point source” facilities, such as sewage treatment plants and industrial 
facilities. In more recent years, the EPA paid attention to runoff from streets, construction sites, 
and farms.200 After 1972, the Isletas stood a chance to see clean water in the Rio Grande.   
The 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act allowed the EPA to award Indian tribes 
“treatment as a state” (TAS) status for the purpose of controlling water pollution. Treatment as a 
state status meant that tribes could write water quality standards for water on their land with the 
oversight of the EPA. The Isletas took advantage of the opportunity and created water quality 
standards for the city of Albuquerque that were more stringent than those of New Mexico and the 
EPA, in regard to a host of toxins, such as mercury.201 The EPA revised Albuquerque’s NPDES 
permit in 1992 to reflect the Isletas’ more stringent water pollution standards. On October 12, 
1992, while revisions were in the process of completion, the EPA awarded TAS status to the 
Isletas. The EPA delayed Albuquerque’s permit until it approved the Isletas’ water quality 
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standards on December 24, 1992. Then the EPA prepared a NPDES permit for Albuquerque that 
reflected the Isletas’ water quality standards for the Rio Grande and New Mexico’s water quality 
standards for the Rio Grande. Albuquerque unsuccessfully sued the EPA in response to the new 
standards in City of Albuquerque v. Browner (1993).202 Ultimately, the EPA recognized limited 
Isleta self-determination to write water quality standards in line with the amendment to the Clean 
Water Act. The EPA did not actually recognize the Isletas sovereignty, though, since they could 
not act on their own accord, and could not impose water quality standards as they wished.     
The federal government was not simply willing to recognize the Isletas water quality 
standards without the tribe following EPA regulations. According to the Clean Water Act, a tribe 
had to prove its worthiness in order for the EPA to consider the tribe to be a state, and thus set 
water quality standards, equal or more stringent, than those of the EPA. First, the tribe had to 
request a letter from the secretary of the interior certifying that the federal government 
recognized the tribe. Then, the tribe issued a statement that the current tribal governing body 
actually governed the tribe. Third, the tribe had to illustrate that it had the bureaucratic authority 
structure to regulate water quality. Fourth, the tribe was required to prove that it had the ability to 
administer a water quality program by using professional environmental officers. Lastly, the 
EPA could request additional documentation from the tribe to prove the required steps were 
completed. Once the regional EPA administrator received the documentation, he notified the 
federal government, and regional agencies, of the application. The regional EPA administrator 
then received comments from the public for thirty days on the tribe’s assertion of authority. If 
any entity challenged the tribe, the EPA administrator and the secretary of the interior met to 
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determine if the tribe was ready for authority under the Clean Water Act.203 Tribes essentially had 
to, and still have to, illustrate to the EPA that they deserve recognition to write water quality 
standards, which in itself means that the EPA does not recognize tribal self-determination. The 
Isleta government’s willingness to submit the paperwork to pass the steps to get permission from 
the EPA to write water quality standards for the Rio Grande illustrates the Isletas’ incredible 
persistence in the face of continued federal refusal to recognize the Isletas’ ability to regulate 
their land and water.     
Tribes could not write water quality standards based on tribal standards and evidence. 
Once the EPA approved a tribe for treatment as a state status, the tribe could submit water 
quality standards to the EPA for approval. The tribal standards were based on the EPA’s effluent 
limitations guidelines and water quality standards. Effluent limitation guidelines were uniform 
scientific standards, promulgated by the EPA, restricting the quantities, rates, and concentrations 
of specific substances discharged into water. The tribal water quality standards were not based 
on pollution technologies, but detailed the condition of a waterway. The tribal water quality 
standards also supplemented the technology-based standards, so that more numerous sources 
could be regulated. Furthermore, the tribal water quality standards also had three elements: one 
or more uses (such as a recreation area), pollutant levels, and anti-degradation provisions.204 The 
EPA provided states and tribes substantial guidance when they were drafting water quality 
standards. Section 304 of the Clean Water Act required the EPA to use the latest science and 
provide its data to states and tribes, which could use the most scientifically modern data to write 
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their standards. Before adopting a standard, the states or tribes had to provide notice and a public 
hearing. Once tribes or states wrote their new water standards, the EPA reviewed the standards. 
If the EPA found tribal standards to be inconsistent with EPA standards, the EPA had ninety 
days to notify the state or tribe and provide specific areas to correct. If the state or tribe did not 
respond with a correct standard, then the EPA had to issue a definitive standard within ninety 
days of the proposal.205 Thus, the EPA only recognized the Isletas’ ability to write water quality 
standards as defined by the EPA. 
The Isletas authored water quality standards as stringent as those of the EPA. Isleta 
Governor Alex Lucero stated that the cleanliness of the Rio Grande was extremely important to 
the Isletas, thus their standards were strict. In addition, other tribes have also shown that they 
want strict water quality standards. In a similar case in the late 1990s, the Penobscots authored 
water quality standards for the Penobscot River more stringent than those of the EPA. The EPA, 
however, concluded in the Penobscot case that the science did not warrant the stronger standards, 
and therefore, the EPA did not agree to the Penobscot water quality standards for the Penobscot 
River. The Penobscots still had to follow federal water quality standards, just like the Isletas.   
In accordance with the Clean Water Act, the Isletas published notice of their water 
quality standards in the Albuquerque Journal, and the Isletas invited representatives of 
Albuquerque to a public hearing on August 7, 1991. All comments submitted to the tribe during 
the comment period were passed on to the EPA administrator for the region. Furthermore, the 
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EPA administrator required sixty days to approve state or tribal standards.206 The Isletas 
complied with all the EPA requirements for water quality standards.   
Ultimately, Albuquerque did not agree to the Isletas’ water quality standards, because the 
city judged that the standards were too stringent. Albuquerque did not blame the Isletas for 
writing such tough standards. Instead, the city sued the EPA for allowing the Isletas to write 
them. The case became City of Albuquerque v. Browner (1993). After Albuquerque, the EPA, 
and the Isletas signed the NPDES permit in 1992, Albuquerque filed a complaint in federal 
district court on January 25, 1993. Albuquerque followed up on February 2, 1993, asking the 
court for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, but Judge Edwin L. 
Mechem denied the request. On March 16, 1993, Albuquerque amended its complaints, and it 
renewed its motion for a preliminary injunction on July 23, 1993. Albuquerque alleged that the 
EPA failed to follow procedure during the approval of new standards, misinterpreted two areas 
of the Clean Water Act, and approved water quality standards for the Rio Grande that were 
unconstitutional. Albuquerque also charged that the EPA failed to include a mechanism to 
resolve “unreasonable consequences” resulting from the new strict standards that were applied 
by two separate entities, the state and the tribe. In addition, Albuquerque argued that the EPA 
violated the Clean Water Act by failing to ensure the Isleta standards were stringent enough to 
protect the Rio Grande. Lastly, Albuquerque claimed that the Isletas’ standards had no basis in 
science. The district court, however, found the EPA to be clear of any incorrect application of 
law.207   
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Further illustrating that the EPA did not recognize the Isletas’ ability to write water 
quality standards, the district court in Albuquerque referenced Arkansas v. Oklahoma (1992), a 
similar case involving the EPA. In Arkansas the Supreme Court found that the EPA could 
require compliance greater than allowed by Congress. Arkansas was a similar case to 
Albuquerque since upstream and downstream water quality standards had to match the Clean 
Water Act. The district court understood the Clean Water Act applied equally to upstream 
pollution dischargers, such as Albuquerque, and a downstream tribe, thus the EPA properly 
recognized the Isletas’ authority to develop water quality standards more stringent than the 
agency’s, since Albuquerque was also subject to those standards.208 But the EPA, not the Isletas, 
were ultimately responsible for the Isletas’ water quality standards.  
Each of Albuquerque’s complaints against the EPA further illustrated that the EPA did 
not recognize the Isletas’ ability to write water quality standards. Albuquerque claimed that the 
Isletas’ standards would lead to unreasonable consequences for the city, but the district court 
found that the EPA met the requirements of the Clean Water Act when allowing the standards to 
stand. For human contact with treated water, the court judged that the Isleta standards had to just 
“resemble” a fishable/swimmable standard, not the drinkable water quality standard 
Albuquerque argued it required. Humans needed to ingest a large volume of water to force a 
drinkable water quality standard.209 Furthermore, the Safe Drinking Water Act covered drinking 
water provisions and the Isletas were not drinking water from the Rio Grande. 
Further illustrating that the EPA had the power to accept and reject standards, the district 
court did not accept Albuquerque’s argument that by allowing the new water quality standards, 
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the EPA had violated the Constitution’s Establishment Clause. Albuquerque charged that by 
allowing stringent water quality standards the EPA had upheld the Isletas’ religious ceremonies 
as more important than Albuquerque’s finances. It was clear to the court, however, that the EPA 
approved the new standards, because they met the requirements of the Clean Water Act. The 
court also decided that the new regulations were not unconstitutionally vague, because once the 
EPA released the NPDES permit for publication, Albuquerque knew exactly what standards to 
follow.210   
Albuquerque also claimed that the Isleta water quality standards were unattainable. The 
district court judged that the EPA lacked the authority to reject harsh standards on the grounds 
that they were financially difficult for the city to follow. The EPA had only the authority to 
declare whether the water quality standards were stringent enough to fulfill the Clean Water Act. 
The Isletas were successfully able to document the reasons behind the new standards, but 
Albuquerque still argued that during low-flow periods, the standards should be lowered. The 
Isletas countered Albuquerque’s statement, replying that during low-flow periods, tribal 
members used the Rio Grande as often as during high-flow periods,211 because religious 
ceremonies were not based on flow rates.212 Overall, the court did not reference the Isletas’ 
sovereignty, or their ability to write water quality standards, but the implications were clear: the 
EPA, alone, was responsible for the water quality standards authored by the Isletas. 
The reality that the EPA was responsible for the Isletas’ water quality standards was 
driven home upon Albuquerque’s appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
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District, which covered New Mexico, Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Utah and Wyoming. 
Although Albuquerque, the Isletas, New Mexico, and the EPA agreed to a new four-year NPDES 
permit on April 15, 1994, Albuquerque still appealed the summary judgment granted in favor of 
the EPA by the district court. Albuquerque believed that the new NPDES permit made the 
district court’s decision moot. The circuit court held that the case was not moot, because a “live” 
issue was still being decided. Under the new settlement, the EPA had not withdrawn its approval 
of the Isleta water quality standards, thus a “live” controversy still existed, since the parties still 
disagreed. In addition, a decision of moot could not be applied, because it was obvious that 
Albuquerque hoped to have the district court’s decision overturned. The district court declared 
that a court decision becomes moot by happenstance, not through direct actions by the parties in 
question. Albuquerque consciously signed the new NPDES permit. Furthermore, if the appeals 
court did find the case moot, Albuquerque might come back and file suit against the EPA again, 
which was also not the point of a case being decided as moot. The courts were not necessarily 
protecting tribal self-determination, as much as they were essentially upholding the EPA’s right 
to interpret the Clean Water Act213   
Albuquerque also argued that the EPA could not judge the Isletas as a state, but that was 
problematic in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Council (1984). In Chevron the 
Supreme Court ruled that the EPA was correct in allowing states to issue permits allowing 
corporations to fix just one air polluting source, as long as the total air pollution from the factory 
did not increase. Federal law allowed the EPA to make a judgment based on its science.214 In the 
case of the Clean Water Act, the EPA could interpret the act to fulfill its mission of protecting 
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the environment and public health. The court reasoned that Congress desired for the states to 
have a major role in keeping waterways clean, and the 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act 
clearly allowed the EPA to judge tribes as states.215   
The appeals court went a step further than the district court and made a statement about 
tribal self-determination. The appeals court stated that while Congress did not include tribes 
specifically in the Clean Water Act, Congress’s oversight did not mean that tribes could not 
exercise limited self-determination over their land by creating water quality standards more 
stringent than state and federal standards. The appeals court also reasoned that “under the 
statutory and regulatory scheme, tribes are not applying, or enforcing their water quality 
standards beyond reservation boundaries.”216 Thus, the EPA could recognize the Isletas’ water 
quality standards and the Isletas would be allowed to administer those standards within the 
boundaries of their land. 
The appeals court again upheld the EPA’s role as an administrator for the Isletas when 
Albuquerque unsuccessfully argued that the EPA made informal rules in regard to Isleta water 
quality standards, in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. Albuquerque contended that 
the EPA did not provide a basis and purpose for Isleta actions, or a review period for public 
notice and comment, even though Congress intended for states and tribes to initiate public 
notices and comment periods. The appeals court reference National Resources Defense Council 
v. US EPA (1993), where the US Appeals Court for the Fourth Circuit found that Congress 
clearly intended for the EPA to have a limited role in establishment of water quality standards, 
with states and tribes holding primary roles, but the Clean Water Act gave the EPA sole 
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judgment of federal standards. Congress also provided the EPA sixty days for approval, and 
ninety days for disapproval, of water quality standards proposed by states and tribes. There was 
no way Congress could have expected the EPA to conduct notice and comment periods within 
sixty to ninety days. Congress intended for the EPA to have a limited role. Even New Mexico 
officials agreed with Congress’s approach, stating:  
Not only would the expansive EPA review of tribal water quality standards sought by the 
City duplicate the lengthy process already undertaken by the tribe itself in adopting the 
standards, it is doubly unnecessary because of the notice, comment, and hearing process 
entailed in issuance of NPDES permits. As it was, there was full opportunity for notice, 
comment and hearing both for adoption of the Isleta standards (conducted by the Pueblo) 
and for issuance of the City’s NPDES permit (conducted by the EPA). To require yet 
another detailed notice, comment and hearing process by the EPA would be to inject 
more bureaucracy, delay and expense into an already lengthy process that allows ample 
opportunity for public comment.217   
Thus, even New Mexico officials did not want to get in the way of the direct federal-tribal trust 
relationship, thus upholding the federal government’s ability to issue the NPDES permit on its 
terms and without further notice. Again, the appeals court upheld the EPA’s ability to recognize 
the Isletas’ water quality standards. 
The appeals court also upheld the EPA’s power to approve the Isleta scientific rationale 
which, according to Albuquerque, made the water quality standards difficult to follow. 
Albuquerque argued that the new standards were unattainable and lacked scientific grounds, yet 
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sections 1341 and 1342 of the Clean Water Act stated that the EPA could allow a state or tribe to 
uphold a more stringent standard than the EPA itself would follow on the federal level. The 
Isletas’ standards were based on probable drought conditions, the need to protect the elderly and 
young, and primary contact during ceremonial use involving incidental ingestion of water. The 
appeals court agreed with the district court that Albuquerque’s claim that tribal usage fell under 
the Safe Drinking Water Act seemed “farfetched.” Instead, the court held that the Isletas’ usage 
resembled a fishable/swimmable standard.218 Once again, the appeals court judged the EPA’s 
approval of the Isletas’ water quality standards to be legal.   
The appeals court judged the EPA’s arbitration process for Isleta water quality standards 
to be correct, as well. Albuquerque claimed the dispute resolution process installed by EPA was 
wrong, contending there should have been a way for a third party to initiate the process, not just 
the state or tribe. The appeals court found that under the Clean Water Act, the EPA’s choice to 
use mediation and non-binding arbitration was within the scope of the law, but the state and the 
tribe could certainly invite third parties into the process.219 The arbitration provision allowed the 
Isletas more possibilities for support of the water quality standards and further supported the 
EPA’s power over the decision making process.   
The appeals court decided that the EPA could only judge Isleta water quality standards 
within secular goals, but that the Isletas could have religious reasons for their standards, as long 
as they worked within the EPA’s secular goals, once again illustrating that the Isletas were 
beholden to the EPA’s standards. Albuquerque argued that the Establishment Clause of the 
Constitution was infringed upon by the EPA, because the Isletas defined primary contact 
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ceremonial use as religious or traditional. The EPA was interested only in the secular goal; the 
Isletas use of water for ceremonies was irrelevant. The EPA was not advancing religion, just the 
goals of the Clean Water Act. Furthermore, according to the appeals court, the EPA’s approval 
of the Isletas’ strict standards was not based on any particular religious belief, although the EPA 
followed the goals of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, which stated that “it shall be 
the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent rights 
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of American Indians.”220    
 Finally, the appeals court rejected Albuquerque’s argument that the standards of the 
Isletas were vague, and therefore the EPA deprived Albuquerque of due process. Albuquerque 
complained about the usage of phrases such as “impart unpalatable flavor to fish” and “nutrients 
produce objectionable algal densities.” Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA could allow 
standards to be defined by narrative descriptions. In addition, Albuquerque argued that it was not 
notified of the changes in the NPDES, but the city had been notified of the changes, thus the 
appeals court could not agree with the city.221 Of course, the Isletas could not truly write water 
quality standards any way they wished. The standards still had to make sense to the EPA and 
match the EPA’s requirements. Ultimately, the EPA’s science and the Isletas’ science meshed. 
As more evidence that the EPA aided the Isletas in their efforts to keep the Rio Grande 
clean, in 2007 the EPA awarded the Isletas $110,000 to develop and manage their environmental 
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programs. At the time, the tribe planned to train staff, develop an outreach program on 
environmental issues, and develop a dredging program with the grant.222   
The case of the Wall Colmonoy Facility is another example of how the Isletas tried to 
control environmental pollution, yet had to be approved by the EPA. The Pueblos created the 
Pueblo Office of Environmental Protection in September 1991 through a Superfund 
Memorandum of Agreement with nineteen Pueblo governors and EPA Region VI. The Pueblo 
Office of Environmental Protection was part of the All Indian Pueblo Council, which represented 
nineteen Pueblo communities, as allowed by each of the Pueblo governors and tribal councils. In 
1993, the Pueblo Office of Environmental Protection helped the Isletas with pollution removal 
under Superfund, yet the EPA was also under control.223   
The EPA encouraged the Isletas’ negotiations with the Wall Colmonoy Facility under 
CERCLA guidelines, thus forcing the Isletas to negotiate for the amount of pollution present in 
their soil. The Wall Colmonoy Facility, located on the Isletas’ lands, was a metal plating facility 
that contaminated the soil with chromium and nickel, both judged to be carcinogenic by the 
EPA. The Isletas negotiated with Wall Colmonoy soil standards of total chromium as 100 parts 
per million (ppm), total nickel as 200 ppm, and hexavalent chromium as 10 ppm. The toxic metal 
levels were well below what the facility owners offered, as well what was done at other facilities 
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around the country, but within the scope of CERCLA.224 Similar to the case of City of 
Albuquerque, the EPA allowed the Isletas to make a deal with Wall Colmonoy to release reduced 
toxins into the soil as outlined in CERCLA. The Isletas’ experiences, however, were not unique 
to the entire Pueblo community.   
The Acoma Pueblos set their own water quality standards in 1998 under provisions of the 
Clean Water Act. The Acoma Pueblo, which lies just southwest of Albuquerque, used the waters 
of the Rio San Jose and Acomita Lake for a variety of purposes, such as religious ceremonies.225 
The Acomas did not face the same set of challenges that the Isletas faced from a major city, so 
the story is not as controversial, with no ensuing court case. Nevertheless, like the Isletas, the 
Acomas expanded their ability to protect their environment, but had to rely on the EPA to allow 
them to do so. The EPA awarded the Acomas $107,244 in 2007 and $291,769 in 2009 to support 
their water quality program. The Acomas said they would use the funds for sampling data for 
surface water quality assurance. The data would also be used in the watershed management 
program.226 The Acomas used the EPA standards as a guide for setting toxicity standards and the 
Acoma Water Office worked in accordance with the EPA and New Mexico.227 Similar to the 
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Isletas’ experience, the EPA recognized the Acoma water quality standards, but the Acomas had 
to write water quality standards in accord with those of the EPA.    
In conclusion, the EPA supported the Isletas’ water quality standards, because they 
followed the amended Clean Water Act, and the EPA continued to provide money to the tribe to 
help it regulate water quality in the Rio Grande River. The EPA recognized Isleta water quality 
standards since they were at minimum as stringent as those of the EPA, in accordance with the 
Clean Water Act. As in years past, the Isletas pushed the federal government to work with them 
on land and water issues, but ultimately the federal government only recognized limited tribal 
self-determination over their land.   
Through the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System, the EPA brokered an 
agreement between Albuquerque and the Isletas. Albuquerque challenged the agreement, but the 
Supreme Court would not hear the case, and therefore, the city could not change the agreement. 
The federal courts found it constitutional for the EPA to approve the Isletas’ water quality 
standards as long as the standards followed the provisions of the Clean Water Act and were in 
agreement with science supported by the EPA.   
Summary of Section One 
 In Chapter Two and Chapter Three it is apparent that the Isletas exercised self-
determination with the United States, pushing the federal government to recognize that they 
could make decisions about land and water. All the way back to the Pueblo revolt, the Pueblo 
people have not quietly followed the foreign government that has claimed control over their 
territory. The federal government has often pushed back, forcing the Pueblos to adhere to federal 
regulations, which do not recognize tribal sovereignty. But, the Pueblos have continued to make 
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decisions in the face of a federal government that has not been willing to recognize Pueblo self-
determination to choose the Pueblo path of life. 
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Chapter 4: The Quapaw Tribe and Self-Determination before the 
EPA 
 
The Quapaws’ connection with the land goes back centuries and is intertwined in their 
traditional belief system. The central force of the universe for the early Quapaws was Wah’Kon-
Tah, who was in all entities of the environment and who was part of man, therefore the Quapaws 
believed that they had a connection to the earth. The Quapaws thought that they were related to 
rocks, clouds, and animals, thus the Quapaws respected the animate and inanimate. The sun and 
the moon were especially important. The Quapaws had numerous deities that they believed 
moved everyday life, such as Ke-Jan-Qa, a small water tortoise, whose tail could not be lifted 
unless they wanted rain. The Quapaws also had sacred objects that held their manitou (sacred 
spirit), which the Quapaws blamed for good and bad fortunes. The Quapaws were appreciative of 
the environment and thanked Wah’Kon-Tah for a successful corn harvest.228 The early Quapaws 
passed their stories to each other teaching that their future was intertwined with the land. They 
were sovereign over the land, because they were the land. The federal government has not 
recognized the Quapaws’ abilities to make decisions involving the land. Thus, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs allowed large mineral leases on Quapaw land during much of the twentieth 
century, but did not recognize the Quapaws’ will involving the mineral leases.   
Even though the federal government did not recognize the Quapaws sovereignty, the 
Quapaws remained on their land, setting the ground for their eventual work with the EPA. The 
United States sponsored treaties in the nineteenth century to move the Quapaws to what is today 
extreme northeast Oklahoma. At the turn of the twentieth century, mining companies asked the 
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BIA to mine Quapaw land. The BIA did not recognize the Quapaws’ sovereign right to issue 
mining contracts for their land. The BIA and the mining companies deemed the Quapaws 
inferior to “improve” the land and write the leases. The Quapaws received financial royalties 
from the mining operations, but often could not choose the royalty figure or what company could 
sign the lease. The Quapaws lack of control over their leases did not stop individual Quapaws 
from fighting for better leases. 
Historians have not written about the Quapaws nearly as much as the Osages or Pueblos. 
There are few book-length studies of the Quapaws, with the best probably being W. David 
Baird’s The Quapaw Indians: A History of the Downstream People from 1980. The purpose of 
the study was simply to tell the story of how the tribe handled challenges from non-Indians and 
endured. His general history of the tribe covered the early years of the Quapaws, but barely 
touched the twentieth century history of the tribe. He devoted little attention to the land issues of 
the tribe, but his work is still useful for understanding struggles of allotment and treaties during 
the nineteenth century. This dissertation improves on Baird’s work by bringing the history of the 
Quapaws in to the modern era and focusing specifically on what could be considered the most 
tumultuous challenge to the tribe, the Tar Creek Superfund site.  
The second important book about the Quapaws is Larry Johnson’s Tar Creek: A History 
of the Quapaw Indians, the World’s Largest Lead and Zinc Discovery, and the Tar Creek 
Superfund Site (2008). Johnson’s thesis was that the Quapaws and the mining corporations lost 
the principle of cooperation and the unity of purpose through enlightened self interest during the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, and thus northeastern Oklahoma has suffered. Johnson blamed 
the breakdown of the family unit on the Quapaws, as well as in America, as one of the problems 
that have led to disaster for people. He also blamed the Quapaws for individually separating the 
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wealth of the ore mines, instead of keeping the wealth in common, thus individual Quapaws 
became poor once the ore ran out.229 This dissertation shows that it is incorrect to blame the tribe 
for individual leases when the secretary of the interior orchestrated those leases. Ultimately, 
ideas of sovereignty and self-government are absent from Johnson’s book, although Johnson did 
illustrate the tribe’s cultural persistence in the early years of European invasion, but only because 
it served as a way to blame the tribe for its later problems. In contrast, the following case study 
focuses on how the federal government did not recognize Quapaw sovereignty and how the 
federal government orchestrated land leases to their benefit and that of corporations.  
To establish evidence for the federal-Indian trust relationship between the Quapaws and 
the United States, it is important to first detail the Quapaw’s path to the self-determination era. 
The Quapaws slowly moved to mineral-rich land through a series of treaties with the federal 
government. Like numerous other tribes, the Quapaws handed over thousands of acres of land in 
exchange for protection from non-Indian encroachment, yet the federally sponsored treaties 
could not truly protect the Quapaws from non-Indian settlers. 
Scholars trace Quapaw roots in America to the Ohio Valley on the banks of the Wabash 
River and Ohio River, settling in their current home in Northeastern Oklahoma before European 
invasion, giving the tribe an argument that their sovereignty should be recognized by the US as 
first peoples.230 Sometime prior to the arrival of the French in the seventeenth century, the tribe 
had moved from the Ohio Valley down the Mississippi River in modern day Arkansas, 
displacing the Tunica and Illinois Indians. The Tunicas and Illinois called the Quapaws 
“Ugaxpa,” which meant “the downstream people.” The Quapaws settled where the Mississippi 
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River meets the Arkansas River, due to the nutrient-rich soil, before separating into four villages 
at the mouth of the Arkansas River.231  
The first Europeans the Quapaws encountered were the French. French explorers Jacques 
Marquette and Louis Joliet first went to Lake Michigan, then the Wisconsin River, before 
reaching the Mississippi River in June of 1673. The two explorers reached Kappa, the northern 
most village of the Quapaws, in July. The Frenchmen stayed only two days before heading back 
up the Mississippi, as the Quapaws were friendly, but did not provide the evidence of wealth that 
the Europeans desired. In addition, the Frenchmen were horribly outnumbered and the Quapaws 
held a distinct military advantage. The next fur traders to go to the region were part of the 
exploration party of Robert Cavelier Sieur de la Salle in 1682. His band of men also found the 
Quapaws to be welcoming, but knew that they had to return with more Frenchmen and establish 
forts in order to take full advantage of the prosperous trade that awaited them. La Salle’s own 
men, rather than the Quapaws, killed him in late 1686. The Quapaws were, in fact, anxious to 
trade with La Salle.232 In contrast to the Spanish explorations in New Mexico, farther to the east, 
the French were not looking for full scale missionary activity, and the Indians of the region were 
not looking to rid the area of the Europeans, since the French were not seeking to stop traditional 
Indian practices.  
The French built their first fort in the region at Biloxi in 1699. Governor Pierre Le Moyne 
d’Iberville established a trading system in the region. The soldiers of Le Moyne traded for a 
variety of animal pelts and products with guns, utensils, metal tools, and alcohol. The Quapaws 
cemented their trading relationship with the French in 1713, when the tribe helped the French 
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defeat the English in Queen Anne’s War, by fighting the Chickasaws in America. The French 
were able to keep Louisiana in their hands in no little part through the help of the Quapaws.233  
The Quapaws remained aligned with the French throughout the eighteenth century, 
maintaining self-rule up to the time the French lost the continent to the British after the Seven 
Years War in 1763. The Quapaws even served as an effective means of curtailing Spanish trade 
with New Mexico across the region. Some bands of the Quapaws strayed from French loyalty, as 
the French could not help defend the tribe from the raiding Osages and other tribes. Thus, 
Governor Kerlerec brought more French soldiers to the Arkansas Post in response to some 
Quapaw warriors joining British-aligned Chickasaw warriors, who then raided a party of French-
aligned Illinois tribe in 1754. For the most part, though, the Quapaws did well in a colonial 
world. Ultimately, the Quapaws had to adjust to a new world of British domination of the 
continent, especially once the American colonies defeated the British in the Revolutionary War 
in 1783.234 
After President Jefferson sealed the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, non-Indian settlers 
flocked to the region during the early nineteenth century, beginning the time of Quapaw removal. 
William Clark negotiated treaties with the Quapaws that would allow for an expanding United 
States and would create the basis for the federal-Quapaw trust relationship. The first official 
meeting between the United States and the Quapaws occurred in November 1816, when Clark 
asked the tribe to send a delegation to St. Louis to talk treaty.235 Clark finally got his wish on 
August 24, 1818, when the Quapaws signed a peace treaty, giving the federal government all the 
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land to the west bank of the Mississippi River and to the north bank of the Arkansas River. In 
total, the tribe gave up 30 million acres and kept just 2 million acres.236    
The federal government immediately made the region taken from the Quapaws available 
for white settlers, further dispossessing the tribe. The Quapaw land cession was a critical 
component of the federal government’s greater Indian Removal Policy.237 President James 
Monroe created the Territory of Arkansas on March 2, 1819 and non-Indian settlers built the 
town of Little Rock on the west side of the Quapaw Reservation in the spring of 1820. In the fall 
of 1820, Little Rock became the capital of the Territory of Arkansas.238 
The Quapaws needed protection from non-Indian settlement, even though that meant 
relying on another tribe or the federal government. The Quapaws ceded the rest of their land to 
the federal government in 1824 and agreed to join the Caddoes on the Red River.239 The Caddoes 
and the Quapaws were supposed to join as one tribe, but the Caddoes refused. Instead of sharing 
Caddo land with the Quapaws, the federal government agreed to a new treaty in 1833, setting 
aside the Quapaw Reserve, in what eventually became Ottawa County, Oklahoma.240 The 
Quapaws lived in desperate conditions for over thirty years, until on February 9, 1867, they 
agreed to sell 7,600 acres for $1.25 an acre to non-Indian settlers, as well as 18,522 acres, the 
western fourth of their reservation, to the Peoria Indians for $1.15 an acre. The Peoria Treaty sat 
unsigned by Congress due to President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment proceedings, and by 
March 1869, the Quapaws were still struggling to survive. Finally, in 1872, Congress 
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Figure 4.1 The Quapaws in Extreme Northeast Oklahoma  
(Family Search.Org, “Tribes and Bands of Oklahoma,” accessed August 9, 2013, 
https://familysearch.org/learn/wiki/en/File:Okterritory.png.) 
 
appropriated $25,801.24 to pay for the ceded area.241 The Quapaws were left with a small 
reservation and were definitely not protected from non-Indian encroachment, despite several 
treaties that were supposed to provide for their protection by the federal government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Federal allotment of reservations beginning in 1887 further disposed the Quapaws. 
Allotment involved the federal government parceling Indian land for farming by individual 
Indians and their families.242 In 1893, Congress proposed 200-acre allotments for each enrolled 
member of the Quapaws,243 and by the end of 1894, 234 Quapaws received 240 acres allotments. 
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After the Quapaws received 200 acres each, 12,000 acres of Quapaw land remained undivided, 
thus Congress further divided the reservation into 40 acre tracts.244 It did not take the federal 
government long to force the Quapaws into signing mining leases. The Quapaws signed the first 
leases on September 23, 1895, which stated that the Quapaws were incompetent and could not 
improve their allotments. The BIA justified allowing non-Quapaws to mine the land, because it 
judged the Quapaws to be incompetent.245 The BIA’s lack of tribal sovereignty recognition did 
not stop the Quapaws from pressuring the BIA for answers on mining problems for the next one 
hundred years, but the federal government still did not recognize the Quapaws’ ability to manage 
their own land.  
Mining on Indian land was not easy for the federal government to regulate, although it 
managed to maintain control over the Quapaws land at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1906, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis Leupp began cancelling mining leases when he thought 
that the Indians who signed them were incompetent.246 But Commissioner Leupp and the 
commissioners of Indian affairs that followed, found ways for corporations to stay in the 
mines.247 In 1907, mine operators and owners, including Kansas Governor Samuel Crawford, 
organized through the Baxter Springs Mining Exchange, sought a relaxation of leasing 
                                                 
244 Baird, The Quapaw Indians, 141-142. 
245 Mining Lease, James A. Newman, Quapaw, September 23, 1895, RG 75, Miami Agency, Records 
Relating to Leasing and Productions, Mining Leases, 1892-1898, Box 1, National Archives, Fort Worth, Texas; 
Mining Lease, Alphonsus Vallier, Quapaw, September 23, 1895, RG 75, Miami Agency, Leasing and Productions, 
Box 1; Mining Lease, Annie E. Dardenne, September 23, 1895, RG 75, Miami Agency, Leasing and Production, 
Box 1, Mining Lease, Ettie Hammitt, September 23, 1895, RG 75, Miami Agency, Leasing and Production, Box 1, 
Mining Lease. 
246 Allotments of Indians of Quapaw Agency, H.R. 25570, House Report 7615, at 1 (Feb. 14, 1907). 
247 Baird, The Quapaw Indians, 184; A. M. Gibson, “Leasing of Quapaw Mineral Lands,” 341-343. 
115 
 
restrictions and general government control.248 The Quapaws, now experienced in mining issues, 
asked the Interior Department and the BIA to at least recognize mining leases that could help the 
tribe. Vern Thompson, one time lawyer for the Skelton Lead and Zinc Company, argued in his 
article, “A History of the Quapaws,” that a Quapaw delegation appealed to Congress and secured 
passage of an act on March 3, 1921, giving the secretary of the interior and the commissioner of 
Indian affairs supervisory care and control over the income of the Quapaws. But, in Whitebird v. 
Eagle Picher Lead Company (1930), Quapaw heirs fought unsuccessfully to have the secretary 
of the interior ask Quapaw heirs for their permission before agreeing to leases.249 Thus, not all 
Quapaws were in the same camp in regard to allowing federal control of mining leases, but many 
Quapaws were trying to steer the interior secretary to approve leases with large profits for the 
tribe.     
The Interior Department allowed the Quapaws to receive only a small percentage of 
mining profits, thus Quapaw hope for advantageous leases was often not fulfilled. Non-Quapaw 
mining companies, from 1906 to 1920, pulled ore valued at $19,503,459 from Quapaw lands and 
gave the Quapaws a royalty of just $1,307,627, at a rate of 6.7 percent. From 1921 to 1929, non-
Quapaw mining companies mined $92,147,072 of ore on Quapaw land and gave the Quapaws a 
royalty of $8,784,424, for a rate of 9.5 percent. One quarter of the ore produced in the tri-state 
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district since 1891 came from Quapaw lands.250 All royalties after 1921 were nearly 10 percent. 
Before 1921 there was a sliding scale, from roughly 7 1/2 percent to 15 percent, which was based 
on market prices for ore.251 In 1928, the Federal District court in Tulsa decided that Secretary of 
the Interior Albert Fall had made fair contracts involving ten Quapaws who saw $30,000,000 in 
ore removed from their land by the Eagle Picher mining company and its sub-lessees.252 The 
Interior Department and the BIA did not let the Quapaws set the rates for royalties on tribal land.  
The Interior Department was sitting on profitable mines and determined that it could not 
allow the Quapaws to control such a business. The Quapaws’ lands provided two-thirds of 
Oklahoma’s zinc and lead ore, which meant large profits, and the interior secretary generally 
approved leases on the Quapaw lands for ten years, or as long as minerals could be mined.253 
Sometimes the Quapaws’ BIA agent auctioned leases to gain a bonus for the Quapaw land 
owner.254 The largest bonus ever received in payment for a Quapaw tract went to John Quapaw. 
The Kansas Explorations Company paid Quapaw $105,000 in 1926 for the use of just six acres 
of his allotment.255 Large payouts to native peoples were rare, though, as the interior secretary’s 
primary concern was to ensure large profits for mining companies and small profits for the tribe. 
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In contrast, the Quapaw land owners were primarily concerned with earning market based 
profits, and were willing to pressure the federal government for a fair deal.256 
The interior secretary’s motives to protect mining company profits were well illustrated 
by the case of the Skelton Lead and Zinc Mining Company, which in the late 1920s made a cut 
over (illegal mining on someone else’s tract of land) from the land of six Quapaw heirs. Dr. L.S. 
Skelton purchased the lease to the land known as the Mary Calf tract from the Welch Mining 
Company, which was illegal, although Skelton stated he did not know it was illegal. Secretary of 
the Interior John Barton Payne set a hearing over the case and decided to allow Skelton to 
purchase the lease for ten years, a standard time frame. Skelton paid the Quapaws a total of 
$125,000 for leases and the Welch Company paid an additional $125,000. Skelton also had 
signed a lease for the tract of land adjoining the land south of the Calf tract owned by the Lucky 
Kid Mining Company. To bring ore from one tract to the other, the Skelton Company made a 
cut-over on the land of Mrs. Clara Showalter.257 
The Skelton Company admitted that they had made a cut-over and offered to pay for the 
ore they took, but not the full value. It offered just 10 percent on the ore it had stolen, instead of 
the entire cost, which equaled $15,000 less than what the Quapaw heirs had requested. Then, in 
July 1930, the Skelton Company offered to lease the land for the standard ten years, in addition 
to the current lease, which ran out in September 1930. Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs 
Joseph Dixon agreed to the Skelton offer after an open bid period where the Skelton Company 
was allowed to match any lease offers from other companies. It is unclear why Dixon was 
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involved with the Skelton deal, because the interior secretary was in charge of approving leases. 
Clara Showalter thought that to accept the Skelton offer would be unfair, because the Skelton 
Company had an advantage against other mining companies, since a new mining company in 
that mine would have had to pay the Skelton Company $200,000 for milling equipment that was 
only worth about $75,000. Therefore, other bidders were convinced not to bid, and the Quapaw 
heirs could not receive the maximum amount of money for their land. Assistant Secretary Dixon 
was protecting the Skelton Company and he did not consult with any of the Quapaw heirs about 
the lease. Showalter and four other unrestricted heirs (Indians who owned the land outright) did 
not agree to the lease.258 
 The Skelton Company also offered a $10,000 bonus if the Quapaw heirs signed the lease, 
but the Skelton offer was still not an acceptable offer for the Quapaws. While the Skelton offer 
seemed profitable, a Mr. Perry of Washington, D.C. offered $100,000 for the lots, but Assistant 
Secretary Dixon did not accept the superior Perry offer.259 Dixon’s justification was that if the 
companies had to pay too much for mining leases, they would not mine the land at all, and the 
Quapaws would not receive any profit.260 The Quapaws, thus, could not stop Dixon from 
awarding the lease to the Skelton Mining Company. Dixon refused to recognize the Quapaws’ 
ability to choose who could mine their land, but the Quapaws continued to ask the federal 
government to approve the leases the Quapaws deemed fit.    
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The Quapaws continued to face challenges in the 1930s, as they saw mining royalties 
reduced. Roughly sixty-five percent of the ore had been mined and it was estimated that only 
eight more years were left for ore mining on restricted Indian land.261 The best ore mines were no 
longer producing and the ore companies moved to more marginal deposits, which cost more to 
extract. Mining companies used a process known as commingling, which used a central shaft and 
single milling location to pull ore from several mines. Commigling is a common process today, 
but at the time, all ore was milled on the same location from where it was extracted. The milling 
process involved separating and cleaning the ore, then preparing it for the smelting process. 
Commingling ensured that companies could still work in the mines, although the tribal profits 
were lower.262 The secretary of the interior, again, chose to approve consistent profits for the 
Quapaws and mining companies, instead of allowing the Quapaws to choose whether the ore 
from their land would be comingled.    
The courts also protected the mining companies at the expense of tribal profits and self-
determination. The case that set the precedent for the protection of mining companies was 
Whitebird v. Eagle Picher Lead Company (1930). The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit decided in Whitebird that the secretary of the interior could sign mineral leases 
without the consent of the tribal heirs. The case stemmed from the claim of Quapaw heirs, in 
1922, that Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall signed fraudulent leases without the approval of 
tribal heirs. The circuit court found no direct evidence of fraud and upheld the Act of 1921, 
allowing the secretary of the interior to make leases without Quapaw consent.263   
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   Problems with mines began for the Whitebirds with the allotment of the Quapaw 
reservation. On September 26, 1896, the Interior Department allotted 200 acres to Eudora 
Whitebird, Mary Whitebird, and Joseph Whitebird. The appellants in Whitebird were all heirs to 
one of the original Whitebird allotments and all members of the Quapaw Tribe. S.C. Fullerton 
and George W. Beck Jr. acquired leases to the land in 1912 from the heirs, and leases to adjacent 
land, for ten years at a royalty of five percent. Fullerton turned around in 1913 and subleased the 
land to the Eagle Picher Company at a royalty of 12½ percent. After World War I, the Eagle 
Picher Company subleased the land to twenty-seven mining companies, at forty acres apiece, for 
a royalty of 17½ percent. The Eagle Picher Company and its sub-lessees operated twenty-six 
lead and zinc concentrating plants on the lands, and the Quapaws had little control over how the 
company operated.264 
In 1920, the Eagle Picher Company faced losing its lease based on market forces and the 
involvement of Quapaw owners, but the federal government came to the company’s rescue. A 
rival company owned by Fullerton, W.W. Dobson and Beck, and their sub-lessees, devised a 
plan to sign leases from the Quapaw heirs at 7½ percent, then to sub-lease to the mining 
operators at fifteen percent. In Whitebird, Vern Thompson, lawyer for the sub-lessees, brought 
evidence in front of the court that royalties in Oklahoma ranged from 5-20 percent. Why could 
the sub-lessees not give higher rates to the Quapaws? Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles E. 
Burke recommended that Secretary of the Interior John Barton Payne not approve the leases until 
the Indians received 15 percent royalties. In response, Secretary Payne recommended to 
Congress the Act of March 3, 1921, which ultimately allowed the secretary of the interior to 
approve all leases and extended regulations against alienation of the Quapaw heirs for another 
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twenty-five years.265 According to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, the secretary of the interior did not have to recognize the Quapaws’ ability to govern 
their own land. 
The Act of March 3, 1921 called on the BIA to levy royalties based on market conditions, 
which held the minimum royalty rates low for the Quapaws. When the price of ore concentrates 
dropped to less than $50 per ton, the royalty was 7½ percent. The royalties were ten percent 
when ore was $50 to $60 per ton, 12½ percent for $60 to $70 per ton, and fifteen percent for over 
$70 per ton. Fullerton, Dobson, and Beck made an offer at the new rate, but with bonuses of 
$10,000 for the Eudora Whitebird tract, $16,000 for the Mary Whitebird tract, and $14,000 for 
the Joseph Whitebird tract. Eagle Picher made offers for land, but with no bonuses. Eagle Picher 
protested the Fullerton, Dobson, and Beck lease offer. On March 20, 1922, Commissioner Burke 
recommended that a commission be sent to settle who should receive the lease.266 The 
commission, which investigated the case from March 22 to June 5, 1922, consisted of John E. 
Dawson, who worked in the Indian Office; T.B. Roberts, a representative of Commissioner 
Burke, and O.K. Chandler, superintendent of the Miami Agency. Burke asked M. Van Siclen, a 
mining engineer from the Bureau of Mines, and Mr. Siebenthal, a geologist from the United 
States Geological Survey, to assist the commission. They recommended the leases be given to 
the Eagle Picher Company, which meant that the Quapaws would receive a lower rate. Chandler 
filed a minority report stating the leases should be given to the highest bidder.267 
Fullerton, Dobson, and Beck continued to offer better deals for the Quapaws than the 
Eagle Picher Company, but Commissioner Burke backed the Eagle Picher Company. Overall, 
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the Interior Department received twenty-two bids to mine the Whitebirds’ land, but 
Commissioner Burke still backed the Eagle Picher Company’s offer. Thus, the lawyers for the 
appellants argued that Commissioner Burke colluded with the Eagle Picher Company, but the 
lawyers for the defense argued that the market for lead and zinc nose-dived after World War I, 
because surplus lead and zinc was thrown on the market. Since the price fell from $135 to $20 
per ton, the Eagle Picher Company argued that they adjusted to price deflation by offering a 
lower royalty for the next lease. Van Siclen believed that the mining royalty ultimately would be 
better for the Quapaws if the Eagle Picher Company won the lease because Fullerton, Dobson, 
and Beck were speculators, and thus their offer was inflated and not tied to the actual price of 
ore. Van Siclen told Burke that a larger royalty, and bonus, could lead to the closing of weaker 
mines and the mining of only rich ore in order for an operator to pay a larger royalty and bonus. 
Thus, according to Van Siclen, the Quapaws would receive nothing from mines not in operation. 
For instance, the Fullerton, Dobson, and Beck bid of 15 percent with a $50,000 bonus would lead 
to the closing of unprofitable mines and the working of more profitable mines. Van Siclen 
argued that the total from the lease paid to the Quapaws by the Fullerton, Dobson, and Beck 
stood to be a quarter to a third less than the lease offered by the Eagle Picher Company. 
Therefore, the poorer heirs with the less profitable mines would probably receive little payment. 
Van Siclen further argued that the Eagle Picher Company would operate with more expertise, 
because it was more established than the Fullerton, Dobson, and Beck Company. The circuit 
court finally decided that the Act of March 3, 1921 clearly provided the secretary of the interior 
the power to approve leases and that Congress would not provide Indians the power to approve 
leases.268 The case illustrated how the appeals court protected corporations at the expense of 
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greater profits for the Quapaws, with the justification that the Quapaws were at least receiving a 
profit from their mines. In addition, the circuit court upheld the 1921 law that gave the secretary 
of the interior power over all leases, thus providing more protection for the companies, and no 
federal recognition of the Quapaws ability to decide who would receive leases to mine their land. 
The Whitebirds continued to push for control of their land, and increased royalties from mining 
leases on their land, even though the federal government did not recognize the Whitebirds’ 
ability to decide who could be awarded leases on their land.     
Many wealthier Quapaws accepted the power of the mining corporations, because it 
brought some Quapaw land owners wealth. In a show of self-determination, the Quapaws 
rejected by vote reorganization under the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, which 
would have provided the tribe a reservation in exchange for a new tribal government system 
based on federal preferences. However, many of the wealthiest Quapaws did not vote for 
reorganization, because they knew it would infringe on their personal freedoms and wealth.269 If 
the tribe would have accepted reoganziation the federal government also would have indefinitely 
extended trust restriction for tribal land, but since mining companies were operating on the land 
anyway, the Interior Department restricted leases, whether the Quapaws agreed to reorganization 
or not.270   
After World War II, mining companies operating on the reservation were slowing 
production, which meant lower royalty payments to Quapaws, because the federal government 
encouraged development in other countries. United States mining companies countered foreign 
mining with commingling, but the Peruvian and Mexican companies did not have a tariff to pay, 
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and were guaranteed six cents a pound for lead and zinc above the United States market price.271 
Then, on May 7, 1954, the Quapaws received a dose of federal cash that served as a replacement 
for mining profits. The Indian Claims Commission offered the Quapaws $927,668 based upon 
money the federal government did not pay the tribe in treaties. The tribe created a new 
government structure and a business committee. When faced with a vote on termination of the 
federal trust relationship, tribal members voted to keep the relationship, despite the 
recommendations of the business committee, which thought that termination would aid with self-
determination. Congress had been trying to terminate tribes from federal funds in order to make 
the tribes self dependent. Termination was disastrous for many tribes across the country. 
Termination would have ended the tribe’s relationship with the federal government and it would 
have taken away access to federal money.272 While the Quapaws chose to continue the federal 
trust relationship, they also chose to keep working toward their goal of self-dependence. 
Mining on Quapaw land, the primary financial spur, continued to slow. During 1956, just 
thirty-one Quapaw mineral leases, out of 172 tracts covering 16,054 acres, produced ore. The 
Eagle Picher Company, the largest operator in the district, controlled sixteen of the Quapaw 
leases and paid $252,508 to Quapaw land owners. The largest royalty received by a land owner 
was $56,000. The smallest royalty was just $2.69. The Muskogee Area Office for Indian Affairs 
paid royalties and approved all leases as of 1949, although by the Act of March 3, 1921, 
Congress allowed only the secretary of the interior to approve leases. By 1957, the mining 
companies had virtually abandoned the Quapaw lands.273 All of Oklahoma saw lead mining 
reduced considerably from 1948 to 1957. The average per year from 1948 to 1952 was 23,979 
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tons of lead concentrate. Mining companies pulled just 10,198 tons of lead concentrate in 1957, 
with the Eagle Picher Company leading the way.274 
In the 1950s, the BIA approved leases for “chat” sales on Quapaw lands, but the federal 
government did not recognize the Quapaws ability to sell chat. Mining companies produced chat 
through ore processing done either through dry gravity separation or wet separation. The dry 
process produced chat. The wet process produced “tailings” that ended up in tailing ponds. Chat 
generally ranged in size from ¼ to 5/8 inch. Although tailings were, and still are, generally 
considered more dangerous, chat is also dangerous for human contact, because it contains 
harmful metals such as lead, cadmium, zinc, and a variety of other metals. If children are around 
chat dust, their brain development can be affected. If female adolescents play on chat piles, they 
may encounter problems with future pregnancies, and their children may suffer health problems. 
Lead exposure also causes problems for adults such as high blood pressure, anemia, and damage 
to the nervous system and kidneys.275  
The Quapaws still needed federal approval to sell chat, and thus the federal government 
continued to not recognize the Quapaw’s ability to make decisions involving federal resources. 
In 1955, E.E. Lamb, the Quapaw BIA agent, approved a lease to sell the chat from the land of 
Robert A. Whitebird to the Oklahoma Paving Company for use in construction by the Oklahoma 
Turnpike Authority, at a price of $.0375 per cubic yard. The Oklahoma Paving Company 
planned to leave a pit for Whitebird to use for a stock pond, which allowed the BIA to justify a 
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small price. While the chat was dangerous, Lamb sold the chat for profit, and not a move to clean 
Whitebird’s land.276  
In the 1960s, the federal government began to address pollution from mining. The Bureau 
of Mines in 1966 completed the first phase of a nationwide study of the reclamation and 
restoration problems (the cleaning of land) posed by surface mining. The Bureau of Mines also 
studied acid mine draining, which was its primary concern with the mines, and planned to find 
ways to treat acid water from mines. Pollution from mining received a single paragraph in a 
twenty-seven page Bureau of Mines summary for 1966. Problems such as stockpiling uranium 
for military use were higher on the federal agenda.277   
Although by 1970 corporate mining was not as intense as it once was on Quapaw land, 
Congress extended the restrictions for Quapaw land for twenty-five years.278 Senator Henry 
Bellmon of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs stated that the BIA had problems 
collecting rents and reasoned if Quapaw land became unrestricted the Quapaws would have little 
chance of collecting rent. Bellmon’s view was similar to that of the secretary of the interior and 
mining engineers of bygone years. Bellmon believed that it was better for the Quapaws to earn 
small royalties, then for Congress to recognize the Quapaws’ ability to choose more profitable 
leases with the chance they would ultimately have no value. At the time, 107 Quapaws held 
seventy-nine allotments with an aggregate acreage of 12,459.05 acres. There were nine leases for 
lead and zinc mining amounting to 1,679.40 acres and nine leases for chat removal totaling 
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691.60 acres, but no oil or gas leases. There were also sixty-four agricultural leases, four 
business leases, and 620 leases for town lots owned by Quapaws.279   
The Senate based its vote on land sale restrictions for the Quapaws, partially on the vote 
of the Quapaw Tribal Business Committee. The Quapaw Tribal Business Committee passed a 
resolution for land sale restrictions on April 5, 1967, because tribal town lots were located in 
various small towns of northeast Oklahoma and were, therefore, difficult to police. Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior Harrison Loesch admitted that collection of rents was difficult, but that 
as of 1970, 85 percent of rents were collected. Still, the BIA had to watch for trespassers who 
dumped trash and cars, since salvage was a popular use of the land.280 By 1970, a vote by a small 
faction of the Quapaws had been reflected in the vote by the Senate, but the Senate did not 
recognize Quapaw sovereignty.   
By 1970, mining on Quapaw lands was virtually finished, so the stage was set for the 
cleaning of the poisoned soil left from mining. The mines contained toxic water, and chat piles 
left on the surface were filled with toxic metals. The EPA took the lead in soil remediation in the 
coming years, with the Quapaw tribe also involved in feasibility studies, which was a major 
change from the vast majority of the twentieth century when the Quapaws had little voice in 
mining leases or chat removal. The EPA would recognize the Quapaws abilities to help with 
cleaning their land on a limited basis, in accordance with the Safe Drinking Water Act.   
In conclusion, the federal government has rarely, if ever, recognized the Quapaws’ 
abilities to make judgments about their land. The federal government pushed the Quapaws to a 
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small section of what became northeast Oklahoma through a series of treaties imposed upon the 
tribe through years of non-Indian encroachment on the Quapaws’ lands. Beginning in 1895, the 
Interior Department allowed mining leases on Quapaw land, since it deemed Quapaw land 
owners incompetent to farm or work the land. Although the Quapaws signed the leases, they 
could not choose the amount of royalty from their mines. The Interior Department awarded 
mining leases during the twentieth century without input from heirs who owned the land. The 
secretary of the interior, as prescribed by federal law, had the power to award leases to 
companies based upon what he deemed the best interests of the Quapaws, which often meant 
keeping established mining companies in the field for the sake of secure royalties, but not the 
highest royalties. The Quapaws, still, pressured the Interior Department for greater input on their 
leases and for greater royalty rates. Later in the century, the BIA removed toxic chat from 
Quapaw land, but with the intention of generating profits, not removal of pollution. It was not 
until the 1960s that the federal government began to address mine pollution around the country. 
The EPA would address mine pollution on Quapaw land in 1981.   
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Chapter 5: The Quapaw Tribe and CERCLA 
During the middle of the twentieth century, in extreme northeastern Oklahoma—once the 
center of the American Lead Belt—children played on piles of toxic dirt in school yards and in 
their backyards at home. Toxic dust floated through the air and sinkholes opened in the towns 
without warning. The federal government eventually moved residents due to the toxicity of the 
land, a remnant of the once profitable mining industry. Once the mines no longer offered ore to 
the mining companies, they sat vacant, filling with water. The water was infused with toxic 
metals released by years of mining, which leached to the surface and into surrounding aquifers 
and lakes. The EPA began cleaning the Quapaws’ land through remediation processes of 
removing soil in 1981, and eventually the Quapaws had a small role to play in the process, but 
the EPA never recognized the Quapaws’ ability to take the lead on cleaning their land. Much like 
the previous years, the federal government did not recognize Quapaw self-determination.  
The EPA only allowed the Quapaws to be involved in the process to the extent that 
Congress outlined roles for Indian tribes in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as Superfund, due to the massive 
amount of money that Congress earmarked for the cleaning of toxic land under the law. The EPA 
did not simply give the Quapaws the money and teach the Quapaws how to clean the land 
themselves. In contrast to the Isleta case, Congress had not amended CERCLA to include a 
provision for treatment as a state status. Thus, the Quapaws’ involvement in the Tar Creek 
Superfund was limited to what was known as investigations and feasibility studies, not actual 
removal of toxic soil (remediation), nor the writing of standards for clean land.      
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Figure 5.1 Tar Creek’s Stained Water  
(James S. Aber and Susan W. Aber, “Picher, Oklahoma: Legacy of Mining,” accessed August 9, 
2013, http://www.geospectra.net/kite/picher/picher.htm.) 
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The Tar Creek Superfund Site encompassed residential, commercial, and industrial areas 
within the towns of Picher, Quapaw, Commerce, Cardin, and Miami in extreme northeastern 
Oklahoma. Several rural districts also received water from the Roubidoux Aquifer. 
Approximately 19,500 people lived near the mining area before the federal government began 
moving residents. Tar Creek flowed through the center of the site and released into the Neosho 
River, south of the site, which discharged into Grand Lake in southern Ottawa County. Toxic 
well water was present in both the Boone Aquifer and Roubidoux Aquifer. Mostly private wells 
tapped the Boone Aquifer, while the Roubidoux Aquifer provided drinking water for the 
towns.281      
The environmental destruction left by mining companies on the Quapaws’ land was 
immense. Mining companies produced more than 500 million tons of waste in the tri-state area 
of Oklahoma, Kansas, and Missouri. Although companies removed more than 75 percent of 
mining waste, more than 100 million tons of chat, or dry waste, remained in the tri-state area by 
the 1980s.282 The companies left tailings, another form of dry waste, in unlined flotation ponds 
near the surface, where the chemicals could seep into the ground.283 During the early to mid 
twentieth century, the mines often had problems with flooding, which mining companies usually 
controlled with pumps. When the mines ceased operations, the companies left underground 
cavities of 100,000 acre feet. In addition, mining companies left approximately 100,000 
exploratory holes, used to explore for ore, in just the Picher field alone. There were 1,064 mine 
                                                 
281 CH2M Hill, Contract Number 68-W6-0036, “Five Year Review Report: Third Five Year Review Report 
for the Tar Creek Superfund Site, Ottawa County, OK.” September 2005, 5; US EPA, “Tar Creek Superfund Site: 
Tri-State Mining District-Chat Mining Waste,” (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2007), 1. 
282 US EPA, “Tri-State Mining Waste,” 1. 
283 The Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma et al. v. Blue Tee Corp et al. N.D. OK, Case 03-CV-0846-CVE-PJC, at 
2 (2008). 
132 
 
shafts on the Oklahoma side of the field and mining companies had abandoned numerous 
wells.284   
The mining companies had pumped large amounts of water out of the ground to be able 
to mine the underground rock formation, leaving the ground open for pollution. Once the 
companies completed mining, they filled the mines with sulfide materials that had been oxidized 
through air exposure. The metallic sulfide materials leached into the ground and lowered the pH 
in the groundwater. By 1979, acidic water had discharged through several locations at the 
abandoned mines, and the groundwater contained lead, zinc, and cadmium, each dangerous for 
human consumption. Further, wind blew dust from the chat piles throughout the region. Once 
rain came in contact with the chat, poisonous metals leached into the ground.285 Although some 
Quapaws had profited from the mines, the mining companies had made the most profit, and now 
they were gone, leaving the tribe to clean the mess.     
Frank Keating, the governor of Oklahoma, formed the Tar Creek Task Force in 1980 in 
response to the discovery of a large ditch, seventy-five feet wide and seventy-five feet deep, 
which formed southwest of the town of Picher. The task force was comprised of twenty-four 
local, state, and federal agencies, charged with investigating the effects of acid that drained into 
water sources of northeast Oklahoma. Based upon the findings of Keating’s task force, the EPA 
placed the Tar Creek site on the National Priority List on July 27, 1981. The EPA used the 
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National Priority List to identify sites to be cleaned with money from the massive federal fund 
created under CERCLA.286     
The cleaning of a Superfund site, both then and now, involved several steps, which need 
to be explained in order to fully understand how the EPA attempted to clean the Tar Creek 
Superfund area, and in order to understand the terms used in the rest of the chapter. First, the 
EPA conducted a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS), which the EPA allowed 
the Quapaws to do as prescribed by CERCLA. The remedial investigation included data 
collection and site characterization, which was often performed in unison with the feasibility 
study, thus defining possible remedies. The remedial investigation also involved sampling and 
monitoring. The next step for the EPA was to select the proposed remedy and to present the plan 
to the public. Finally, the EPA reviewed the public comments and consulted with the state on the 
most productive plan. The final recommendation was presented in a Record of Decision (ROD) 
showing all the facts of the proposed process. The EPA often divided a complex remedial action 
into operable units (OUs).287   
The EPA signed a cooperative agreement with the Oklahoma State Department of Health, 
on June 16, 1982, to clean Tar Creek, but the Quapaws had little to do with the initial process.288 
The EPA began the restoration of Operable Unit 1 (OU 1) on June 6, 1984, which included water 
diversion, plugging wells, and monitoring of groundwater and surface water.289 The ROD for OU 
1 addressed the poisoning of Tar Creek by acidic water from the mines and downward migration 
of acidic water from the Boone Aquifer to the Roubidoux Aquifer that had occurred through 
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wells connecting the two aquifers. The solution was to reduce surface recharge of the Boone 
Aquifer through dikes and diversion structures, designed to keep water from entering two 
collapsed mine shafts identified at points where tainted water seeped into the ground water. The 
EPA plugged sixty-six abandoned wells, which stopped the transfer of acid water to the 
Roubidoux Aquifer. All told, the EPA plugged eighty-three wells.290 The state of Oklahoma 
completed the ROD for OU 1 by 1986 and the EPA continued to monitor the groundwater in 
compliance with the ROD for OU 1. The EPA had no further plans for Tar Creek by 1991 and 
the Quapaws were not participating in remedial or feasibility studies in 1991.291  
The EPA conducted its first five-year review in 1994, still without requesting assistance 
from the Quapaws. The EPA tested for lead, arsenic, cadmium, and zinc at busy areas such as 
parks and schools.292 The EPA also sampled soil at residences beginning on March 21, 1996. The 
EPA found that contamination had occurred due to the wind blowing soil, but not chat, and 
began soil remediation at residences in September of 1996.293 The EPA installed four new 
monitoring wells in 1997 and one additional monitoring well in 2000 to monitor the Roubidoux 
Aquifer. Soil removal and backfilling of residential yards became the ROD for Operable Unit 2, 
because the EPA considered soil removal to be more important than chat removal. The Army 
Corps of Engineers remediated 1,300 yards of soil from January 1998 to July 2000 and then 
hired private contractors to finish the work.294    
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Although entrenched in the Self-Determination Era, the EPA only recognized a limited 
role for the Quapaws in the Tar Creek Superfund. In September 1998, in the middle of the 
remediation process, the EPA went into a cooperative agreement with the Inter-Tribal 
Environmental Council of Oklahoma (ITEC) and the Quapaw Tribe, with the goal of enhancing 
tribal involvement in the Superfund. Initially, the ITEC was to conduct remediation studies for 
two industrial properties owned by the Quapaws,295 and the ITEC provided technical support, 
training, and environmental services in a variety of environmental disciplines to the tribes that 
were members of ITEC.296 The EPA awarded about $122,000 to the ITEC for the program, as 
well as “assistance funding” to the Quapaws, but did not state a total amount of aid in the second 
five-year plan. In early 1999, the EPA awarded the ITEC and the Quapaws an undisclosed 
amount of money to conduct a remedial investigation and feasibility study on mining waste 
affecting Beaver Creek, which flowed through the Quapaws’ campgrounds and powwow 
grounds.297 The tribe complained that the EPA withdrew the funds once the plan was drafted, 
thus limiting the Quapaws’ ability to even help with remedial investigations, which was not even 
a major part of the Superfund process.298 Later in 1999, the EPA awarded approximately $36,000 
to the ITEC and another undisclosed amount of funding dollars to the Quapaws. In 1999 the EPA 
also awarded Oklahoma $150,000 to address tailings at the site, including restriction of chat 
usage and dust suppression, along with erosion control.299 Although the EPA awarded money to 
the Quapaws, it was not for the purpose of operating their own soil remediation, but was only for 
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studying the region. The EPA only allowed the Quapaws to study the region, because CERCLA 
did not require the EPA to recognize tribal sovereignty. The EPA, alone, held final responsibility 
for remediation of Indian land under CERCLA.300    
In the early 2000s, the Quapaws left the ITEC and created their own environmental 
department, attempting to govern their own land. The EPA awarded the Quapaw Tribal 
Environmental Office Superfund Management Assistance Program $1,981,667 to ensure the 
tribe’s “meaningful and substantial involvement” in the Superfund process. They were involved 
with the OU 4 remedial activity in accordance with the ROD. They also helped with the OU 2 
residential remediation on tribal land. The Quapaw Tribal Environmental Office also provided 
oversight to tribal chat project sales operations to ensure that they were in compliance with their 
Site Operating Plan. Quapaw officials hired consultants to provide assistance in understanding 
CERCLA-related activities and to aid tribal environmental staff in review of technical documents 
related to OU 2, OU 4, and OU 5. The consultants were retained to map land ownership on the 
reservation, ensuring that the EPA properly identified property rights.301 The Quapaws had to 
work within the framework of CERCLA, but also continued to exert their self-determination. 
The EPA encouraged Quapaw involvement though financial support, as long as the Quapaws 
remained bound to the role prescribed them in CERCLA. 
Shortly after the EPA recognized the Quapaws’ ability to function in a limited role in the 
Tar Creek Superfund process, the EPA ruled in 2000, without the input of the Quapaws, that the 
site was too polluted to be completely cleaned. Prior to the EPA’s ruling, the Oklahoma Water 
Resources Board (OWRB) concluded that impacts from pollution to Tar Creek were irreversible, 
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so the OWRB made Tar Creek a secondary recreation (human ingestion is limited) water body 
and lowered fishing status to “habitat-limited.” The EPA agreed with the OWRB’s assessment of 
Tar Creek302 and decided that in order to clean Tar Creek it would have to drain the federal 
Superfund coffer. In other words, it was virtually impossible to meet the water quality standards 
for surface water in Tar Creek.303 For the EPA to not be able to clean Tar Creek was amazing, 
given the fact that the Superfund account received $1.7 billion annually until 1995, when the tax 
on corporations, producing chemicals and oil, expired.304   
In 2002, the Quapaws turned to the state of Oklahoma for help. Due to the federal trust 
relationship, states are not supposed to operate programs on Indian land, and Indian tribes have 
worked since the early 1830s and the Cherokee Cases, to keep it that way. The Oklahoma 
Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) conducted a study of the fish in the Neosho River 
and Spring River in 2002 and 2003. ODEQ found that fish from the rivers were safe for 
consumption. The tribes in the region asked for the testing, because traditional customs involved 
eating whole local fish. The ODEQ concluded that skinless fish filets could be consumed at a 
rate of up to six eight-ounce meals per month, but bones from fish, whether whole-eviscerated or 
whole-uneviscerated, were not safe.305 Oddly, in 2002 the EPA judged samples taken from the 
Roubidoux Aquifer to be safe for human consumption, although five wells of the twenty-one 
sampled failed the secondary drinking water standard for iron, and one of the five failed the 
secondary standard for sulfate. Secondary standards were not health-based, but were based 
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instead on aesthetics, taste, and odor.306 The Quapaws continued to push the federal government 
for survival in Northeast Oklahoma, even turning to Oklahoma for judgments supporting tribal 
desires.   
The Quapaws also questioned the EPA’s efforts, especially at the Roubidoux Aquifer. 
The EPA reported that it performed flood-plain sampling between Commerce and Miami, 
Oklahoma, but the Quapaws argued the EPA did not perform the sampling.307 As of 2005, when 
the EPA conducted its third five-year review, acidic water had been detected at several 
Roubidoux wells. The EPA argued that the effectiveness of the well-plugging program could not 
yet be determined, but neither the EPA, nor the Oklahoma Department of Environmental 
Quality, found drinking water that failed to meet standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act.308 
The Quapaws were questioning the EPA’s ability to clean tribal land. 
On December 9, 2003, the EPA, along with two potentially responsible parties (PRPs), 
mining corporations, and the Interior Department, agreed to an Administrative Order of Consent 
to perform a remedial investigation and feasibility study in regard to chat piles and mining waste 
in non-residential areas surrounding the Tar Creek site, which became Operable Unit 4.309 The 
EPA scheduled Operable Unit 5 for 2006-2007 to deal with the pollution of the Spring River and 
Neosho River.310 It seemed the EPA had originally underestimated the amount of pollution in the 
area. 
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The time had come for residents to move due to the severity of the pollution. The Water 
Resources Development Act of 2007 provided $30 million for the EPA to plan and implement 
removing residents in the Tar Creek Superfund area. The EPA recommended only resident 
removal for those people under the greatest threats of chemical exposure and it predicted human 
removal to last thirty years.311 In 2005, before the passage of the Water Resource Development 
Act, which allotted money for the federal government to move families from Quapaw lands, 
Oklahoma, without Quapaw input, spent $3 million to relocate fifty-two families with children 
under six. The initial round of buyouts in 2005 cost $54,029 per home, $37 per square foot. The 
second group of buyouts in 2008 cost $65,624 per home, $52 per square foot. The relocation 
trust presented 878 buyout offers, with fifty-one offers rejected. Before the buyouts, Picher had 
1,640 residents, the town of Cardin had 150, and the former town of Hockerville did not have 
any. The federal buyout program of homes and businesses around the Tar Creek Superfund was 
almost completed by the end of 2010. Initial projections placed the buyout at $55-$60 million, 
but it ended up costing $46 million. James Inhofe, author of the Midnight Rider, which also 
infringed on tribal sovereignty and is discussed in depth in section three, was a key figure in 
bringing the money to northeast Oklahoma for the buyouts.312   
On June 29, 2004, Quapaw Environmental Director Tim Kent told CHM2 Hill that he 
would have liked to have seen the tribe have more control of the resources for cleaning the site. 
CHM2 Hill was the firm that the EPA contracted to finish the third five-year review. As part of 
the review, CHM2 Hill questioned Kent and other local leaders about their opinions on the 
process. Kent stated that the tribe was developing water quality standards of their own, 
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suggesting that the tribe had the ability to operate their own environmental recovery area.313 
CH2M Hill asked Kent his overall impression of the work done at the site since the completion 
of the second five-year review. Kent was dissatisfied that OU 1 had not worked, and worse, that 
it seemed the EPA had given up on it. He thought that existing technologies could be used to 
finish OU 1. He also suspected that water from mines might be migrating to the Roubidoux 
Aquifer through other means than faulty well casings.314 In other words, he questioned that the 
EPA had complete control of the situation. 
Kent, however, was pleased with the soil remediation efforts. If there was a problem, it 
was at the location where the EPA removed clean soil to replace the polluted soil. Water had run 
off the area into Beaver Creek. He told the EPA about the issue, but as of 2005, it seemed the 
EPA was still looking into it.315 
Kent also believed that OU 4 was too narrow in scope. He did not like the fact that the 
remedial investigation and feasibility study addressed only chat piles, and that it did not expand 
to other issues such as the fate of transport wastes or the full characterization of wastes. The tribe 
asked the EPA to create another operable unit to deal with the sediment problem at the site, 
which the EPA did not do.316 
Kent applauded the outcomes of the remedial operations, because the lead levels in the 
blood of local children were lower, which Kent attributed to the remediation project. Even so, 
Kent was concerned about the buyout program, because of the potential for infringement of the 
federal trust responsibility. Furthermore, Kent wanted to be contacted whenever work was done 
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on tribal land. Kent believed that CERCLA allowed greater involvement by tribes, not less, and 
argued that the tribe should have complete control of the Superfund process.317 The EPA did not 
take the extra step to follow through on what Kent desired, since CERCLA did not include a 
treatment as a state provision for tribes to take over site evaluation and planning.318 Kent’s 
statements were in accord with what Quapaws had done for centuries, which was to push for the 
federal government to recognize the tribe’s ability to rule itself.   
Chat removal was another problem that the Quapaws felt they were capable of addressing 
on their own, but the federal government limited the Quapaws ability to sell the polluted 
substance. There was definitely a market for chat, because the Oklahoma Department of 
Transportation (OKDOT) preferred it in hot mix asphalt, where its hard and durable nature, 
along with its skid resistance, made for great highways.319 There was also promise for the 
Quapaws to profit from chat sales, because OKDOT’s requirement that chat be bought on the 
open market, along with other aggregate asphalt sources, increased the profit potential.320 
Without respect to tribal sovereignty, the BIA placed a moratorium on chat sold by Quapaws in 
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1997, but slightly changed course in 2001, opening chat sales to Quapaws, but with BIA 
regulation. The BIA also made deals with outside entities to haul chat.321 
The BIA acted much as it did before 1970, making rulings on the dismissal of funds for 
the tribe, but not recognizing the tribe’s ability to make those rulings itself. After 2001, the BIA 
still did not recognize the tribe’s ability to regulate chat sales. Jenny Rampy, a Quapaw, 
complained that her chat was removed without her approval. The company hauling Rampy’s chat 
from her residence argued that it had a contract with the majority land owner, a non-Indian, since 
2002. BIA spokeswoman Nedra Darling defended the BIA’s position on chat sales, reasoning 
that a portion of the profits were put into an escrow account for Indian land owners in a private 
                                                 
321 Clifton Adcock, “Quapaws Tied to Toxic Chat, Like It or Not,” Tulsa World, February 28, 2010; CH2M 
Hill,“Third Five Year Review,” 47. 
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bank in Kansas. The Quapaws had not received any of the money. Quapaw Jan Kellough argued 
that “The land is still in trust with the federal government; that’s what we don’t understand,” 
thus, why would the federal government hide money from the tribe.322 Like the early twentieth 
century, the BIA tried to ensure profits for the Quapaws, but without the tribal government’s 
input, or that of landowners.   
Only after the turn of the new millennium did the BIA allow Quapaws to sell their chat 
individually. Even then, the BIA allowed chat to be taken from Quapaw property without tribal 
consent. The Interior Department answered calls by Quapaws to regulate chat, in 2005, with a 
pilot project on chat sales, which asked the Quapaws to meet Best Management Practices 
(BMPs) similar to those imposed by the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality on 
non-tribal land. The project called on the state, along with the University of Oklahoma, to 
investigate the safety of chat in asphalt paving.323 Tyler Powel, office director for the Oklahoma 
secretary of the environment, stated at the 13th National Tar Creek Conference, that removing 
chat piles could take thirty years, even if 100 train car loads were taken out per day. He remained 
hopeful that the job would be finished and that the area would be restored.324 There could be 
promise for the future of chat sales for the tribe, but overall, the BIA had disregarded the tribe’s 
ability to regulate chat sales.  
 Not only were the Quapaws confused by the federal government’s unwillingness to let 
the tribe regulate chat sales, but the tribe sued the EPA on May 5, 2004, due to its “intermittent, 
delayed, stalled and ill-defined”325 efforts at cleaning the region. The Quapaw tribe sued under a 
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CERCLA provision, allowing a natural resource trustee to sue due to natural resource damages 
(NRDs). Originally, the case was against seven mining companies, and labeled Quapaw Tribe v. 
Blue Tee Corp (2008), but the tribe filed an amended suit against the federal government. The 
tribe believed that danger from lead exposure and chat piles had existed since the 1930s, and that 
the EPA should have taken action to clean the region much earlier than it did. The EPA, instead, 
did not begin soil remediation until 1996, even though Tar Creek went on the National Priority 
List in 1981. The EPA also did not investigate the chat piles and tailing ponds for two decades 
after initial discovery. Furthermore, the tribe criticized the EPA for not issuing its first five-year 
review until 1994. The EPA responded to Quapaw complaints by arguing that since Tar Creek 
was a complex site, it had multiple operable units, which take years to remedy.326 
 The Tenth Circuit Court did not rule in favor of the Quapaws. First, there was a 
technicality that hurt the Quapaws. They could not file suit for natural resource damages until 
remediation efforts at a Superfund site were completed.327 The court decided that while claims for 
losses were allowed under CERCLA, it could not grant the tribe a financial settlement, since 
there was not precedent for such action against the EPA under CERCLA. The decision in New 
Mexico v. General Electric (2006) provided the opposite precedent, as the court found that if 
preemptive money was allowed for recovery, then a remediation job might not be finished, or 
money provided for remediation and recovery might be used for another purpose. The Quapaws 
had hoped to receive money for damages, and for the interim loss of use, because the claim did 
not interfere with the EPA’s ongoing work at the Superfund site.328 
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 Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit did not agree with the Quapaws that the EPA was not 
“diligently proceeding” to clean the area, even though there was no defined period for the EPA 
to complete the remedial investigation and feasibility study for OU 5. The tribe tried to use the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s (RCRA 1976) “diligently proceeding” provision, 
because RCRA allowed a citizen to bring suit. The problem for the court was that RCRA was not 
the same as CERCLA, so the court did not deem it a sufficient parallel example. Furthermore, 
RCRA also did not define “diligently proceeding.” The court said Congress meant to provide 
federal agencies the ability to make professional judgments without interference from the courts 
in terms of professional analysis. There was simply no way for the court to judge the value of a 
claim until the EPA had completed full remediation. The mere fact that chat removal could take 
thirty years did not mean that the EPA was acting without diligence. The EPA also assessed the 
risks to humans from pollution from chat piles and mining waste differently than the tribe did, 
but this did not mean the EPA was acting without diligence, especially given the fact that the 
EPA had started the process of moving families to other locations.329 In the end, the Quapaws 
tried to define appropriate remediation methods, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed. The tribe was 
left to allow the EPA to clean their land as was defined by CERCLA. Still, the Quapaws had 
continued to exert their self-determination over their land through the suit, challenging the power 
of the EPA, and the federal government.   
In conclusion, mining companies had polluted the Quapaws’ land for the majority of the 
twentieth century, yet the Quapaws were not in control of their own destiny in regard to cleaning 
the region. The EPA offered the Quapaws opportunities to perform remedial investigations and 
feasibility studies, and spent nearly two million dollars in that effort, but the Quapaws were not 
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allowed to clean the area themselves. According to Ursula Lennox, the remedial project manager 
for the Tar Creek Superfund site, “the EPA’s mission is to protect human health and the 
environment, and the funds designated for this project enables this mission to be accomplished. 
Congress has given the EPA the authority to clean up uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous 
waste sites, but, to ensure that the tribes, public, and communities are engaged in this effort, 
various grants and tools are awarded and used.”330 Tribal environmental director Tim Kent asked 
the EPA to recognize the Quapaws’ ability to lead the cleaning process for the region, but the 
EPA was not willing to let the Quapaws take the lead.331  Nevertheless, the Quapaws continued to 
vie for control of Quapaw land.  
Section Two Summary 
 The Quapaws pushed the United States government to recognize the Quapaws’ 
sovereignty over their land for hundreds of years. The Quapaws strength to act as sovereigns in 
the face of the United States was evident back in the nineteenth century. First, the Quapaws 
survived treaties that ceded land to the United States. Then the Quapaws remained on their land 
despite allotment beginning in 1887. In the twentieth century, Quapaws challenged the leases 
approved by the Interior Department in an effort to get better financial royalties from the mining 
of the land. In the 1990s, the Quapaws questioned the EPA’s ability to clean the pollution left by 
the mining companies, and pushed the EPA for recognition that the tribe could clean its own 
land, although the EPA fell short of recognizing tribal sovereignty over the Superfund process.   
 Despite its creation at the dawn of the Self-Determination Era, the EPA, like the BIA and 
Interior Department, did not recognize Quapaw sovereignty over tribal lands. During the 
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nineteenth century, the federal government consistently tried to move the Quapaws out of the 
way of non-Indian expansion. In the twentieth century, the federal government made judgments 
on behalf of the Quapaws for mining profits. As the twentieth century gave way to the new 
millennium, the EPA followed suit by not turning over control of the remediation project at Tar 
Creek to the Quapaws. Like the case study of the Isletas, the EPA did not recognize the 
Quapaws’ abilities to make decisions about their land without the help of the federal 
government.  
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Chapter 6: The Osage Nation and Oil before the EPA 
 
    
The Osages came to control a vast oil reserve over many years, which ultimately gave 
them the responsibility to keep the land clean of oil waste. The Osage origin story teaches of a 
connection to the land and to be wary of non-Indians, requiring Osages to work in peace with 
non-Indians. The story begins with Wah’Kon-Tah, the life force of the universe, sending Osage 
ancestors from the stars to populate the earth. The Children of the Middle Waters, or Little Ones, 
floated down to earth and landed on a red oak tree in the autumn. Wah’Kon-Tah taught the Little 
Ones life skills, such as the power of fire, by lighting a field ablaze with his crooked fire lance. 
Wah’Kon-Tah also showed the Little Ones how to watch the stars to see what their brethren were 
doing. By studying the skies, the Little Ones gradually became aware of the seasonal changes. 
Wah’Kon-Tah, then, divided the Little Ones into the People of the Waters, the People of the 
Land, and the People of the Sky. The three groups of the Little Ones discovered the U-Tah-No’n-
Dsi, the Isolated Earth People, but the Little Ones stopped short of making contact. The Little 
Ones were scared, because the Isolated Earth People practiced murder and deceit. Eventually, 
Wah-Sha-She, leader of the Water People, stepped forward to offer the pipe of peace and 
smoked it with the earth people. They made peace and remained on earth, becoming the Osage 
Nation.332 Through the Osage creation story it is evident that tribal members must continue to 
work with non-Indians, even though non-Indians do not recognize Osage sovereignty.  
The federal government has usually protected the ability of non-Indians to operate on 
Osage lands, over the Osages’ right to keep and manage their property. In much the same way, 
oil pollution on Osage land before the EPA was only measurable to the federal government in 
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dollar amounts, and the Osages’ ability to protect their own land from pollution was not 
important to the federal government. It did not recognize the Osages’ ability to choose how oil 
companies should clean Osage land and at what cost the Osages should be reimbursed. That did 
not stop individual Osages from complaining to the federal government about oil pollution 
during the earlier twentieth century, as they asked for the government to clean land that was 
damaged by oil spills. The Osages acted as sovereigns even though the federal government did 
not recognize their sovereignty. 
There are many histories of the Osage Nation, including a history of the Osage oil 
reserve, but none cover the Osages relationship with the EPA, not to mention Osages of the Self-
Determination Era. In addition, the histories of the Osages do not address pollution and the land 
prior to the birth of the EPA in 1970, and especially pollution and land issues intertwined with 
the Osages’ drive to clean their tribal land. Furthermore, historians have not illustrated the 
Osages’ persistent push against the federal government to respect Osage land. The first book to 
consult on the Osages to become familiar with their history is John Joseph Mathews’ The 
Osages: Children of the Middle Waters (1961), in which the goal is to bring tribal history from 
an Osage perspective, because he realized the elders of his community were concerned the oral 
histories of the Osages wouild be lost. Mathews was an Osage Tribal Council member who 
helped create the Osage Nation Museum in Pawhuska. Terry Wilson has written that one could 
not begin to understand Osage history until you read Mathews. Mathews’ book is heavy on oral 
documentation from Osages, as he consulted forty-five individuals to get their take on Osage 
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history. It also provides a detailed history of the early years of Osage involvement with European 
powers. Mathews ends his study in the 1930s, so there has been much to build on.333  
Gilbert C. Din and A. P. Nasatir, in The Imperial Osages: Spanish-Indian Diplomacy in 
the Mississippi Valley (1983), described the early years of the tribe through the use primary 
material from Spanish sources, which is substantial given the long Osage history with Spanish 
contact. Din and Nasatir did not cover modern history, but their study is essential reading for a 
historian that wants to understand the early years of the tribe. Din and Nasatir outlined how the 
Osages were major power brokers during the early years of European contact.334  
Craig Miner’s The Corporation and the Indian: Tribal Sovereignty and Industrial 
Civilization in Indian Territory, 1865-1907 (1976) was the story of several tribes, but Miner 
wrote the first chapter devoted to the Foster Lease on the Osage reservation. Miner’s thesis was 
that the corporations took advantage of the tribe, which was certainly the case. Unlike the section 
that follows, Miner did not give the Osage Nation credit for its perseverance and he did not 
recognize the power of individual Osage voices to help the BIA identify oil spills on the 
reservation.335  
In The Underground Reservation, Osage Oil (1985), Terry P. Wilson devoted research to 
the Osages and their mineral leases, with particular attention to the same archives that Miner 
used to write about the Foster Lease. Wilson’s goal was to tell the story of the Osages, because 
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his wife was Osage, and he felt the tribe had been disrespected in the historical record. Wilson 
did not provide much information past the Assimilation period (1887-1934), most notably 
leaving out a discussion of environmental pollution from oil.336 There are more studies of the 
Osages, and some are referenced in this chapter, but the ones previously desribed are the most 
important to read in order to get a feel for the problems and successes of the Osages.    
After 1803, the Osages had to learn to live in unison with the federal government, which 
did not respect the tribe’s right to live without the interference of non-Indian settlers. Historians 
believe the first Osage interaction with Europeans occurred in June 1673, when Louis Joliet, a 
French trader, and Father Jacques Marquette, a Franciscan missionary from Québec, floated 
down the Mississippi River from the Great Lakes, taking notes about the flora and fauna of the 
river, and the Indians living on the banks. On April 9, 1682, French explorer Sieur de la Salle 
and Italian explorer Henri de Tonti, along with a party of twenty Frenchmen and eighteen 
Algonquins, reached the mouth of the Mississippi and claimed the entire area for France. They 
named their new territory, Louisiana, in honor of King Louis XIV.337 The French traded for furs, 
horses, and slaves with the Osages. In addition to the market exchange with the French, the 
Osages supplemented their dietary needs with venison from their hunts.338 Once Spain acquired 
Louisiana in 1762, the Spaniards traded with the Osages at the Arkansas River, where the Osages 
were also doing well in a revived trade with the British.339 The Spanish, realizing that the Osages 
held a tremendous advantage on trade, encouraged other tribes to attack the Osages. In 1794, the 
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Spanish finally decided to make peace with the Osages, because they were concerned that French 
envoy Edmond Genêt, who was in America garnering support for a war against the British and 
Spanish, would convince the powerful Osages to attack the Spanish.340 Even at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, the Osages were still quite powerful and held control of their own destiny, 
despite the encroachment of the European powers.  
Following the Louisiana Purchase, the United States established its relationship with the 
Osages and chipped away at Osage power as part of its Indian removal plan. President Thomas 
Jefferson made William Clark the Indian agent to the tribes of the west in the fall of 1806 upon 
Clark’s return from the famed Lewis and Clark expedition of the American Northwest. Clark 
officially became superintendent of Indian affairs in 1812. In 1808, Clark met with Pawhuska, an 
Osage chief, at Fort Prairie Fire to sign the first Osage peace treaty with the United States. The 
Osages agreed to settle near Prairie Fire, later named Fort Osage, and not roam the Prairie and 
Plains attacking other tribes. To lure the Osages into a life of farming, the United States 
promised to supply a blacksmith, grain mill, plows, two log houses, a trading post, $1,000 in 
merchandise, and $1,200 in cash. The federal government also would not hold the Osages 
accountable for American property that the tribe had destroyed. Most importantly, however, 
William Clark promised to protect the Osages. The ceded land included virtually all of the 
modern state of Missouri, south of the Missouri River, and also included the modern state of 
Arkansas north of the Arkansas River.341 As might be expected, losing land to the encroachment 
of non-Indians took a toll on Osage tribal unity. By 1813, one band of Great Osages lived on the 
Osage River, 400 miles from where it splits with the Missouri River, and the second band of 
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Great Osages lived on the Arkansas River, 750 miles from where it splits with the Missouri 
River. The band on the Osage River numbered about 500, while the band on the Arkansas River 
numbered about 400. Sixty Little Osages lived near the Great Osages on the Osage River, and 
150 lived near the Great Osage band on the Arkansas River.342 By the end of the century, the 
Osages’ land holdings were severely diminished, and the federal government did not respect the 
Osages’ right to rule. Even with the federal government’s lack of sovereignty recognition, the 
Osages continued to exert control over their natural resources.     
The federal government signed another treaty with the Osages in 1818, after they lost to 
the Cherokees at the Massacre of Claremore Mound, proving Clark’s promises of peace were 
empty. The Osages’ trouble with the Cherokees began when the Cherokees migrated to Osage 
territory from Tennessee beginning in 1786. By 1816, about 6,000 Cherokees lived on the lower 
Arkansas River. This Cherokee band signed a treaty with the federal government on July 8, 1817 
that the band would give up whatever ground it still owned in Tennessee.343 The Cherokees and 
Osages argued over hunting ground, with murders often ensuing after clashes in the forests. 
During the Massacre of Claremore Mound, the Cherokees killed thirty-eight Osage women, 
children, and old men, and captured over 100 girls and boys. The Cherokees sent word to the 
federal government of their victory, and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun ordered the Osages to 
surrender their land to the Cherokees.344 The ceded land bordered the Arkansas River, the 
Verdigris River, the Verdigris Falls, and all Osage land east to the Cherokee border. 
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The federal government’s meager compensation to the Osages came in the form of paying non-
Indian claims against the tribe, which amounted to $4,000.345 The federal government’s plan of 
limiting Osage independence was coming to fruition, but the Osages continued to live in their 
much reduced territory. 
Even after taking most of the Osages’ land, Clark still was under the impression he had to 
mold the Osages into a “peaceful” tribe. On October 6, 1818 the Big and Little Osages signed a 
treaty with the Cherokees, and the Cherokees’ allies, the Shawnees and the Delawares. The two 
sides promised to return all prisoners in spring 1819, and the Osages agreed to allow the 
Cherokees and their allies to hunt on their land.346 On September 21, 1822, the Delawares asked 
federal Indian sub-agent Pierre Menard for an agreement with the Osages to pay for past 
damages from Osage raids. The Delawares hoped for $1,000 or land, but the Osages only offered 
$500. The Delawares eventually accepted an agreement of peaceful relations from the Osages, 
although the treaty simply stated that the “white hairs” of the Osages agreed to the peace 
treaty.347 A consistent theme through all the Osage treaties was that the agents and superintendent 
hoped for peace, but were not particularly concerned that the Osages had to give up their most 
important resource, their land, to get that peace. In the collective eyes of the federal government, 
non-Indian settlement always trumped Osage needs. 
In 1825, William Clark wrote a series of letters to tribes to try to instill faith in them that 
the federal government would provide for Indian people. He told the Osages that he had “turned 
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three Indian armies from the direction of your towns and prevented the parties from sucking the 
blood of your people.”348 Clark argued that the Osages’ land was valued by many tribes, thus the 
Osages had to cooperate with the federal government and share Osage land. Clark, however, did 
not mention that non-Indians wished to possess the lands as well. He wrote that “if you have 
confidence in me to attend to what I say—Your Great Father the President of the U.S. is willing 
to purchase your lands and apportionate a part to such tribes he might think proper, who will live 
in friendship with you and will strengthen your arms.”349 Clark had an unfair advantage in 
negotiations with the Osages, since animals were scarce and tribal annuities were small.350    
The Osage chiefs agreed to the treaty Clark wanted on June 2, 1825, at St. Louis. The 
Osages ceded all their remaining land in Missouri and the Territory of Arkansas, along with all 
lands west of Missouri and the Territory of Arkansas, north and west of the Red River, south of 
the Kansas River, and east of a line from the head of the Kansas River, southward through the 
Rock Saline. It was quite a bargain for the United States, since American citizens could move 
freely through the area, and the federal government reserved the right to navigate rivers and 
lakes. The federal government agreed to provide the Osages with $7,000 in cash and provisions 
annually for twenty-five years, along with 600 cattle, 600 hogs, 1,000 chickens, ten yoke of 
oxen, six carts, various farming tools, a blacksmith, and an advisor on farming. The federal 
government planned to assume the debts to trading houses in the amount of $4,105.80 if the 
Osages would allow the federal government not to abide by the provisions in the 1808 treaty, 
which forced the United States to furnish American troops for the protection of the Osages at 
Fort Osage. As in previous treaties with the Osages, the federal government also agreed to pay 
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Figure 6.1 Osage Treaty Cessions  
(W. David. Baird, The Osage People (Phoenix: Indian Tribal Series, 1972.), 31) 
 
white American citizens for property damaged by the Osages. Once the treaty was signed, the 
tribe moved to modern-day southeastern Kansas.351 Despite the treaty, the Osages continued to 
hunt and raid. 
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The Osages were not pleased with the conditions in their new home. The Osages had to 
compete with other tribes for hunting land and non-Indian squatters were prevalent. The Osages 
raided other tribes for provisions well through the next few decades, since treaty provisions 
proved to be insufficient. Horse theft was one Osage strategy to make up for insufficient 
annuities. In the 1820s the Osages raided the Pawnees on occasion,352 and in the summer of 1836, 
an Osage band stole horses from the Peankeshaws.353 In 1850, the Osages were low on provisions 
because their federal annuity payment was late, despite the request of Superintendent D.D. 
Mitchell to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando Brown to honor the Osage treaty and issue 
the annuity payment.354 In late summer 1854, a band of Osages rode north to steal horses from 
the Sacs and Foxes.355 In response, the Sacs and Foxes planned a war for later in the summer of 
1854 against the Osages, but the Sacs and Foxes never followed through on their plans.356 Osage 
bands were generally peaceful, at least to the eyes of federal bureaucrats. Colonel M. Arbuckle, 
commanding officer at Fort Smith, argued that a pledge should be taken by other tribes not to 
bother the Osages.357 Arbuckle’s pity was not necessary, though, as evidence from previous years 
showed that the Osages could survive despite the lack of provisions.   
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The Osages land resources were limited on their diminished land holdings, but they 
continued to find ways to survive and continued to be a power across the region.  According to 
one settler in 1858, the Osages were unwilling to sell ponies, even skinny ponies, illustrating the 
Osages ability to conserve their resources.358 A band of Osages who lived among the Sacs and 
Foxes in Kansas even considered going on an exhibition tour to make money.359 In the summer of 
1860, a drought hit Kansas, and with few provisions from the federal government, the Osages 
traveled west to the Kansas plains to hunt buffalo, unwilling to let federal treaties dictate when 
and where the tribe could travel.360  
The 1860s and 1870s saw Osage lands officially opened for settlement by the federal 
government, and the federal government forced the Osages to move to their current home lands 
in Oklahoma. Final Osage land cessions came in 1865, as they ceded the northern and eastern 
sections of their Kansas reservation in exchange for more federal provisions. In 1865, the Osages 
ceded thirty miles of land on the eastern part of the Kansas reservation and twenty miles on the 
northern border. For the eastern ceded land, the federal government paid $300,000, but the 
federal government kept the money in trust for the tribe. The ceded land was not to be open to 
homesteaders, but soon after, it was.361 The annuity from the 1865 land sale never reached the 
tribe, because the local Indian office never opened an account to disperse the funds.362 On 
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January 17, 1867, Congress adopted the Kansas Legislature’s resolution that Indian lands be 
opened to settlement under the Homestead Act, which provided free land to settlers who could 
improve the land.363  On July 17, 1870, the federal government made the remainder of Osage 
lands open for sale to settlers with and all Osages were to move from the state of Kansas.364 The 
Osages gave up a total of 8 million acres in Kansas and settled in northcentral Oklahoma on 
1,470,559 acres purchased from their historic foes, the Cherokees.365 By the time the Osages 
finally moved to Oklahoma, over 15,000 non-Indians lived illegally on the Osages’ former 
lands.366 Ironically, a few years later, oil companies tapped a massive underground oil reserve on 
the new Osage lands, but the Osages did not sign over their mineral rights.367  
The Osages did not allow the federal government and Kansas state government to dictate 
how settlement patterns would unfold across the Plains and Prairie without a fight. During the 
Civil War, the Osages attacked soldiers who crossed the region to recruit for their military 
forces. On one occasion during the war, Osage warriors killed twenty Confederate soldiers 
crossing Osage lands.368 In the winter of 1873, a band of Osages hunting in south-central Kansas 
killed John Mosely, a popular citizen of Barbour County. Due to tall-tales of Indian atrocities, 
the locals were worried that the killing of Mosely was the first move in a pending Indian war. 
The Osages killed three more settlers in Barbour County in the summer of 1874, and the two 
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incidences were enough evidence of a prospective Indian offensive to convince Governor 
Thomas Osborn to call on Captain C.M. Rickers to form a militia unit of sixty men to kill 
Indians. In August 1874, Rickers’ militia found and killed four Osages who had nothing to do 
with the previous murders, but were only hunting on the Plains. Rickers did not care that the 
Osages did not have a connection to the killing of John Mosely. The federal government, indeed, 
charged Rickers with taking Osage property, but not with murder, and he remained in charge of 
his militia. The federal government demanded only reparations from the state of Kansas in the 
name of the Osages.369   
Despite the lack of federal sovereignty recognition, the Osage Tribal Council approved 
leases on tribal land, but with the oversight of the federal government. In 1891, the federal 
government allowed Indian tribes who owned reservations to lease the land for mining for the 
first time, but also imposed a ten-year limit to the contracts approved by tribal councils, thus 
beginning the next phase of federal infringement of Osage sovereignty. The federal government 
deemed tribal councils incompetent and unable to protect themselves from dishonest oilmen.370 
Henry Foster of Independence, Kansas, asked the BIA for the exclusive right to test and produce 
oil on the Osage reservation, and the Osage National Council approved the lease on March 14, 
1896. The lease granted Foster exploration rights on 1.5 million acres. The secretary of the 
interior approved the Foster lease just after Henry Foster died, so Henry’s brother, Edwin Foster, 
then took on the project. The lease stated that in return for exclusive rights to oil exploration, 
drilling and production, oil had to be found within eighteen months. Once oil was found, new 
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wells had to be drilled within six months. Foster was required to pay the Osages ten percent on 
oil production, and $50 on each producing gas well every year, but he could use all the surface 
resources he needed, such as timber, stone, water, and wood.371  
Congress soon created a system of wealth distribution for the Osages, as the tribe began 
earning handsome profits from oil production. Congress allotted the entire Osage reservation in 
1906 under the Osage Allotment Act (1906). No Osage born after July 1, 1907 was to receive an 
allotment, and all Osages maintained a headright for minerals, meaning that they received 
payments from leases to non-Osage entities that produced oil on Osage land. The federal 
government allotted the reservation three times into sections of 160 acres and then divided the 
remaining land among the Osages.372   
Individual Osages complained about oil pollution, showing how the Osages continued to 
exert their sovereign control over their land, even after many years of the federal government 
rarely recognizing the tribe’s ability of self-rule. The federal government responded to the Osage 
complaints by asking companies for financial restitution. On February 28, 1907, Secretary of the 
Interior Ethan Allen Hitchcock informed the Prairie Oil and Gas Company that it had to pay 
$205.02 for 2.23 acres of damages as a result of its Bird Creek Discharge Line and its Bird Creek 
Suction Line on the Osage Reservation. Hitchcock, however, did not make the oil company clean 
the land. Nor did he provide the tribe money to clean its land.373 The practice of the secretary fo 
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Figure 6.2 Indian Reservations in Oklahoma Prior to Statehood in 1907  
(Caddo Nation, “Home,” Accessed August 8, 2013, http://caddonation-nsn.gov/images/IT1866-
89.gif.) 
 
the interior asking a company to pay for pollution and change practices was a consistent theme in 
the early twentieth century on the Osage reservation.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before Osages received money for damages, the federal government usually investigated 
their claim. On February 14, 1907, C.F. Larrabee, the interim commissioner of Indian affairs, 
ordered the BIA agent of the Osage Nation, Ret Millard, to investigate and assess the damages 
by mining companies on Albert Lombard’s land. The companies mined on cultivated land and 
land platted for homesteads, which was in violation of the Osage Act of 1906. The historical 
record is unclear on whether Lombard’s land was damaged, but if it had been, the common 
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practice was for the company to pay for the damages at a value prescribed by the federal 
government.374   
 The Osages continued to exert control over their land despite the lack of federal 
recognition of tribal sovereignty. In early 1908, Lenora Stewart, an Osage Indian, made a claim 
of $1,000 in damages to the local BIA agent for pollution, but she would only see half that 
amount, since the civil engineer assigned to the case did not agree with her claim. She 
complained to the local BIA agent that the Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Company (ITIOC) 
had released salt water on her land. Inspector Charles F. Leech, a civil engineer, inspected the 
claim. He found that salt water from the well on Lot 33, which produced about seventy-five 
barrels of salt water waste per day (salt is a byproduct of oil production), had leaked into Butler 
Creek, which flowed through Stewart’s land. Stewart relied on Butler Creek for water for her 
cattle. Leech reported that the ITIOC had done everything possible to prevent waste from Lot 31 
from leaking into waterways. The ITIOC had constructed a reservoir to catch salt water so that it 
could be pumped into tanks. Although, the BIA officials were probably unaware of the variety of 
metal and toxins that salt water waste contained, they did realize that the salt water itself was 
dangerous for the land. The waste from the two wells on Lot 31 often produced fifty barrels of 
saltwater daily, which often found its way into Butler Creek. In addition, the ground around the 
reservoir was saturated with oil. The excess oil could not be burned off, because that would 
destroy the operation of the ITIOC. Sometimes oil companies “cleaned” oil from the soil by 
burning. Well 18 on Lot 32, the largest to that point on the Osage Reservation, made 8,000 
barrels of oil, salt water, and other waste after it was shot. Leech wrote that it was extremely 
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difficult to control the oil and waste flow, even though workers were offered $10 a day to try to 
control it. It took two weeks to control Well 18, and most of the discharge from the well flowed 
into Butler Creek. After the company got the well under control, it made about 4,700 barrels of 
oil, salt water, and other waste. The ITIOC constructed two reservoirs, thus Leech believed that 
the company did everything possible to control waste, yet a large portion still flowed into Butler 
Creek. As a result, cattle could not drink from Butler Creek and an oil fire destroyed two 
hundred trees on the banks of the creek. Leech assessed the timber to be of little value and that 
$500 would cover the damages.375  Osage Agent Ret Millard, the regional BIA agent, left his post 
just before the accident on Stewart’s land, and new BIA Osage Agent, Hugh Pitzer, made a trip 
on May 19, 1908 to Stewart’s land to investigate the claim.376 Upon Pitzer’s recommendation, 
Commissioner Larabbee allowed Pitzer to broker a deal between Lenora Stewart and the ITIOC 
for an undisclosed amount of money.377 The BIA did not recognize Stewart’s right to set her price 
to pay for destruction by oil waste. 
Sometimes Osages claims of pollution were not answered in nearly the positive manner 
that Lenora Stewart received, since the BIA chose when retribution would be paid. On January 
30, 1909, landowner R.W. Durill wrote a letter of complaint to Ret Millard that the oil 
companies were allowing oil to flow into Butler Creek on the Osage reserve, ruining the stock 
water. Whoever received the letter wrote a note on the bottom after the situation was 
investigated, saying that there was no cause for action. The author of the brief note likely was not 
                                                 
375 Charles F. Leech, Field Inspector, to Osage Indian Agent, March 26, 1908, RG 75, Osage Agency, Oil 
and Gas, Box 1; Lenora Stewart to Ret Millard, May 2, 1908, RG 75, Osage Agency, Oil and Gas, Box 1. 
376 Hugh Pitzer, Osage Indian Agent, to T.A. Stewart, May 13, 1909, RG 75, Osage Agency, Oil and Gas, 
Box 1.   
377 Larabbee to Pitzer, August 24, 1908, Osage Agency, Oil and Gas, Box 1.  
165 
 
Ret Millard, because he was not the Osage agent by that date.378 It may have been A.W. Curley, 
the clerk for the Osage Agency, who also wrote a letter to Durill on February 4 stating that the 
matter would be investigated at once.379 The Osage agent, presumably Hugh Pitzer, wrote a letter 
to Durill on April 8 stating that while the oil inspector found evidence of salt water that had 
escaped into Butler Creek, “the conditions were not such as to justify any action.”380   
The oil companies were often responsive to the requests of the BIA and findings of the 
oil field inspector, although not necessarily responsive to the claim of the Osage land owner. 
J.W. Evans of the Matson Oil Company responded on March 4, 1909, to a request from the 
Osage Agency to make sure oil was not running from his company’s tanks onto the ground. He 
wrote in reference to oil leaking on Lot 53 that “the matter will receive my prompt attention, and 
immediate steps taken to prevent waste.”381 On April 6, 1909, when Hugh Pitzer sent a letter to 
Waite Phillips, president of the Creston Oil and Gas Company (the younger brother of Frank and 
L.E. Phillips, who began Phillips Petroleum) that gas lines on his Lot 195 were leaking, Phillips 
sent his field inspector to investigate and fix the problem.382 Ultimately, Phillips’ field inspector 
did not find a problem, and thus Phillips did not fix the problem.383 The BIA accepted this 
conclusion. 
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Sometimes the BIA was proactive, but still did not force great changes from the oil 
companies. On June 29, 1909, Hugh Pitzer detailed to Waite Phillips how his No. 20, 21, 22, and 
23 receiving tanks had been allowed to overflow on June 23 and 24. Approximately 150 barrels 
of oil leaked onto the ground. The oil flowed down a “hollow” across Lot 68 and into Candy 
Creek. Pitzer told Phillips that the, “tanks should be more carefully looked after and not 
permitted to overflow.”384 Pitzer also told Phillips that the company was responsible for $7.79 in 
lost royalties that they needed to pay to the Osage Agency immediately.385 It is not clear why the 
oil companies tended to listen to the oil field inspector, but nevertheless, the companies paid 
their fines if they also agreed with the conclusion of the oil field inspector.  
Action by oil companies usually had to also be convenient for the oil company. On 
September 2, 1909, Bird Jones, an Osage, told Mr. Jarmark, chief clerk of the Osage Agency, 
that salt water from Lot 276, which belonged to her family and Laura Jones, had spilled on their 
land. The Barnesdale Oil Company had a gas separator to divide salt water from gas. Well 1 had 
needed repair for three months and the pipes had finally burst, allowing the salt water to spill 
over two acres of hay meadow. Bird Jones claimed that this salt water spill made the land 
worthless, and therefore she wanted the government to pay for the loss.386 L.W. Young of the 
Barnsdall Oil Company responded by shutting down the gas well that was leaking, arguing that 
Jones’s claim was “uncalled for, inasmuch as a ditch has been made from the well, in which the 
water has been running.”387 There is no evidence that Jones received retribution for the damage 
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from the oil waste. Even though Young did not agree with the claim, the gas well was shut down, 
since the company was not using it.388 Jones asked for retribution for an oil spill, and the 
company actually shut down the offending well, but only because the Barnesdale Company 
responded to the request of the federal government to fix the problem. Ultimately, the company 
only shut down the well because it was convenient for them.  
With complaints on the rise, oil companies searched for creative ways to gain advantages 
in the oil fields, since financial settlements of oil pollution complaints could reduce the 
companies’ profits. Oil companies, in 1932, began re-pressuring wells with natural gas. Some 
companies used acid to eliminate geological resistance to the flow of oil and others flooded land 
around wells. Oil companies approached the Osage Council in 1936 to approve leases for 
twenty-eight separate 160-acre lots to allow for more effective implementation of a re-pressuring 
system, even though re-pressuring allowed for salt waste to be released on clean land. The Osage 
Tribal Council approved the plan, as did the Interior Department, and over 70 percent of Osage 
County’s oil production came from flooded land by 1966.389 By the 1960s, the Osage Tribal 
Council, with the BIA’s approval, was making decisions to increase profits for the tribe, 
although the Osage Tribal Council did not echo the concerns of all Osages. 
William Zimmerman, assistant commissioner for the BIA, supported the Osage Tribal 
Council’s ability to set land values, even though the Osage Tribal Council did not represent the 
interests of all the Osages. The federal government authorized the Osage Tribal Council in 1947 
to determine the bonus value of land leased for oil, gas, and mining purposes, ultimately leading 
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to the selling of millions of acres of Osage land.390 In 1948, the federal government allowed 
Osages who were members of the tribe, but not of two Osage parents, to sell their land. By 1957, 
the surface rights to 1.2 of the 1.4 million acre reserve had been sold.391 This was controversial 
since some Osages argued that the Osages who sold their land were not loyal to the tribe, yet the 
federal government allowed them to sell, creating a form of limited self-determination that only 
benefitted part of the tribe.   
The federal government did not recognize the Osages’ ability to make the determination 
to extend the mineral estate. The federal government approved revised leases on the Osage 
reserve beginning on November 14, 1949, to allow for blanket leases (large leases), as a response 
to wells that were not producing, creating greater incentive for oil companies to continue to 
produce oil on the reservation. Blanket leases allowed fewer oil companies into the fields, so 
there was less competition, and the companies already there in the field would feel secure in 
investing in machinery. The BIA allowed twenty-two separate projects, ranging from 320 to 
23,240 acres. In the 1950s, secondary oil recovery (using chemicals or gas) led to daily oil 
figures tripling, which meant more oil companies wanted long-term contracts. The federal 
government responded to this need in 1964 by allowing companies to mine on Osage land 
indefinitely. Mining companies could invest in machinery and be fairly secure in the fact that 
their mining operations would eventually pay for the machinery. The Osages bore the entire cost 
of the maintenance of the oil reserve, although management duty still fell to the BIA.392 Even 
                                                 
390 Hearing on H.R. 3323, Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee of Public Lands, 
House of Representatives, 80th Cong. 1-2 (July 3, 1947) (statement of William Zimmerman, Jr. Assistant 
Commissioner, Bureau of Indian Affairs). 
391 Baird, The Osage People, 82-83. 
392 Hearing on H.R. 10204, Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 88th Cong. 1-3 (August 12, 1964) (statement of James Edmondson, Senator, Oklahoma). 
169 
 
with maintenance costs, Osage profits rose due to the oil crisis in America, stemming from war 
in the Middle East in 1973. The value of a single headright rose from $2,715 annually in 1972 to 
$10,870 by 1977, then to more than $30,220 by 1980.393  
During the twentieth century, the courts did not support self-rule by the Osages, although 
the courts occasionally upheld the federal trust relationship. In McCurdy v. United States (1924), 
the Supreme Court decided that allotted Osage lands were not subject to taxation by Oklahoma. 
The land in question belonged to Osages who died before the secretary of the interior approved 
the allotments on November 19, 1908. Under the Osage Allotment Act of 1906, Congress 
approved Osage allotments that were nontaxable by a state or territory, even if an Indian who 
owned the allotment died and the allotment was transferred to an heir.394   
In Oklahoma Ex Rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission et al. v. Barnsdall Refineries, Inc. et al. 
(1936), the Supreme Court ruled that an excise tax by Oklahoma on oil produced on Osage land 
was also illegal, thus upholding McCurdy.395 The court’s reasoning began with the Act of March 
3, 1921, in which the federal government authorized Oklahoma to levy a tax against the gross 
production of oil in Osage County.396 It was meant to pay for improvements to Osage County, 
and thus, it was meant to benefit the Osages. In contrast, the 1933 state law in question called for 
a 1/8 cent per barrel tax on all oil proceeds in Oklahoma. The tax went directly to the state 
treasury and was used to defray the costs of operating the state’s oil and gas distribution law. The 
court decided this tax unnecessarily burdened the lessees in Osage Country, which were to be 
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regulated solely by the federal government. It was illegal for the state to tax the Osage Nation, 
but the court held that such a tax could exist if it ultimately benefited the Osage Nation, not 
Oklahoma.397 In both McCurdy and Barnsdall, the court decided that the federal government and 
state governments could collect taxes that benefitted the Osage Nation, although the Osage 
Nation could have no voice in passing the legislation that called for those taxes. And, the state 
could tax businesses on the reservation if the court deemed the tax beneficial for the Osage 
Nation. 
In contrast to the previous two cases, the Supreme Court found in West v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission (1948) that the Osages’ land was indeed subject to Oklahoma’s estate tax upon the 
transfer. Thus, not only did the Court not recognize the ability of the Osages to run their own 
affairs, the federal trust relationship could also be bypassed when the federal courts deemed it 
necessary. Charles West, Jr., an Osage, died in 1940 and his mother was to receive his entire 
estate. The Oklahoma Tax Commission levied a tax of $5,313.35 against the transfer of the estate 
valued at $111,219.18. The federal government still held the land in trust, and the Oklahoma 
Inheritance Transfer Tax Act of 1939 provided the consent for the state to tax land under federal 
trust.398 The West court used the case of Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States (1943) as its 
guide. In this case the federal government sued to recover inheritance taxes paid on the land of 
three members of the Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and 
Seminoles). The justification was that Oklahoma’s Indians were citizens of Oklahoma, and 
therefore they were not immune to inheritance taxes. The Court also believed that Oklahoma 
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would hold a heavy burden if Indian land was exempted from inheritance taxes, since revenue 
was needed for the public good.399  
The Osages could not protect their property from the decisions of the courts, and even 
their own tribal council, but by the latter half of the twentieth century the technology came 
available that allowed them to protect their underground water from oil waste. Private companies 
developed waste injection during the mid-twentieth century, since the federal government 
allowed oil companies to control the method of waste disposal. Waste injection wells protect 
both subsurface and surface water from brine and a variety of other materials harmful to humans, 
plants, and animals. The brine brought to the surface during the oil production process is saltier 
than sea water, and often has toxic metals and radioactive substances. All oil and gas-producing 
states now require that the brine be injected into the same rock formation or a similar formation 
from where it originated. Before the 1970s, scientists believed that once crude oil leaked on land 
it would evaporate, oxidize, become part of a solution, disperse, or be eaten by 
microorganisms.400 Scientists were still developing processes for oil waste injection throughout 
the twentieth century, thus the BIA did not have to address the issue before the 1970s, although 
they were clearly aware of the mess of oil leakage on land, as was evidenced from the complaints 
from Osages during the early twentieth century. 
In the United States, scientists first separated salf from oil waste in 1859 when companies 
tried to market lamp oil, yet scientists paid little attention to the oil and brine industry for fifty 
years after that, especially in states like California, Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma, where brine 
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could be especially thick.401 Oil producers generally used surface disposal, which was the norm. 
This was the case not just in Oklahoma, but around the nation. In 1907 at Bradford Field, 
Pennsylvania, oil producers flooded land with brine in the hope that it would simply evaporate.402 
Farmers even sued for damages in the 1920s. A farmer from Oklahoma, Bessie Edwards, sued 
the Pulaski Oil Company in 1923, because salt sterilized a strip of her land. The court awarded 
Edwards only $800 since an acre was worth just $50 at the time.403   
Most land owners received payments from oil companies, so they had little incentive to 
complain about oil waste, thus it was a tremendous show of self-determination that Osages stood 
up to the companies in the early twentieth century. The private companies often settled with land 
owners over waste spills in order to keep the information out of the public eye. In addition, land 
owners often did not go to court due to legal fees, and the fact that it was almost impossible to 
prove that salt water from an injection well, or an oil well, polluted a fresh water aquifer. It was 
much less costly to simply drill another shallow well.404 
A variety of systems were used in the early twentieth century to dispose of waste. In 
1927, the Atlantic Company of Texas, with seven oil wells, disposed of waste oil and bottom 
sediment in open pits, which oil companies believed could protect rivers and lakes. The Rowan 
Davis Lease of Texas used a treatment plant and removed bottom sediment instead of letting it 
flow into Pine Oak Creek. In one Texas oil field, a local farmer asked that the brine be released 
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into the field for his cattle to drink. The salt content was low, so the cattle could tolerate it. In 
contrast, oil companies in California pumped their brine into the Pacific Ocean. By 1930, they 
were pumping 200,000 barrels of waste brine into the ocean every day.405   
Scientists developed water injection in Pennsylvania just after the turn of the twentieth 
century, but thought that it was unrealistic for the long term. Scientists could pump water 
underground into tight sandstone containing crude oil, pushing the remaining crude to the 
surface. In the early years, industrial waste was often injected into Michigan sandstone. Porous 
sandstone, the Traverse and Sylvania, were both appropriate for the disposal of waste. Oil field 
brines were also injected in Michigan along with California, Texas, Arkansas, and Kentucky 
during the twentieth century.406 Scientists believed that while oil emulsions might be readily 
disposed, oil brines needed just the right conditions for proper disposal. Kansans had problems 
with algae, which grew when deep water came in contact with oxygen, plugging the pores of the 
receiving strata. Scale from the corrosion of metal pipes, as well as chemical reactions with 
incompatible brines, also clogged the strata. Oil companies used evaporation ponds in Kansas, 
Oklahoma, and Texas. Geologists, however, believed that soil seepage was not problematic since 
many states had low salt concentrations in their soil. By the 1930s, the Bureau of Mines finally 
realized that seepage had polluted shallow underground aquifers in Kansas. As a result, farmers 
had to relocate their freshwater wells, particularly difficult during a drought.407   
The first test injection well in Texas was at the East Texas oil field in 1936, which would 
lead scientists to change their idea of waste disposal. The East Texas Salt Water Disposal 
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Company was established in 1942 and 250 operators subscribed to membership through stock. 
By 1959, over 1,874,000,000 bbl (barrels) of water had been injected through sixty injection 
wells. The company took salt water from the tank batteries of operators, transported it to a 
central point, and treated the salt water with chemicals to stabilize it before returning it to 
underground wells.408  By the 1950s, scientists believed that there was tremendous capacity for 
underground storage of waste. Fracturing—the splitting of rock layers—allowed for upwards of 
forty million gallons per acre of waste. The fractured area was held under pressure while waste 
was distributed into the strata. Scientists thought that underground fracturing made no changes 
on the surface, since there were many layers of clay, shale, and plastic materials above the 
fractured layer.409   
The stage was set for the EPA to clean land in Indian country through waste injection. 
Congress approved the expansion of the Osage Mineral Estate, and the BIA allowed oil 
companies in the field with little oversight of their injection processes. This brought both wealth 
and pollution to Osage Country. As detailed in the next chapter, the EPA then created rules for 
oil companies as allowed by the federal government under the Clean Water Act. 
 Despite a lack of federal recognition that the Osages could make land decisions on their 
own, some Osages asked the federal government to stop pollution on Osage lands. Osages, like 
Lenora Stewart, asked oil companies to at least pay for damages to Osage land caused by oil 
                                                 
408 W.S. Morris, “Industrial Wastes: Subsurface Disposal of Salt Water from Oil Wells, Presented at the 
32nd Annual Meeting, Federation of Sewage and Industrial Wastes Association, Dallas Texas, October 12-15, 1959,” 
Journal (Water Pollution Control Federation) 32 (Jan. 1960), 43-45. 
409 Black, “Underground Waste Disposal,” 672; Marcus G. Puder, Bill Bryson and John A. Veil, 
“Compendium of Regulatory Requirements Governing Underground Injection of Drilling Wastes,” prepared for the 
US Department of Energy Office of Fossil Energy National Petroleum Technology Office under contract W-31-109-
Eng-38 by Argonne National Laboratory (Feb. 2003), 3. 
175 
 
spills. The science was not available prior to 1930 for the BIA, and the Osages, to know the true 
harm of oil waste. All they were aware of was that the salt water and oil pollution made cattle 
sick and destroyed river banks. The BIA forced companies to pay for damages, keeping oil 
leases alive and maintaining royalties for the Osage land owners. While the BIA encouraged the 
Osage Tribal Council to have a stake in land decisions during the twentieth century, the BIA did 
not recognize tribal self-determination.
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Chapter 7: The Osage Nation, the Midnight Rider, and the 
EPA 
 
On August 10, 2005, President George W. Bush signed the Safe, Accountable, 
Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) 
with Republican Senator James Inhofe’s ominous Midnight Rider, section 10211, 
attached to it. The Midnight Rider forced Oklahoma’s tribes to make deals with 
Oklahoma for primary control of oil waste injection (primacy). The rider not recognize 
the Osages’ ability to operate their own injection wells as allowed by the 1986 
amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act, and infringed on the federal trust 
relationship with the Osages, since it interjected the state of Oklahoma into the 
relationship. According to over two hundred years of legal precedent, the federal 
government should not have allowed Oklahoma to usurp the power of the EPA to award 
Indians primary control of their environmental protection systems. When a tribe had been 
awarded primacy by the EPA, they could operate an environmental program without 
everyday oversight from the EPA, as long as the tribe followed federal regulations. Tribal 
leaders in Oklahoma and around the United States expected the EPA to at least protest 
the Midnight Rider, yet the EPA did not. Instead, the EPA helped tribes navigate the new 
law.  
The Osage Nation and the EPA began working together on underground waste 
injection in 1980.410 At the time the Osage Nation owned more oil and gas acreage than 
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any tribe in the United States at 995,707.17 acres, so there was plenty of waste from oil 
operations with the potential to pollute underground sources of drinking water.411 The 
EPA even used Osage employees to build the program. Three Osage employees reported 
to two EPA officials for several years.412 As detailed in the previous chapter, in the late 
twentieth century, the federal government finally understood how to successfully deal 
with oil waste through the use of underground injection.    
The Safe Drinking Water Act called on the EPA to oversee underground waste 
injection programs on Indian reservations, and in states, to prevent oil waste spills. For 
example, the EPA has looked at each injection well on a case-by-case basis and set 
requirements for waste injection pressures based upon subsurface rock formations. High 
well pressures sometimes fracture subsurface rock formations, which endangers drinking 
water sources. In addition, well operators have been required to maintain financial 
resources to ensure the plugging of old injection wells.413 Overall, the federal government, 
represented by the EPA, has required more oversight over oil production operations than 
the BIA had asked for in earlier years. As a result of tougher restrictions, oil companies 
challenged the requirements.    
The Osage Nation and the EPA tried to help oil companies follow the Safe 
Drinking Water Act. The EPA created the Osage Outreach Project in 1996 to get oil 
companies to cooperate with federal underground waste injection regulations. The EPA 
                                                 
411 Fixico, The Invasion of Indian Country, Appendix C, 224. The other major oil and gas 
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412 Diane Daniels, interview with author, February 5, 2010. 
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educated oil companies operating on the Osage reservation, both non-Indian and Indian, 
about the regulations they needed to follow in regard to underground injection. The EPA 
published two manuals to help companies on the reservation avoid expensive penalties. 
The “Osage Operator’s Environmental Reference Manual” covered all the necessary 
requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the “Osage Operator’s Environmental 
Handbook” was a scaled down version meant for glove compartments of pickup trucks.414 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
414 Wesley Brown, “Osage Get EPA Pointers,” Tulsa World, Aug. 28, 1997. 
Figure 7.1 Oil Waste Injection Well  
(Pollution Issues.com, “Injection Well,” accessed October 13, 2013, 
http://www.pollutionissues.com/Ho-Li/Injection-Well.html#b; also see, Paul Osborn, ed., 
“Technical Program Review: Underground Injection Control Regulations,” (Washington 
D.C.: GPO, 2002). 
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In 2005, Osage Nation officials completed the federal treatment as a state 
application and the federal primacy application, which would give the EPA the ability to 
recognize Osage primacy over oil waste injection on the reservation. When the federal 
government approved a treatment as a state application, a tribe had the ability to operate 
an environmental program independent of the federal government, much like a state, as 
long as the tribe followed federal law. States and tribes had to prove they would regulate 
waste disposal with the same strict standards of the EPA. For example, if the EPA had 
awarded the Osage Nation primacy of underground waste injection, it would have been 
required to ensure all wells on the Osage reserve passed the mechanical integrity test, 
illustrating that each well had no significant leaks.415 The Osage Environmental and 
Natural Resources Department, in conjunction with the EPA, was already enforcing EPA 
regulations, thus the achievement of primacy over injection practices on the reservations 
was a natural step for the Osages.   
The local representative of EPA’s Region VI, which covered the area of New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas, told Diane Daniels, the director of the Osage 
Environmental and Natural Resources Department, to wait until both applications were 
completed and to submit them together. While her office was completing the 
applications, the Midnight Rider became law.416 Daniels now had to make a deal with 
Oklahoma before her department could be awarded primacy. The chance of Oklahoma 
agreeing to Osage primacy of its underground injection control program was slim.   
 
                                                 
415 Underground Injection Control, 40 C.F.R. § 147.2912 , 2902. 
416 Daniels, interview with author, February 5, 2010. 
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Figure 7.1 Oil and Gas Wells on the Osage Reservation  
(Osage Nation Roads Department, “Osage Nation Oil and Gas Well Map,” accessed 
August 9, 2013, http://www.osagetribe.com/tip/welcome_sub_page.aspx?subpage_id=5.) 
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The Midnight Rider also challenged the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, which 
gave the EPA the discretion to interpret environmental law.417   
Why would Inhofe want to stop tribes in Oklahoma from gaining primacy status? 
Inhofe has always had connections with the oil and gas industry, therefore protection of 
the oil and gas industry seems to be the reason for the Midnight Rider. As a member of 
the House of Representatives, Inhofe worked to protect oil and gas producers in 
Oklahoma. In 1988 he spoke on the floor of the House in favor of repealing a provision in 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 which would charge oil producers an 
extra fifteen cents on diesel fuel. At the time the industry was suffering due to a glut in 
the market, therefore it constituted a horrible blow to small producers in Oklahoma. By 
1987, oil and gas production was down by twenty-five percent in Oklahoma. In that 
period the number of employees in oil and gas manufacturing declined thirty-four percent 
and the number of employees in oil and gas extraction went down 65,000 workers. The 
tax was going to cost one small, operator—unnamed by Inhofe—more than $300,000.  
This operator was going to shut down his business, forcing hundreds out of work.  
Included in Inhofe’s proposal was an exception for farmers and ranchers using diesel in 
their work pickups. Operators could get the money back in a refund, but Inhofe argued 
that even a short term hike would be disastrous. He also argued it would damage cash 
flow and increase bureaucracy and administration costs.418   
In 1999 Senator Inhofe came out on the side of oil producers, operating 13,000 oil 
and gas wells in Osage County, when state and federal laws endangered profits. The 
                                                 
417 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
418 Assisting Oilfield and Gas Operators, United States Senate, S. Rep. 100-458 (Feb. 23, 1988) 
(statement of James Inhofe). 
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Osage Environmental Audit, conducted by Oklahoma State’s Bureau of Social Research 
and funded by the Oklahoma Commission on Marginally Producing Oil and Gas Wells, 
found that oil producers spend $9 million a year, $1.97 a barrel, to comply with state and 
federal environmental laws. That meant that producers were spending a total of $15.35 to 
producer a barrel of oil, incurring a net loss of $4.45 per barrel. Thus, domestic producers 
had difficulty competing with foreign oil companies. Venezuelans could produce and 
ship oil cheaper than domesticate producers could draw the oil from the ground. Prices 
began plunging in 1997, costing between 10,000-15,000 jobs. Inhofe along with other 
leaders, including Osage Nation Chief Charles Tillman, looked for ways to decrease 
costs. Inhofe argued the unnecessary costs must be removed and that all regulations 
should be based in “sound research.”  Tillman said that oil profits on the reservation had 
declined 90% in the 1990s.419   
In 2005, Inhofe was the majority leader of the Senate’s Environment and Public 
Works Committee. He made protecting big oil corporations in the state of Oklahoma a 
top priority with his position. In 2007, Inhofe received more than $1 million in 
contributions from the oil and gas industry.420 For the 2010 federal budget, Inhofe 
requested $1 million for a compressed natural gas station for the city of Norman.421 
Illustrating a lack of belief in oversight, Inhofe was well noted for being a global 
warming denier, calling it the “greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people,” 
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and not surprisingly, the natural gas industry does plenty to pollute the air.422 Ultimately, 
by allowing Oklahoma to judge primacy, not the EPA, Inhofe was doing what he could to 
reduce oversight, and thus penalty fees, in the oil fields.    
Tribal leaders in Oklahoma and across the nation were alarmed at federal 
infringement of tribal sovereignty with the passage of the Midnight Rider, especially in 
regard to the unexpected method in which the Midnight Rider passed Congress. Jeannine 
Hale, administrator of environmental programs for the Cherokee Nation, was one of the 
first tribal officials to notice the Midnight Rider. On Friday, July 29, 2005, she contacted 
tribal leaders around the country. She wrote, “Folks, we have a really bad provision in the 
Highway bill that has been passed by the House and is on the Senate floor today. You had 
better read it.”423 Tribal leaders did not respond soon enough to her call to action, but the 
problem quickly became a concern for them.   
On August 2, 2005, A. David Lester, executive director of the Council of Energy 
Resource Tribes (CERT), sent an email to tribal leaders stating he believed that they were 
entering an era, “of retrenchment from social and political justice overall in the American 
political environment that will tolerate roll back of certain gains by Indian Tribes of the 
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past 30-40 years.”424 Lester was referring to the fact that the Midnight Rider represented 
the goals of legislators who did recognize tribal self-determination. 
Three days later, James G. Sappier, chief of the Penobscot Nation, and chairman of 
the National Tribal Environmental Council, wrote a letter to President George W. Bush 
urging him to veto HR 3. Sappier claimed the Midnight Rider stood as an affront to tribal 
sovereignty in Oklahoma since it removed the ability of tribes to regulate environmental 
quality on their own lands. He argued that since Inhofe added the provision at the last 
minute, the bill undermined “a fair process for substantive legislation that is deliberative 
and equitable.”425 Sappier also called on the President Bush to veto HR 3, because the 
legislation was “an outrageous circumvention of the Congressional process and 
fundamental rules of democracy until the offending non-germane provision is stricken.”426 
All that said, President Bush signed the bill into law on August 10, 2005 refusing to 
recognize the ability of Oklahoma’s Indian nations to operate their own environmental 
programs. 
                                                 
424 A. David Lester, Executive Director of CERT, email to David Conrad, NTEC, Aug. 2, 2005, 
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The repercussions were felt throughout the community of Indian environmental 
leaders. Robert Gomez, Director of the Taos Pueblo Office of Environmental Protection, 
declared that “the secret rider is an outrageous circumvention of the Congressional 
process and the fundamental rules of democracy.” Gomez said the bill was unfair, since it 
was “completely unrelated to transportation so no one could even guess it [the Midnight 
Rider] might be in the bill.”427 It is important to note that the passage of the Midnight 
Rider did not mark a circumvention of the Congressional process, since it was voted on, 
but Inhofe wrote the Midnight Rider into the bill the night before the House vote, 
certainly circumventing the “fundamental rules of democracy.”  
David Conrad, of the National Tribal Environmental Council, told Diane Daniels 
that even the governor of Oklahoma was unaware of the provision.428 Therefore, this was 
not a power grab by Oklahoma, but instead by Senator James Inhofe, a Republican 
Senator of Oklahoma. Inhofe acted unilaterally on the issue, completely infringing on the 
federal trust relationship. 
On September 7, 2005, Robert Wilson, Treasurer of the 33rd Business Committee 
of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma, asked seven groups and 
representatives of the federal government to overturn the Midnight Rider, including 
Arizona Senator John McCain, a Republican who sat on the Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee. Wilson stated that the Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes of Oklahoma had 
                                                 
427 Robert Gomez, Director, Taos Pueblo Office of Environmental Programs, “Secret Legislation 
Removes Oklahoma Tribal Sovereignty to Regulate Environment,” post on 
indigenouswatersnetwork@yahoogroups.com, Friday, August 5, 2005, author received through email from 
Diane Daniels, February 16, 2010. 
428 David Conrad, NTEC, email to Diane Daniels, August 11, 2005, DD emails. 
 186 
worked closely with Senator Inhofe, who was chair of the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee, and Chairman Young of the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee. The tribes were surprised when the rider was added at the last opportunity, 
because there was no time for comment. Wilson argued that it was accepted federal 
environmental law for tribes to receive treatment as a state status.429 He was correct, since 
the Safe Drinking Water Act was amended in 1987 to allow for treatment as a state 
status.430 The new provision infringed on this ability and further limited tribes by allowing 
state law to reign on Indian reservations. Wilson stated that “this is an enormous intrusion 
on tribal sovereignty, and goes against centuries of precedent.”431 Wilson was wrong in 
his last statement, because the United States had infringed on tribal sovereignty 
throughout American history. The Midnight Rider did, however, go against the intentions 
of the Self-Determination Era. Wilson did not receive a response, as senators and 
Congressmen proved unwilling to challenge Inhofe, a senior senator and chair of the 
Environment and Public Works Committee.432 Oklahoma pushed forward with control of 
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Indian land and infringement of the federal trust relationship, while the EPA tried to work 
within the provisions of the Midnight Rider, not lobbying against the law.433     
In December 2005, Oklahoma announced its intention to operate environmental 
programs on Indian land located within state boundaries. Immediately, tribal leaders tried 
to talk with the EPA, but there was little the EPA would do.434 Sappier argued it would be 
better for the EPA to sit down with tribes and Oklahoma and talk things out, expressing 
that the tribes should be considered equals with the EPA and Oklahoma. He reminded 
tribal leaders that the EPA had a federal-tribal trust responsibility to uphold.435 In other 
words, the EPA had the responsibility to protect tribal land, even with the passage of the 
Midnight Rider.   
Sappier and other tribal leaders went forward with their plan to meet with the EPA. 
On Friday, January 6, 2006, Deborah Ponder, Deputy Director of Environmental Justice 
and Tribal Affairs for the EPA, wrote to Indian representatives that while Ann Klee, 
counsel for the EPA, would be available for a meeting on Monday, January 9, any 
outcome of a meeting with Klee would not affect the EPA’s decision to not challenge the 
                                                 
433 Timothy Cama, “EPA Accused of Improper Lobbying for Water Rule,” The Hill, May 19, 
2015, accessed October 7, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/242472-epa-accused-of-
improper-lobbying-for-water-rule. The EPA has been known to lobby for causes and to stand up for itself, 
as has other agencies.  
434 Jonathan B. Hook, Director, Office of Environmental Justice and Tribal Affairs US EPA 
Region 6, email to Diane Daniels, Dec. 28, 2005, DD emails; Jeannine Hale, email to Jonathan Hook, Dec. 
28, 2005; David Conrad, email to Diane Daniels, December 28, 2005, DD emails. 
435 James Sappier, email to Diane Daniels, Dec. 30, 2005, DD emails. 
 188 
rider.436 David Conrad also conceded that Ann Klee would not fight the rider.437 Jeannine 
Hale told other leaders that tribes could not depend on the EPA and should continue to 
seek repeal of the rider through negotiations and other means.438 Hale continued to 
express the need for tribes to fight the Midnight Rider. It is apparent that the EPA’s main 
goal was environmental protection within the scope of the Midnight Rider, rather than 
assisting the tribes drive toward primacy and self-determination.    
By the end of 2006, no tribe in Oklahoma had gained primacy, and the EPA was 
assisting the tribes of Oklahoma in navigation of the Midnight Rider.439 In February of 
2007, Richard Greene, the Region VI EPA Director (for Oklahoma, Texas, New 
Mexico), sent a letter to tribal environmental leaders in Oklahoma about how to gain 
primacy under the Midnight Rider. First, the EPA would consider whether primacy 
agreements between the state and tribes were appropriate. The EPA, however, would be 
unable to approve any agreement not in accord with existing environmental laws. In 
addition, a public hearing would be announced in local newspapers, and if there was 
significant interest, a public hearing would be conducted. The EPA advised that evidence 
of an agreement with Oklahoma should be submitted alongside the tribal application for 
treatment as a state eligibility.440 The EPA now chose to work with tribes in Oklahoma on 
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the basis of the Midnight Rider, which limited its freedom to award primacy without 
agreements from Oklahoma.441 The Midnight Rider did not stop tribes from trying to gain 
primacy of their environmental programs.   
 The tribes of Oklahoma remained unwilling to agree to the Midnight Rider. The 
Osage Nation drafted a resolution in regard to the rider meant for presentation at the 
meeting of United Indian Nations on April 16, 2007.442 The resolution stated that tribes 
still retained governmental jurisdiction on their land, despite the Midnight Rider.443  On 
Friday, June 1, 2007, Jeannine Hale requested a meeting between the EPA and all the 
tribes of Oklahoma, hoping to talk the EPA into finding ways to circumvent the rider. At 
this point, the EPA had not received comments from Oklahoma tribes of EPA Region VI 
asking for interpretations of the rider.444 Only the Citizen Potawatomies and the Quapaws 
were negotiating agreements with the Oklahoma over their environmental programs by 
August 2007, but no agreements had been finalized.445 On August 7, 2007, Hale met with 
EPA general counsel Roger Martella to discuss the rider and the EPA’s policies on how 
to implement it, but ultimately the EPA’s response did not change.446 The EPA had 
decided to help tribes work within the framework of the rider.   
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Tribal leaders fought for repeal of the Midnight Rider when it came up for 
renewal in 2009. Osage Principal Chief Jim Gray sent a letter to Congress asking for 
repeal, stating that the Midnight Rider attacked Indian sovereignty in Oklahoma by 
taking away Indian rights to administer environmental programs. He also wrote that the 
rider raised concerns for all Indians because “it could be used as a model to chip away at 
sovereign tribal rights throughout the country.”447 Furthermore, he argued, that for tribes 
in Oklahoma the rider changed the “delicate balance Congress established between tribal, 
state, and federal sovereignty in its environmental laws, and circumvented the EPA’s 
duty to reasonable differences between environmental standards.”448 Gray’s letter did not 
sway the members of the United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to overturn 
the law.449   
Debra Lekanof of the Swinomish Tribe traveled to Washington, D.C., in 2009, to 
explain the Indian Environmental Act, which several Indian leaders wrote with the hope 
of negating the Midnight Rider. The National Tribal Caucus supported the effort, 
believing it was a necessary first step toward repeal of the rider. Lekanof met with the 
National Tribal Operations Committee (NTOC), which was set up in 1994 by the EPA to 
facilitate stronger partnerships with tribes. The committee was comprised of nineteen 
tribal leaders and the EPA’s senior leadership committee, including the head of the EPA. 
Lekanof told the NTOC that the Indian Environmental Act would reaffirm the EPA’s 
trust relationship. Lekanof also reassured her fellow tribal leaders that administrator Lisa 
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Jackson had reaffirmed EPA’s trust relationship to Indian nations. Jackson informed 
Lekanof that as a part of her commitment to tribes, the American Indian Environmental 
Office was moving from the Office of Water to the Office of International Affairs as an 
effort to recognize tribes as sovereign nations.450 However, the Indian Environmental Act 
did not pass, and the federal government extended the SAFETEA-LU for eighteen 
months on July 31, 2009. The extension closed a federal budget shortfall by transferring 
$7 million from the General Treasury Fund to the Highway Fund, which was more 
important in the eyes of Congress and the President.451 Recognizing Indian sovereignty to 
jurisdiction of tribal land was not a priority for the federal government.   
In conclusion, the Self-Determination Era held promise for tribal leaders that 
Congress would recognize tribal abilities to clean and protect tribal land, but the 
Midnight Rider made it apparent that the federal promises of self-determination did not 
include primary control of underground injection and other environmental programs. 
Despite Congress’s amendment to the Clean Water Act that allowed tribes to have 
primary control over their waste injection programs, the Midnight Rider denied the Osage 
Nation the ability to operate its own oil waste injection program. Since 1980, the EPA 
had slowly helped the Osage Nation to develop an effective environmental protection 
program, but now the best way for tribes to move forward was to gain primacy. The 
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Midnight Rider forced tribes to depend more heavily on the EPA in order to keep tribal 
land clean.   
 Indian leaders throughout Oklahoma and the United States did not stop trying to 
protect and regulate their own land. Their letters and emails illustrate that from 2005 to 
2010, tribal leaders like Jeannine Hale of the Cherokees, continued to push the EPA and 
Congress to change their course and recognize tribal self-rule. Congress could not curtail 
the ability of native peoples to act on their sovereignty. 
Summary of Section Three 
 Chapters five and six illustrate that the Osages never stopped driving to exert 
control over their land, but that the federal government would not recognize Osage 
Nation sovereignty. First, despite the Osages slowly losing their land throughout the 
Prairie and Plains of the United States, they managed to maintain a life on the Prairie, and 
they had the foresight to retain their mineral rights. Next, oil companies managed to spill 
oil and oil waste on Osage land, endangering local fresh water supplies with pollution. 
Pollution made the cattle sick, killed plants, and rotted away the river banks. The Osages 
did not stand by and allow this to happen, complaining to the BIA. While the BIA did not 
clean the land, the BIA asked companies to pay for land pollution.  
In the early twentieth century, scientists knew that unrestrained oil was 
detrimental for the land and animals, but they did not understand the full ramifications of 
the pollution. They also did not understand how to fix the problem. It was not until the 
end of the twentieth century that oil waste injection became a staple of the oil producing 
industry.   
 193 
By the 1980s, the Osage Nation had a hand in cleaning and protecting its land by 
overseeing oil waste injection on its reservation with the help of EPA officials. The EPA 
never gave up its right to help the Osage Nation in this process as provided by the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, but the Osage Nation did not waver either. When the Osage Nation 
could finally operate its underground injection control program on its own, without the 
EPA’s help, it jumped at the chance to gain primacy. The Midnight Rider stalled the 
Osages’ efforts by forcing the Osage Nation to make a deal with the state of Oklahoma in 
order to achieve primacy of oil waste injection.   
The Midnight Rider changed how the EPA could relate to tribes in Oklahoma. 
The rider forced tribes of Oklahoma to make deals with the state before they could apply 
for primacy with the EPA. Even with this provision, tribal leaders in Oklahoma, and 
around the United States, weighed on the EPA, Congress, and the President to overturn 
the Midnight Rider. As of 2010 the Midnight Rider still existed, the EPA had not 
awarded primacy to any Oklahoma tribes, and the EPA had not recognized the Osages’ 
ability to clean and protect their land from oil waste without direct oversight from the 
EPA. Like federal agencies of bygone years, the EPA did not recognize tribal self-
determination.      
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Conclusion 
As stated in the Introduction, the greater significance of this dissertation is that it 
analyzes the EPA’s relationship with American Indians in the late twentieth century, 
illustrating that the EPA has not acted as an agency born during the Self-Determination 
Era, but one more akin to federal agencies of the past. American Indians inherently 
possess sovereign rights as nations to protect and maintain their land from environmental 
damage.452 Tribes and individual Indians in North America have never stopped exerting 
their self-determination to act on their sovereignty over their land, and thus they have 
culturally persevered. Tribes have consistently invoked their right to self-determination 
according to the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the United States Constitution and in 
contrast to Chief Justice John Marshall’s Cherokee decisions, the Supreme Court’s Lone 
Wolf decision, the Interior Department’s patterns of paternalism, and the Midnight Rider 
of a lone Senator.   
 The Isleta people managed to remain in central New Mexico despite years of 
challenges to their right to make their own decisions about their land. In the 1920s, the 
BIA did not challenge the Pueblo Lands Board, and Congress ultimately did not replace 
Pueblo lands that were misappropriated. The BIA initiated the Lands Program in the 
1930s to add land to the Pueblos’ holdings, yet other federal agencies blocked the BIA 
and created the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board, which eventually provided more 
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land for the Pueblos, but not the two million acres BIA Commissioner John Collier had 
imagined in 1934.453    
 In spite of the federal missteps, the Isletas pushed to control their own range and 
the animals on it. They tried to increase the number of animals on the range, because they 
knew the range could handle the grazing pressure. When the BIA found out what the 
Isletas were doing, it pushed back, but the Isletas did not stop trying to control their land 
for themselves and future generations. 
Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987 to allow the EPA to deal with 
tribes as they would with the states. The federal government’s new respect for tribal 
nations made sense in light of the Self-Determination Era. The Isletas could write their 
own water quality standards for the Rio Grande, as long as they were as stringent as those 
of New Mexico and the EPA. The Isletas wrote water quality standards for the Rio 
Grande that were tougher than any standards the city of Albuquerque had to follow in 
prior years. In response, Albuquerque sued, but the federal district court and the federal 
Appeals Court denied Albuquerque’s claims, approving the EPA’s ability to recognize 
the Isleta right to set water quality standards for the Rio Grande. Although it was 
operating during the Self-Determination Era, and the courts cleared the way, the EPA still 
did not recognize the Isletas’ desire to control their own land. The EPA advised the 
Isletas to write their water quality standards based on the EPA’s science. The Isletas did 
not have the freedom to write the standards outside of accepted federal science. 
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The Quapaw case study also illustrates how the federal government did not 
recognize the ability of Indians to make decisions about their land. The Quapaws lived on 
the one of the most profitable mineral fields in the United States, and in the early 
twentieth century mining companies fought for legal control to mine the ore. The district 
court in Tulsa agreed in 1928 that Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall had signed fair 
leases on behalf of the tribe with the Eagle-Picher Company, although the Quapaws 
received no more than ten percent on a lease. Meanwhile, the Eagle-Picher Company 
sub-leased the land at fifteen to thirty percent per annum. In the 1920s, the Skelton 
Mining Company stole ore from the Quapaws, yet Secretary of the Interior Joseph Dixon 
awarded the ore to the company, with just ten percent going to the land owners. In 1930, 
the Tenth Circuit Court decided in Whitebird that the secretary of the interior could sign 
mining leases without the consent of tribal heirs. In each case, the Quapaws pressed the 
BIA, the Interior Department, Congress, and the courts to give the tribe better royalties, 
but the federal entities did not recognize the tribe’s right to make its own leases.     
Not until the 1960s was pollution on the radar of the federal government and the 
Quapaws. The next stage in the Quapaw story was cleanup, but the EPA recognized only 
a limited role for the Quapaws to help in the Superfund process. Empty mines on Quapaw 
land flooded in the 1970s and toxic metals flowed to the surface. The EPA placed Tar 
Creek on the National Priority List in 1981, and from that point forward, soil 
remediation, and resettlement, took place. The EPA spent millions to clean the area, but 
refused to directly give money to the Quapaws to clean the area. The EPA, under 
CERCLA, was the only entity that could perform soil remediation and other 
environmental cleaning strategies. Federal law allowed the EPA to award the Quapaws 
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funds to take part in remedial investigations and feasibility studies, but the EPA did not 
allow the tribe to take the lead in cleaning their land. Just like the BIA before it, the EPA 
in Quapaw country did not allow the Quapaws to determine the future of their own land.  
The Osage Nation case study has a similar conclusion as the first two. The Osages 
fought for control of their land throughout their relationship with the United States. In the 
nineteenth century, the federal government made a series of treaties with the Osage 
Nation that moved it to a small portion of what eventually became northcentral 
Oklahoma. Individual Osage land owners demanded that the BIA do something about oil 
pollution, but the Osages were not able to set the cost of repayment. Not until the late 
twentieth century did oil waste injection begin on Osage land. The Osages, along with the 
EPA, worked to control this process. 
Then in 2005, President Bush signed the “Midnight Rider,” which forced the 
Osages to negotiate terms with the state of Oklahoma before it could control its own oil 
waste injection program, and essentially stalled Osage attempts to gain treatment as a 
state status and primary control of oil waste injection on the reservation. The Osage 
Nation, and other tribes around the country, lobbied for repeal of the Midnight Rider, 
which as of 2010 had not occurred.   
The EPA did not support the efforts of Osages, and Indians leaders from around 
the United States, to overturn the Midnight Rider. The EPA sought ways to help the 
Osages, and other tribes of Oklahoma, broker deals with Oklahoma, as outlined in the 
Midnight Rider, to earn primacy and treatment as a state status, but did not defend the 
tribe as a sovereign entity. While the EPA must follow federal law, it also has the ability 
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to lobby for or against federal law. It saw its power to protect tribal land limited by the 
Midnight Rider, and it did not respond in protest.  
Overall, the federal government has never completely recognized the legal rights 
of the Isleta, Quapaw, and Osage peoples to control their land, but they did not stop 
pressing for their rights to self-rule. In spite of the statements by some EPA 
administrators that they recognize Indian sovereignty, their ability to do so was 
compromised by Congressional fiat and politics. The Isletas, Quapaws, and Osages 
insisted on self-determination, providing challenges to the BIA, Interior Department, and 
the EPA. Rather than a perceived loss of tribal authority, the Isletas’, Quapaws’, and 
Osages’ continued traditions of asserting control over their own people, lands, and 
destiny should rightfully be considered a hallmark of the Self-Determination Era of 
American Indian history. It would serve historians well to not define American Indian 
history by federal legislation, but by analyzing tribal histories through the eyes of the 
sovereign tribal nations.      
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Appendix A – EPA Organization 
 
Office of the Administrator. It oversees both the Regional and Headquarter Offices 
 
Regional Offices    
 
Region 1/ Boston, covers CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT  
 
Region II/ New York, covers NY, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands 
                
Region III/ Philadelphia, covers DE, DC, MD, PA, VA, WV 
 
Region IV/ Atlanta, covers AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN 
 
Region V/ Chicago, covers IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI 
 
Region VI/ Dallas, covers AR, LA, OK, TX, NM 
 
Region VII/ Kansas City, covers IA, KS, MO, NE 
               
Region VIII/ Denver, covers CO, MT, WY, SD, ND, UT 
 
Region IX/ San Francisco, covers AZ, CA, HI, NV, American Samoa,  
 
Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, 
 
Federated States of Micronesia, Guam,  
 
Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau 
 
Region X/ Seattle, covers WA, OR, ID, Alaska 
 
 
Headquarter Offices 
 
Office of Administration and Resource Management 
 
Office of Air and Radiation 
 
Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention 
 
Office of Chief Financial Officer 
 
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 
 
Office of Environmental Information 
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Office of General Counsel 
 
Office of Inspector General 
 
Office of International and Tribal Affairs 
 
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response 
 
Office of Water454 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
454 “EPA Organization Chart,” US EPA, accessed March 28, 2015, 
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-organization-chart. 
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Appendix B – EPA Enforcement 
 
Step 1: The environment problem is identified. 
 
Step 2: Congress creates laws to address problem. 
 
Step 3: The EPA issues regulations to implement laws. 
 
Step 4: The EPA provides compliance assistance to local government, tribes, college and 
universities and businesses. Often, the EPA identifies a state agency that can help the 
entity in question.  
 
Step 5: The EPA provides compliance monitoring, which includes both on-site 
monitoring through inspections and off-site monitoring through data analysis. 
 
Step 6: Enforcement actions are initiated when the regulated community does not comply 
with the required clean-up, which can include court procedures.455 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
455 “Enforcement Basic Information,” US EPA, accessed March 28, 2015, 
http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-basic-information. 
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Appendix C – Alphabetical List of Acronyms 
AMC – American Mining Congress 
 
BIA – United States Bureau of Indian Affairs  
 
BPA – Bonneville Power Administration 
 
CERCLA – Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
 
CERT – Council of Energy Resource Tribes 
 
CWA – Clean Water Act 
 
EIS – Environmental Impact Statement 
 
EPA – United States Environmental Protection Agency 
 
FDF – Fundamentally Different Factor  
 
IGRA – Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
 
INS – United States Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
IRA – Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
 
ITEC – Inter-Tribal Environmental Council of Oklahoma 
 
ITIOC – Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Company 
 
MSHR – Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 
 
NPDES – National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
 
NRD – Natural Resource Damage 
 
NTEC – National Tribal Environmental Council 
 
NTOC – National Tribal Operations Committee 
 
OCCA – Organized Crime Control Act 
 
ODEQ – Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality 
 
OKDOT – Oklahoma Department of Transportation 
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OU – Operable Unit 
 
OWRB – Oklahoma Water Resources Board 
 
RCRA – Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
 
RI/FS – Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study 
 
ROD – Record of Decision 
 
SAFETEA-LU – Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A  
Legacy for Users 
 
SDWA – Safe Drinking Water Act 
 
TAS – Treatment as a State 
 
VA – United States Veterans’ Administration 
 
